Asean

Redazione published in Asean, Politics and strategy

Summit in Phnom Penh opens Southeast month

The annual ASEAN summit is being held in Cambodia until 13 November. It is the first of three major events in November, together with APEC and G20, which will see the area at the centre of the international political scene. Between divisions and major issues, here is the agenda of the regional bloc's summit

Article by Francesco Mattogno

A month at the centre of world diplomacy. Home to three major international events, for much of November South-East Asia is a compulsory stop on the agendas of the leaders of the major powers. The first event is the 40th and 41st annual summits of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) taking place in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, until 13 November. The term 'summit' is reductive. It is six days of non-stop bilateral and multilateral meetings, from the Business and Investment Summit (ABIS) to the 25th ASEAN-China Summit and 10th ASEAN-US Summit. Many guests have also chosen to join the heads of state or government of the Association's member countries, including senior international officials such as UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and European Council President Charles Michel.

As for the ASEAN countries, Min Aung Hlaing is not present. This is the second year in a row that the general and coup prime minister of Myanmar has not been invited to the summit, a consequence of the civil war unleashed following the military coup on 1 February 2021. As for China, no trip to Cambodia for Xi Jinping: in his place Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Li arrived early to meet both Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni and Prime Minister Hun Sen. Joe Biden is instead expected to attend the meetings on 12 and 13 November. This is the first trip to Cambodia by a US President since 2012, when Barack Obama visited the country at the very last ASEAN summit chaired by Hun Sen before that.  

The non-decisions on Myanmar have highlighted gaps in the ASEAN decision-making process and reignited the debate on overcoming the 'consensus principle', whereby every member state must agree at the time of a resolution. All material for the Phnom Penh summit, where issues such as the environment, energy and post-covid recovery will probably only frame questions on politics and security. So much so that Hun Sen himself had tried, unsuccessfully, to make the summit the venue for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. 

And politics is always at the heart of the American and Chinese presence at the summit. China winked at ASEAN by concluding a series of agreements with Vietnam and Singapore just a few days before the summit (the Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first to meet Xi Jinping after the 20th Congress). On 26 October, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also received ASEAN diplomats in Beijing, saying he hoped the Association would remain 'independent' in the future.

In turn, Biden had invited the bloc's leaders to Washington last May, ushering in a 'new era' of US-ASEAN relations. For this reason, the US President could focus on emphasising the benefits of cooperation in the fields of economic, digital, and environmental development, trying to show himself as an alternative to the People's Republic. Indeed, the US and ASEAN could establish a Global Strategic Partnership, the same one signed at last year's summit between the Association and its main trading partner: China. It is somewhat the state of normality in South-East Asia, pulled to either side. The region's aim is to remain in balance between the great powers, just as they are all knocking at its door.

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Redazione published in Asean, Politics and strategy

What to expect from the G20 summit in Bali

The declared goal of the Indonesian presidency was to bring attention back to emerging and developing countries, but unfortunately geopolitics and the war in Ukraine got in the way

By Ilaria Zolia

Indonesia is finalising preparations to host the 15-16 November G20 summit in Bali. Joko Widodo, Indonesian President and G20 President-in-Office, visited Kiev and Moscow in late June to meet with Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, becoming the first Asian leader to meet with both heads of state since the start of the war. Widodo's visit, stressed Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, 'underlines the concern for humanitarian issues, in an effort to help solve the food crisis caused by the war, as well as its consequences'. In various forums on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Marsudi repeated the same mantra: 'As a host nation, Indonesia is intent on advancing multilateralism and promoting post-pandemic economic growth'.

