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What to expect from the ASEAN summit

From October 26 to 28, Kuala Lumpur will host the summit of Southeast Asian leaders. Several prominent figures from partner countries and major global powers will also attend — including Donald Trump. Here are the key points on the agenda.

By Tommaso Magrini

The upcoming ASEAN Summit, to be held from 26 to 28 October under Malaysia’s presidency in 2025, is shaping up to be one of the most significant events for the political, economic, and strategic future of Southeast Asia. It is not merely a meeting of heads of state but a moment when the ten member countries (with Timor-Leste awaiting full membership) will define the course toward the ambitious goal of “ASEAN 2045” — a vision of deeper, more sustainable, and more autonomous regional cooperation on the global stage.

According to the Malaysian government, the summit will conclude with the adoption of 84 outcome documents, a number that reflects the intention to translate discussions into concrete commitments. But beyond this impressive figure, what truly matters is whether these documents will mark real progress or remain, as often happens, a collection of well-meaning declarations lacking binding implementation mechanisms.

Malaysia has sought to give its presidency a distinctive mark by overcoming the traditional divide between economic and diplomatic policymaking. For the first time, foreign and economic ministers from member states will meet jointly to coordinate their agendas before presenting them to the heads of state. This is a significant step, as ASEAN has often struggled with coherence between its economic and political dimensions: while commercial integration has advanced, a common foreign policy has often been hampered by internal divisions and diverging national interests.

Another central topic will be the ecological transition. During the summit, a meeting of the so-called ASEAN Zero Emission Community will take place, involving external partners such as Australia and Japan. The goal is to promote joint projects to accelerate decarbonization in the region — a particularly tough challenge in an area where many countries still depend heavily on fossil fuels, and where economic growth often clashes with environmental objectives. It will be interesting to see whether the summit can move from principles to practice, introducing concrete initiatives with shared funding, technical cooperation plans, and a credible roadmap toward net-zero emissions.

On the economic front, Malaysia also aims to strengthen ASEAN’s trade relations with its main partners. Among the most anticipated topics are the update of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (version 3.0) and the expansion of cooperation with the United States. China remains ASEAN’s largest trading partner, but the growing strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington forces Southeast Asian nations to perform a delicate balancing act. The summit will thus serve as a test to see whether ASEAN can maintain what some call “active neutrality” — the ability to benefit from relations with both powers without taking sides.

Another key issue will be the integration of Timor-Leste, which has been granted observer status but has yet to become a full member. The final admission of this small state poses logistical, economic, and political challenges, as its level of development is far below the ASEAN average. Yet it also carries symbolic weight: it represents a further opening of the community and a reaffirmation of ASEAN’s principle of inclusivity. The summit could define a clear timeline and framework for Timor-Leste’s full membership, strengthening ASEAN’s identity as a region based on solidarity and cooperation.

Malaysia’s presidency has also announced that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) will be central to discussions. First signed in 1976, this document forms the legal foundation of relations among ASEAN member states and reaffirms the organization’s core principles: respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The renewed emphasis on these principles comes at a delicate time, marked by growing tensions in the South China Sea, where countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam are at odds with China over territorial claims. It is likely that ASEAN will once again seek to strike a balance — reaffirming international law while avoiding positions that could threaten internal unity or antagonize Beijing.

One element expected to draw global attention is the presence of foreign leaders, underscoring the summit’s growing geopolitical importance. Among the most anticipated guests is Donald Trump, who, having returned to the White House, appears determined to reassert the United States’ role in the Indo-Pacific. According to diplomatic sources, Trump is expected to attend the signing of a bilateral agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, aimed at definitively settling border disputes and boosting cross-border economic cooperation. His presence, alongside that of other leaders — including the prime ministers of Japan, India, and Australia — will give the summit an unprecedented international profile, highlighting Southeast Asia’s central role in the emerging global balance. The signing of the Thailand–Cambodia agreement, in particular, will serve as a test of ASEAN’s ability to act as both mediator and guarantor of regional stability.

