Trump’s threatened tariffs risk seriously damaging several Southeast Asian economies—but tariffs aren’t the only source of friction between ASEAN countries and the United States. The new American administration seems unclear on how to engage with the region, while its unpredictability is prompting ASEAN states to accelerate efforts to diversify their economic and diplomatic partnerships.
By Francesco Mattogno
When Senator Tammy Duckworth asked Pete Hegseth to name at least one member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during his confirmation hearing as U.S. Secretary of Defense, he was left speechless. It was January 14, just days after Donald Trump returned to the presidency. Asked how many ASEAN countries there were, Hegseth awkwardly started naming Japan, South Korea, and Australia—none of which are members.
In truth, the current U.S. Secretary of Defense not only had no ideas or proposals for how to pursue America’s strategy in what Washington calls the “Indo-Pacific,” he didn’t even know what the Indo-Pacific was.
Six months later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio flew to Kuala Lumpur on his first official trip to Asia as head of U.S. foreign policy. In Malaysia—at the heart of Southeast Asia—Rubio declared that “the Indo-Pacific remains a focal point of U.S. foreign policy,” and that Washington wouldn’t be distracted by events elsewhere in the world, because “the history of the next 50 years will largely be written in this region.”
Rubio was attending a series of meetings traditionally held alongside the ASEAN foreign ministers' summit. Beyond the nice words about the U.S.-ASEAN partnership—described as “not only resilient but crucial”—the trip was brief and had one clear goal: to sugarcoat Trump’s threatened tariffs, which are targeting Southeast Asian states more than almost any other part of the world.
Tariffs, Negotiations, Deals
In the days leading up to the ASEAN Ministerial (July 8–11), President Trump updated the import tariffs announced against various Southeast Asian countries, delaying their implementation from July 9 to August 1. Through a series of nearly identical letters, Trump reiterated the threats made on “Liberation Day” (April 2), with some modifications.
Some tariffs were lowered—for example, Cambodia saw its rate drop from 49% to 36%, while Laos and Myanmar each had theirs adjusted to 40% from 48% and 44% respectively. Notable exceptions included the Philippines (from 17% to 20%) and Malaysia (from 24% to 25%). As with the economically questionable logic of Liberation Day, the rationale behind these updates remains unclear—even to those directly affected.
What is certain is that for months, bilateral negotiations have been ongoing between ASEAN states and the White House to reduce tariff levels and limit economic damage. One example is the preliminary deal reportedly signed with Vietnam: according to early July announcements, Hanoi may have secured a 20% tariff rate—down from 46%. However, some details remain unclear, as reported by Politico.
If confirmed, the agreement would see Vietnam fully open its market to U.S. products—removing import tariffs—and commit to purchasing American goods including agricultural products, fuel, Boeing aircraft, and weapons. Most regional countries are pursuing similar arrangements, offering significant concessions to curry favor with the White House. Thailand, amid an internal political crisis, is doing everything it can to reach a deal. Indonesia, after two years with no ambassador in Washington, has just appointed one—and succeeded in cutting its tariffs from 32% to 19%.
A particularly noteworthy part of the U.S.-Vietnam deal concerns so-called “transshipped goods”, which will face a 40% tariff. This term appears to refer to products made in third countries but routed through Vietnam before final export to the U.S.—a clear nod to China, which is often accused of using Southeast Asian nations to circumvent direct U.S. tariffs.
This clause has become central to all negotiations between the White House and ASEAN nations—and also raises concerns due to its vagueness. Some worry that it could include goods assembled in ASEAN countries using Chinese components or technology, which would threaten to cripple half the region’s industries. There are also geopolitical consequences: China has already expressed displeasure over the Vietnam clause.
Non-Alignment and Diversification
Countering Chinese influence in Southeast Asia is a stated goal of the Trump administration—much like past U.S. governments. What has changed is the tone and method. Threatening to hurt regional economies to force concessions risks backfiring for Washington—especially if even its “friends” aren’t spared.
Singapore was irritated by the Liberation Day tariffs, while the Philippines was stunned by Trump's decision to raise duties despite being one of Washington’s closest allies since President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office in 2022. As in Japan and South Korea, the sense in Asia is that Trump’s U.S. is becoming an unreliable partner.
During his opening speech at the July ASEAN Ministerial, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim denounced tariffs as a “geopolitical tool.” Malaysia is perhaps the country most openly resisting American pressure. Its Trade Minister Tengku Zafrul Aziz stated that if any deal violated national interests, “no agreement will be signed.”
Tensions with Washington go beyond trade. Malaysia and Indonesia—two large Muslim-majority ASEAN countries—have repeatedly criticized U.S. and Western support for Israel’s actions in Gaza. Anti-Western sentiment is growing, and U.S. popularity is declining across Southeast Asia, also due to Trump’s drastic aid cuts, including the closure of USAID, which has severely affected humanitarian programs.
Sticking to their traditional “friends with all, enemies with none” diplomacy—and driven by U.S. unreliability—ASEAN countries are rapidly diversifying diplomatic and economic ties. Most never cut relations with Russia, even after the invasion of Ukraine. Disputes in the South China Sea haven't blocked deeper cooperation with China either—ASEAN signed a regional free trade agreement with Beijing in May.
Now Trump is threatening an additional 10% tariff on BRICS members, claiming to punish “anti-American policies.” This again hits Southeast Asia: Indonesia has formally joined BRICS, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are now BRICS partners.
Ironically, after years of isolation, Trump also sent his standard formal letter—addressed to “His Excellency”—to General Min Aung Hlaing, head of the military junta in Myanmar. This represents the first symbolic recognition of a regime that, since the coup of February 1, 2021, has sparked a civil war with tens of thousands of civilian deaths and millions displaced.
When it comes to Southeast Asia, members of Trump’s administration may need to study the subject more carefully. The region is economically vital, politically complex, and increasingly wary of erratic partners. Without a coherent and respectful approach, the U.S. risks not only economic backlash but also strategic marginalization in a region where trust—and power—are rapidly shifting.
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