At the dawn of his G20 chairmanship and picking up the baton from Italy, Widodo had said that Indonesia hoped to provide a platform for global partnerships and international financing to support the energy transition to cleaner renewable sources during his presidency. Jakarta is well aware of the difficulties emerging economies face when faced with the transformation that the energy transition requires. What is considered one of the main solutions on the table is, for developing countries, a challenge that requires first and foremost universal access to quality electricity. Indonesia alone has sovereignty over 17,500 islands and a sinking capital city, while economic policy is deeply rooted around fossil fuels. The projects are many and ambitious, such as a solar park in Java that will be completed by the end of 2022 and will be, with its 145 Megawatts, the largest in the country. 

The declared aim of the Indonesian presidency was to bring attention back to emerging and developing countries, but unfortunately geopolitics and war got in the way. Much of the discussion in the months leading up to the summit focused on the presence of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Joe Biden and possible bilateral meetings between the three leaders of Russia, China and the United States. In his remarks at the Global Governance Group Forum held in New York, Marsudi emphasised the need for the G20 summit to produce results that benefit everyone, without being overburdened by current geopolitical issues. Former Indonesian leader Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono invited US President Joe Biden to meet with Russian and Chinese counterparts Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Bali next month to avert the 'real possibility of a third world war'. It would be Biden's first meeting with both leaders from Moscow and Beijing since the start of the war in Ukraine. "Europe and East Asia could breathe a sigh of relief" if the Bali summit is a success, says Yudhoyono.

Against this backdrop of tensions, the Indonesian G20 presidency has long been walking a tightrope to defend its neutral stance on the war in Ukraine. Rivalries between the West and the Kremlin will pose a challenge for the summit host country, which has never openly taken sides by maintaining the ASEAN 'third way' line based on neutrality and pacifism. Despite the pressure, Indonesia has so far 'successfully handled the pressure', according to Ina Hagniningtyas Krisnamurthi, Indonesian Ambassador to India. "We hope to have a joint communiqué... and we hope to be a good host for all those who come to Bali," she told the Indian newspaper The Economic Times.

For Jakarta, the G20 is still a forum with economic development at its core to boost cooperation between emerging economies and global powers. According to Teuku Rezasyah, an expert on international relations at Padjadjaran University in West Java, the summit is likely to end without a joint communiqué due to the heated tensions between the members, which would be the same outcome as the preparatory meeting for the Foreign Ministers' Summit held on 7-8 July in Bali. "If there is no joint communiqué, there should be a statement by the President outlining the issues contested by the G20 members, so that we can see which members violate the G20 principles and which support them," he added. Indeed, at the meeting the Foreign Ministers of the participating G20 countries failed to find common ground on the war in Ukraine and its global impact. Also present at the meeting was Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov, who left the ministerial session while his German counterpart Annalena Baerbock was criticising Moscow for the war in Ukraine. Widodo has always stressed the importance of the participation of all leaders. In an interview with Bloomberg on 19 August, he said: 'We are going through a food crisis and an energy crisis. Indonesia wants to be friends with all countries, we have no problems with anyone. What we want is for this region to be stable, peaceful, so that we can build economic growth. And I think not only Indonesia, but also Asian countries want the same thing,' he concluded. During its chairmanship of the G20, Indonesia has developed an agenda that reflects the interests of developing countries in global health architecture, digital economy transformation and energy transition. Jakarta hopes that somehow its agenda will not be erased from geopolitics altogether.

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Lorenzo published in Asean, Politics and strategy

How to further improve ASEAN

The Southeast Asian bloc already has many strengths, but also the potential to further strengthen its functioning and role