The summit will therefore have a strong diplomatic dimension. All ASEAN leaders and their dialogue partners are expected to attend in Kuala Lumpur, Italian’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni included. Malaysia intends to use the opportunity to reaffirm ASEAN’s role as a global actor, not merely a regional platform. In an international context marked by strategic rivalries, wars, and trade tensions, Southeast Asia seeks to position itself as a zone of stability — capable of mediating and defending a multipolar order founded on dialogue.

However, expectations must be tempered by ASEAN’s structural limits. The organization operates on the principles of consensus and absolute respect for national sovereignty, meaning that every major decision requires unanimous approval. While this principle has prevented internal conflicts, it has often paralyzed collective action, making it difficult to adopt unified positions on sensitive issues. The risk, once again, is that the impressive number of adopted documents may result in a flood of solemn declarations with few concrete mechanisms, deadlines, or dedicated resources.

The real test of success will therefore be concreteness: how many of these 84 documents will include binding commitments, monitoring mechanisms, or detailed action plans? If Malaysia’s presidency manages to ensure even part of that, the summit could mark a turning point in regional governance. Otherwise, it risks becoming yet another diplomatic showcase.

Beyond the formal outcomes, observers will be watching closely to see whether ASEAN can strengthen its strategic autonomy. In an era when Southeast Asia lies at the heart of U.S.-China competition, member states are forced into a delicate balancing act between economic interests and geopolitical security. ASEAN’s ability to speak with a single voice will be crucial to preserving regional stability and preventing the bloc from splitting into opposing camps.

Ultimately, the 47th ASEAN Summit is expected to be more than a declaration of intent — it should be a test of political maturity. The region has grown economically; now it must prove that it can build a shared political identity. If the summit succeeds in giving new momentum to coordinated action on sustainability, trade, security, and governance, it could mark the beginning of a new phase for ASEAN, that could participate to shape the future world order.

Italy-ASEAN Association in hearing at the Italian Chamber of Deputies

On March 12, 2024, representatives of the Italy-ASEAN Association were heard at the Foreign Affairs Commission by the Standing Committee on Foreign Policy for the Indo-Pacific established at the Commission, as part of the fact-finding investigation on issues related to the projection of Italy and European countries in the Indo-Pacific. Ambassador Michelangelo Pipan, President of the Italy-ASEAN Association, and Romeo Orlandi, Vice President of the Italy-ASEAN Association, spoke. Translated with DeepL.com (free version)

You can see the full video on the Chamber of Deputies website..

More and more wealth in Singapore

 The number of family offices - companies that manage the lives and assets of the wealthiest clans - rose to 1,100 at the end of last year, from just 400 in 2020

Article by Tommaso Magrini

Singapore is getting richer. The assets managed by the city-state asset management industry have doubled in just six years, reaching about 4,000 billion dollars and about 80% of these assets are foreign. Blackrock Inc. is expanding into Singapore, as is the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan. Swiss banks are also expanding: UBS Group AG’s offices dominate an entire block in a prominent shopping district, with a staff of 3,000, a private gym and a cappuccino bar. The rapid rise of money management is the result of a very specific project. In 2020 the government introduced a new type of legal structure, called a variable capital company, which provides tax and legal incentives to hedge fund, venture capital and private equity companies that settle in Singapore, similar to offshore hub programs. Since last October, more than 600 companies have benefited from the new program. Some of the world’s largest money managers have settled in Singapore, including Marshall Wace, Citadel Enterprise Americas of Griffin and D.E. Shaw. Billionaire Cohen’s Point72 Asset Management has expanded its Singapore team by over 50%, reaching 100 people. Overall, hedge fund assets grew by 30% in 2021, reaching $191 billion. The number of family offices - companies that manage the lives and assets of the richest clans - rose to 1,100 at the end of last year, from just 400 in 2020. Among the incentives to have contributed are the 2019 tax changes and a program that provides a fast track to residence for the ultra wealthy. Singapore is also benefiting from the willingness of several companies seeking diversification in the region or a basis for wider Asian operations beyond mainland China and Hong Kong.

Laos and China: closer than ever before

While Laos smiles at Beijing's investments in the country, Vientiane must pay attention to its debts.