Editorial by Lorenzo Lamperti

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations plays a key role regionally and globally. But there is still room for improvement to make ASEAN increasingly integrated and effective at all levels. How? By succeeding in integrating and involving in decision-making and organizational processes the various collateral bodies that can help bring strategic and intellectual guidance to the bloc's actions. A positive case in point is the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a regional organization created in 1993. It is an informal mechanism that includes the strategic study centers of ASEAN member states and the 17 non-ASEAN states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), thus allowing intellectuals, scholars and policymakers to exchange information and views on the future of the region. In an editorial published in recent days, The Diplomat lines up a number of examples where more can be done instead and are worth mentioning. According to the author, Teh Pi Li, there is little coordination among national think tanks, ministries, and ASEAN institutions, with most research institutes dealing mostly with national security issues and regional social or cultural questions not being a priority. "In a broader sense, ASEAN has not clarified how scholars or stakeholders can be involved in the ASEAN-led mechanisms mentioned in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), through which ASEAN hopes to engage stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions," reads The Diplomat, which states that "there is a lack of formal mechanisms through which stakeholders can exchange ideas and information." The economic front is then mentioned, with linkages between the various ASEAN trade councils and those of the bloc's external partners in need of great strengthening. ASEAN sees itself as a "community," and it already is in so many ways. But to navigate the turbulent waters of the present, there is perhaps a need to further strengthen a ship that is already steadfast but can become even more secure as it proceeds into the future.

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Valerio Bordonaro published in Asean, Politics and strategy

The future of the ASEAN Way

A debate has arisen within the bloc of South East Asian countries on the Association's decision-making mechanisms

Editorial by Valerio Bordonaro

Director Associazione Italia-ASEAN

That of consensus "is the fundamental principle of ASEAN for mutually beneficial cooperation and to ensure the continuity of the Association in fully integrating the bloc, so as to realise the building of the ASEAN community". It is the so-called 'ASEAN way' characterised by neutrality and pacifism that we have talked about several times. And which Cambodian Chun Sovannarith also talks about. That is the key, in his view, to the 'extraordinary success' of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in making the region 'stable, peaceful, inclusive, sustainable, resilient and prosperous for over five decades'. For 55 years, ASEAN has been making its decisions based on the consensus model, which is cited six times in the 55 articles of the association's Charter. Through this shared decision-making process, an alternative to the majority principle, a mechanism of integration and continuous consultation between all member states has thus been produced. Lately, however, an idea has been circulating that, if applied, could make some changes to this historic unity of purpose. On the model of the 'ASEAN Minus X' (a formula that allowed some states of the group not to implement tariff and trade policies adopted in common), there are those who imagine the creation of a 'majority with super-vote' model aimed at improving the institutional effectiveness of the association in cases where consensus is not reached on regional or international issues of common interest. A position on which it may be worth opening a debate, but according to Chun Sovannarith, 'one must ask whether or not any new model would fit the current context, considering that the consensus principle already works effectively for ASEAN's unity in diversity, under the motto of one vision, one identity and one community'. In this sense, it can also be said that this idea 'may not be consistent with the very nature of ASEAN', he adds, expressing a position that matches that of the Cambodian government. Based on the articles of the association's Charter, Chun continues, 'the legal personality of ASEAN must take precedence over political decision-making by far, as the leaders' decision-making is legally bound by the principle of consensus'. Opinions aside, it should be considered that to change the decision-making model and amend the Charter would require the consensus of all ASEAN states.

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Agnese Ranaldi published in Asean, Politics and strategy

ASEAN pragmatism on Russia

South-East Asian nations condemn the Russian offensive in Ukraine but cannot afford sanctions that affect their economies

South-East Asia holds on to its commercial relations with Moscow, while the West and its Asian partners continue to impose sanctions and condemn Russia for its offensive in Ukraine. Geopolitical tremors triggered by the invasion spread internationally. However, if among the ranks of Moscow's detractors it is China that is described (wrongly) as the only 'defector', the South-East Asian countries have opted for a 'third way' of their own. On the one hand, they have joined the chorus of condemnation at the multilateral level; on the other, Singapore is the only representative of the region to have imposed sanctions on Moscow. Countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Indonesia, prefer to remain cautious so as not to jeopardise the resilience of their economies, while Myanmar’s militarist junta refuse to give up Russian arms flowing into the country.

The post-pandemic economic crisis has forced some ASEAN member states to take stock of their resources before adopting an untenable diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Russia. Indeed, most South-East Asian nations consider the war in Ukraine a regional crisis that does not involve them. Moreover, ASEAN's paradigm of values hinges on the principle of neutrality, borrowed from the colonial experience to which these territories were subjected for decades. For this reason, Southeast Asia is reluctant to close trade and political relations with the Russian Federation and condemn it to political and economic isolation.

Thailand has declared that it will restore regular air service between Moscow and Phuket at the end of October, a move to reinvigorate the tourism sector hit by the pandemic. Between January and February, before the invasion, Russians accounted for the majority of tourists travelling to Thailand. But the popular Moscow-Phuket service was suspended just after the outbreak of the conflict. Since Beijing's 'zero-Covid' policy is restraining Chinese tourists from organising trips to Southeast Asia - and flights from China used to be an important income for Bangkok - Thailand will focus on attracting at least one million Russian tourists this year. In addition, Moscow and Bangkok aim to expand bilateral trade to reach a trade volume of $10 billion in 2023 (about four times that of 2021), as Thai Trade Minister Jurin Laksanawisit said on the sidelines of APEC meetings in May.

Vietnam, on the other hand, focuses on food supply. On 18 August, talks were held to expand trade in wheat, the flow of which from Russia in 2021 had already fallen below 190,000 tonnes - from around 2.6 million in 2018 - due to the presence of potentially invasive thistle seeds. Then, on 6 September, a new connection between sea and rail freight routes between Russia and Vietnam was launched, which will facilitate logistical interactions and enable the direct transfer of goods. Financial cooperation is also a crucial issue for Russia and ASEAN countries, which have discussed the possibility of switching to payments in national currencies, in particular with the Vietnamese dong and Indonesian rupiah. The possibility of finding alternative payment systems to the traditional ones, such as the Russian MIR circuit, would also be on the table.

Moscow is also the leading arms supplier in South-East Asia. President Vladimir Putin has always recognised the region's great political and commercial potential, and has opted to use defence diplomacy to strengthen cooperation with the region's players. One of the main destinations for Russian military equipment and armaments is Myanmar. In a meeting on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok in early September, the leader of Burma's coup military junta Min Aung Hlaing addressed President Putin with these words: 'We should call you not only leader of Russia, but also leader of the world, because you control and organise the stability of the whole world'. As Channel News Asia suggested, Min Aung Hlaing's comment comes at a time when both governments find themselves diplomatically isolated: Moscow over its military intervention in Ukraine, Naypyidaw over a military coup last year. In the ASEAN-Russia relationship, the complexity of international relations in the age of the globalised economy becomes clear. Most of ASEAN's trade with Russia involves Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam. The growth of high value-added products sold by ASEAN is also increasing, partly due to the vacuum left by European suppliers who have left the Russian market. These economic performances seem to contradict the international community's almost unanimous condemnation of the offensive in Ukraine. At the multilateral level, ASEAN countries joined the UN's calls for peace. But when the General Assembly voted to suspend the Russian Federation from membership of the UN Human Rights Council in April, many Southeast Asian countries abstained. These included Singapore, as well as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia, while Vietnam and Laos voted against. This progressive softening towards Moscow is justified by assessments of economic and political pragmatism. The different postures adopted in the multilateral sphere on the one hand, however, confirm the regional actors' adherence to the rules of international law. On the other, they manifest a refusal to isolate Russia, with a message that implies that the multilateral system is moving - despite the crises or precisely because of them - towards greater inclusiveness.

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Sabrina Moles published in Asean, Politics and strategy

Asian monarchies: the role of royal families in ASEAN countries

Some ASEAN countries still host some of the richest royal families in the world. How do the monarchs of Southeast Asia live today and what role do they play?

Elizabeth II is dead, Rama IX is dead...and I don't feel so well myself. Monarchs in ASEAN countries continue to influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the political, social, and economic dynamics of their countries. With the only exception of Brunei, where a regime of almost absolute monarchy remains, the other states of the region have long begun a process of governance redefinition facing an increasingly modern world.