Sixty years have passed since the beginning of diplomatic relations between Laos and China and the two countries are increasingly closer: Beijing is currently the most important foreign investor for Laos with almost eight hundred projects underway including highways, infrastructure and high- speed railways to be completed to improve the connectivity of the Southeast Asia State. The growth of Chinese investments in the country has been dizzying. While in 2003 they corresponded to less than 2%, in 2018 these had grown to 79% of total foreign direct investments in Laos.

Trade between the two countries has also seen a sharp increase in recent years: in 2019, compared to the previous year, trade between Beijing and Vientiane increased by 17%. A fundamental role in increasing economic relations between China and Laos is played by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) program. Laos plays a strategic role for China to allow direct and faster access to the countries of Southeast Asia, primarily to convey its products to Thailand. For these reasons, Beijing is investing in the construction of high-speed railways to allow greater and faster connectivity between the province of Yunnan and Vientiane.

At the moment, three projects regarding the construction of high-speed railways are particularly important for Laos: the Boten - Bokeo section of about 180 kilometres, the Vientiane - Pakse section and the railway that will connect Boten and Vientiane, the most ambitious and expensive project, part of BRI plan. While the Vientiane - Pakse railway will allow greater connectivity with the south of the country, allowing people to reach Pakse in seven hours compared to the ten hours it currently takes, the Boten - Bokeo project would allow Beijing to have rapid access to the north border of Thailand, in order to transport Chinese products to Bangkok more quickly. Finally, the rail section between Boten and Vientiane is almost ready, which cost six billion dollars and is the most expensive project ever built in Laos. The high-speed railway will be over 400 kilometres long, joining another railway segment already present in China and connecting the Laotian capital with Kunming, the capital of the Yunnan province. This project will not only allow a faster passage of products destined for the Laotian market but will also increase the number of Chinese tourists coming to Laos, as had already happened in the past when Boten was known as the "Golden City" due to the presence of numerous casinos that attracted Chinese and Thai tourists.

Beijing's interest in investments in Laos has meant that today the relationship between the two countries is rosier not just from a commercial but also from a political point of view. Vientiane is increasingly linked to Beijing, so much so that it recognizes and supports its political choices (it is no coincidence that last year, at the United Nations Assembly, Laos supported the national security law implemented by Beijing in Hong Kong). A further sign of closeness between Vientiane and Beijing came this spring, with the election of Khemmani Pholsena - the former Minister of Commerce of Laos and childhood friend of the leader Xi Jinping - to the role of advisor to President Thongloun Sisoulith. However, what seems to be a consolidated relationship aimed at increasing the economy of one of the poorest countries in the world (with the pandemic crisis, among other things, the country's unemployment rate has reached 25%) could hide a pitfall: the so-called debt trap. Laos' debts towards China correspond to over 400 million dollars, while the total amount of the country's debts corresponds to over 60% of GDP: if Vientiane finds itself insolvency, it could become a pawn for Beijing which it would have the right to redeem itself on the small state by obtaining control of some infrastructures in the country, as already risks happening elsewhere.

Il Vice Presidente dell’Associazione Italia-Asean, il Prof. Romeo Orlandi sottolinea quali siano le possibilità di investimento per le imprese italiane in Indonesia

Roma, 28 gennaio 2016. Il Prof. Romeo Orlandi, Vice Presidente dell’Associazione Italia-Asean è intervenuto all’evento organizzato dall’Ambasciata di Indonesia in Italia sulle relazioni bilaterali tra i due Paesi. In quest’occasione, il Vice Presidente Orlandi ha presentato un’analisi delle relazioni economiche tra Italia e Indonesia, soprattutto per il flussi commerciali e di business. L’evento è stato concluso da S.E. August Parengkuan, Ambasciatore d’Indonesia in Italia.

Il Vice Presidente dell’Associazione Italia-Asean, il Prof. Romeo Orlandi sottolinea quali siano le possibilità di investimento per le imprese italiane in Indonesia
Il Vice Presidente dell’Associazione Italia-Asean, il Prof. Romeo Orlandi sottolinea quali siano le possibilità di investimento per le imprese italiane in Indonesia