Many prerogatives of power and representation are still part of for royal families’ duties. They also remain influential figures due to their enormous wealth. Nonetheless, Asian dynasties are part of the national identity and reflect some distinctive features of their homeland, such as religion or ethnic majorities’ traditions. Public opinion on their behavior is equally varied: in some countries, monarchs are put in a bad light by corruption and fancy habits, while in others they are the most appreciated public figures since they promote social development and social rights.

Thailand

The 2014 coup was not the only event that upset Thailand’s public order in recent years. In 2016, the death of King Rama IX (Bhumibol Adulyadej) after 70 years of regency became the subject of one of the most spectacular national mourning in the world. Over 250,000 people flocked to the capital to celebrate the monarch's funeral, who was cremated in a building specially built for the occasion. A whole year of national mourning followed, which included (for the first 30 days) a ban on organizing parties or playing music.

The Chakri dynasty ascended to the throne in 1782 and experienced years of prosperity and expansion of its influence in the region. In the 19th century, King Rama IV also managed to negotiate agreements with the United Kingdom that allowed the country to maintain a certain independence (unlike the other kingdoms and sultanates in the region) and start the construction of a modern state. The accession of King Rama IX to the throne in 1946 plays a pivotal role in Thai history: he attempted to hold the country together in the face of numerous coups and promoted social development through educational programs and financial support. On the contrary his successor, Maha Vajiralongkorn (Rama X), has been largely criticized. As Forbes estimated in 2011, the Thai royal house is the richest in the world, with an estimated assets of at least $ 30 billion. Thailand has one of the strictest Lese Majesty laws, which in recent years has often been used to thwart anti-government protests that have sometimes resulted in anti-monarchist positions.

Cambodia

Cambodia also introduced a lese majesty law in 2018. Starting in 1993 the King of Cambodia is elected by the Royal Council of the Throne, a group of nine Cambodian authorities that includes the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate. The criterion for accessing the selection? Be at least thirty years old and descend from the family of King Ang Duong (1796-1860), who today is divided into the houses of Norodom and Sisowath.

King Norodom Sihamoni continues to have some decision-making power in the choice of some government positions, including the prime minister. Sihamoni enjoys a certain respect even abroad, unlike the rest of the royal family, which in 2006 US officials in the country had defined "a tragedy, comedy and melodrama all rolled into one that could have provided grist for at least a half dozen Shakespeare plays” (comment exposed by Wikileaks).

Malaysia

Cambodia is not the only country to have adopted a constitutional monarchy that differs from the hereditary standard of a single dynasty. Malaysia also adopts a governance system that provides for the election of a monarch every five years, according to a shift among the sultans of nine of the thirteen states into which the country is divided. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong ("He who is made Lord") plays above all a representative role of the Malay and Muslim community. In fact, starting from the 1990s, the sultans gradually lost their powers, until the elimination of the same political immunity.

Yang di-Pertuan Agong can choose the prime minister but cannot dismiss him. He plays a representative role in diplomatic missions and is considered the symbolic leader of the armed forces. The sultans, who also play the role of "Guardians of Islam", have often exposed themselves to the issues of corruption in the ruling class and Islamic extremism (whose values ​​are often intertwined with Malaysian supremacism). In recent years, for example, they have opposed the implementation of the Hudud, a subset of Sharia law (the body of precepts derived from the Qumran and which some Islamic countries integrate into their own system of laws).

Indonesia

Even more marginal is the role of Indonesian royal families, who do not officially hold power but maintain a status of representation. The identity connotation, in this case, is still strong: in some areas of the country, such as Java, Bali and Borneo. An example of this is the survival of the Javanese Halus ("refined") culture that revolves all around the ceremonials of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. King Hamengkubuwono X is the only sultan recognized by the government and has risen to the headlines for removing the compulsory male ancestry to the throne. A decree of 2015, in fact, made the title of sultan neutral, thus opening the royal career to his five daughters. He also put an end to the traditional polygamy of the Sultans of Java, always with a view to modernizing the sultanate and to give more rights to women.

Brunei

The influence of the Sultan of Brunei, the only monarch who still holds absolute power in Southeast Asia, is quite different. And it is not the only record: the Guinness Book of Records classifies Istana Nurul Iman ("Palace of the light of faith") as the largest royal residence in the world. The building occupies over 200,000 square meters with its 1788 rooms, 257 bathrooms, a banquet hall that can accommodate up to 5,000 people and an air-conditioned stable that houses 200 polo ponies. Hassanal Bolkiah, in addition to being one of the richest rulers in the world, has also become the longest-serving monarch after the death of Elizabeth II and has reigned continuously since 1967.

The Legislative Council of Brunei was established with the 1959 Constitution but, in fact, its members only have advisory powers. In fact, on the occasion of the revolts of 1962, the king obtained full powers by declaring a state of emergency, which is still in force today. Unlike Malaysia, Sharia laws are part of the regulatory body of Brunei along with some laws inherited from the colonial period.

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Alessio published in Asean, Economy and trade

ASEAN global home of resilience

South-East Asia continues to show positive signs on supply chains but also on the strength of its stock market

Editorial by Alessio Piazza

Warning to mariners: supply chains are not yet broken, at least not in Asia and particularly in South-East Asia. In a world where geopolitical and military tensions are multiplying, trade between major Asian nations is booming and companies continue to pursue growth. It is certainly no coincidence that while the winds of protectionism are blowing elsewhere, ASEAN countries have just ratified the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and are at the centre of multiple regional initiatives. According to the International Monetary Fund, ASEAN countries will grow faster than China in the near future. The middle classes in these countries are at the centre of very strong growth, making them potential markets, not just centres of production. The region's population is larger than that of the United States and the European Union, is younger and offers inexpensive labour, coupled with evolving skills. This is demonstrated by the shift in increasingly sophisticated manufacturing segments such as the Apple Watch. The technology sector is poised for a boom. Recent reports identify the electronics, aerospace components and semiconductor sectors as potentially the most promising. But ASEAN countries are also showing signs of resilience in the stock market. Largely due to a sharp increase in consumption driven by tourism and related industries, Southeast Asian stocks are proving more robust than those in North Asia. The region, however, is not immune to global inflationary pressure and the US Federal Reserve's aggressive rate hikes, which have led to capital flight. According to analysts, however, the region will endure thanks to its large domestic markets and further diversification of the supply chain from China. At the end of September, the MSCI ASEAN Index - an indicator of the region's most closely watched equities - was up 1.4 per cent from the previous quarter in local currency terms. Inflationary pressure in South East Asia was less acute than in many other markets. This is a further sign of a region that is set to play an increasingly central role in terms of trade.

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Redazione published in Asean, Global Lens

The Third Asian Defense Way

Acronyms for policies in the Indo-Pacific are multiplying. But as China and the United States seek to consolidate their influence in Asia, countries on the continent try to shield themselves from the consequences of this antagonism by setting up bilateral agreements that help maintain a certain degree of interoperability without being forced to openly take the side of one or the other power

Article by Lucrezia Goldin

Either with me, or against me. Unless we find a third way to consolidate defense. In the increasingly polarized competition between China and the United States, bilateral security relations are growing between several Asian countries, which, with an approach made up of individual military cooperation agreements, are trying to free themselves from the magnetism of Washington and Beijing, exploiting regional interoperability as the key to independence from the two powers. An approach that, operating without clamor and without obvious anti-China or anti-US aims (as some multilateral initiatives such as Quad and Aukus on the Chinese side and the Global Security Initiative on the US side are perceived to be), takes the form of an alternative architecture that allows Asian countries to equip themselves with deterrence tools without the risk of annoying the two powers.

From Japan to South Korea, via Singapore and the Philippines, bilateral exchanges on security technology and defense equipment show an Asia that would rather not get caught in the crossfire of high-sounding acronyms between China and the United States. A move to the rear made up of apparently second-rate but strategic agreements, especially if conceived as an instrument of long-term independence from the viewpoint of the large antagonistic blocs.  

The undisputed leader of this trend is Japan. For several years, Tokyo has been trying to revive its defense industry, and to do so, it is intensifying its relations with several South-East Asian countries. As early as 2016, Japan and the Philippines signed a defense agreement, whereby Tokyo pledged to supply security equipment and technology to Manila. Under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte then, an update to the same agreement in the summer of 2020 led to the sale of radar control systems from Mitsubishi Electric to the Philippine government, marking the first sale of fully Japanese-made defense technology to a Southeast Asian country. With Malaysia, on the other hand, there is the Japan-Malaysia Defence Pact of 2018, while on relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga's focus has led to the signing of two agreements for the transfer of defense equipment and technology (in March and September 2021 respectively). Even trying not to draw too much international political attention with these agreements, Tokyo's stated aim is to promote its vision of a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. This vision was also confirmed by Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo last September during a visit to Hanoi, in which he spoke of cooperation with Vietnam as being aimed at 'contributing to peace and stability in the region and the international community as a whole'.

On this front, the new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is also wasting no time. Last May, the Japanese Prime Minister and his Thai counterpart Prayut Chan-o-cha signed an agreement for the transfer of military equipment to Thailand, which was shortly followed by the Japanese government's announcement that it would reform its regulations on the export of military equipment so as to allow the export of missiles and fighter jets to 12 countries including India, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Australia from 2023. Also with Singapore, as announced during a meeting on the sidelines of the Asian security summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, negotiations will soon begin to reach an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, which also includes the areas of cyber security and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRNE) explosive weapons. An enhanced Defense Exchange Memorandum, signed by the respective Defense Ministers Kishi Nobuo and Ng Eng Hene, complements the one signed between the two countries in 2009. The aim: to move towards 'more concrete security cooperation'. Less talk, more agreements. Without China and the USA in the way.

Active participation also on the part of India, which with the India Act East Policy created platforms for dialogue and joint maritime exercises with Singapore and Thailand, the SIMBEX and SITMEX, with the aim of maintaining regional security. To the Philippines, New Delhi provided its Brahmos missile systems and arranged for the movement of several ships of India's Eastern Command to facilitate bilateral exercises with the Philippine Navy. Dialogue with Vietnam has also been productive and free of US or Chinese interference. In 2016, a $500 million line of credit was established between Hanoi and New Delhi for the purchase of new defense platforms, and today most Vietnamese pilots are trained at Indian training bases in exchange for access to naval and air bases in Cham Ranh Bay. Finally, with Thailand, India shares maritime objectives related to issues such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking, smuggling, and piracy, confirming an interoperability that remains strong between the two countries both because of their historical and cultural backgrounds and because of their common interests related to the maritime border in the Andaman Sea, a key access point for trade in the Strait of Malacca.

South Korea has also given signs that it wants to join this 'behind-the-scenes' strategy. The Moon Jae-in administration had started to intensify relations with India and ASEAN countries through the New Southern Policy of 2017, but failed to materialize many agreements and cooperation independent of existing security platforms. The case of the Indonesian non-participation in the realization of the new Kf-X/IF-X fighters is an example of this. After a defense agreement between South Korea and Indonesia concluded in 2013, the two countries "encountered several complications" in the joint realization of new equipment, but to date they maintain good relations and at the presentation of the new 2021 Korean KF-X fighters, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto had also been invited. Also as part of the Shangri-La Dialogue sideline meetings, on the other hand, Singapore and South Korea updated their Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation, adding cybersecurity and maritime cooperation as collaboration priorities.

Asia is also moving without China and the United States, aware that excessive dependence on either side in security matters can prove counterproductive. For existing disputes with Beijing on the one hand, for the recent unpredictability shown by Washington from Donald Trump onwards on the other. Small agreements in times of big multilateral pacts thus mark a third way to try to maintain regional stability without being mere pawns in the game of others. But the agreements are beginning to be many. And when viewed as very thin threads of a broader, more expansive strategic canvas, the formula of the bilateral agreement as an inoffensive means of maneuver could be called into question. 

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Lorenzo published in Asean, Economy and trade

A common currency for ASEAN?

With global inflationary pressures, the idea of a single currency for countries in the Southeast Asian region is back on the agenda. But obstacles remain.

Editorial by Lorenzo Lamperti

A common currency for the ASEAN region. Among the first to launch the proposal was the former Premier of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad, after the Asian financial crisis. Proposal reiterated in 2019, when he spoke of a common trade currency pegged to gold, "not to be used locally but to regulate trade." The hypothesis has come back to the fore in these weeks marked by global economic turmoil and inflationary pressures. Raising it again was notably Vijay Eswaran, a Malaysian businessman and Executive Chairman of the multinational QI Group, based in Hong Kong but operating in some 30 countries. "Why the push for a common currency in ASEAN? Just look at Europe, where the euro is the best example of a common currency. In the 20 years since its introduction, the euro has contributed to the stability, competitiveness and prosperity of European economies. The single currency has helped keep prices stable and has protected euro area economies from exchange rate volatility," Eswaran says in a commentary published in the Jakarta Post in recent days. Many Asian emerging market economies hold large reserve assets denominated in U.S. dollars as a means of self-insurance against potential financial instability. According to the businessman, "with this dependence on the dollar, Asian countries are highly exposed to shocks from changes in economic policy and conditions relative to the United States." A common currency, Eswaran continues, "could help eliminate exchange rate uncertainty, guard against speculative attacks, and increase ASEAN's bargaining power," with long-term interest rates "likely to fall and become less volatile" and intra-regional trade flows facilitated. There could also be benefits for individuals, with greater accessibility for services such as health care, education and tourism. "Labor and talent could be more easily exchanged, leading to more job opportunities and greater economic integration among ASEAN countries," Eswaran concludes. The biggest obstacle to concrete developments in this regard, however, remains the great diversity in economic development among member countries. Suffice it to say that Singapore has a per capita income 60 times that of Myanmar.

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Redazione published in Asean, Culture and society

Art of the Loom: the Future of Sustainable Fashion

The fashion industry accounts for about 10% of global carbon emissions and 20% of wastewater. This should not come as a surprise as synthetic textiles are the mainstay of the fast fashion industry. But Bangkok is working hard to make it sustainable

Article by Dr. Vilawan Mangklatanakul

How many times do you wear a piece of clothing before throwing it away?

A study of 2,000 women by the British charity Barnado’s reveals that one piece of clothing is worn an average of seven times before being thrown out. Fast fashion has made it possible for one to constantly change their looks on the cheap. The Instagram culture is fueling the drive to buy new clothes often. Outfits that “no longer spark joy” can be easily discarded. But this “out of sight, out of mind” mentality is quickly inundating landfills across the world with unloved garments.

The fashion industry accounts for about 10% of global carbon emissions and 20% of wastewater. This should not come as a surprise as synthetic textiles are the mainstay of the fast fashion industry. Fabric like polyester and spun from plastic threads, break down into microplastics which get into the soil and water, ultimately entering the food chain. In fact, microplastics have become a leading marine pollutant. Even if countries have good marine debris and wastewater management, microplastics from synthetic fibers in the laundry could still threaten the well-being of life below water.

As a contrast and a blessing in fact, natural yarn used in Thai silk and cotton garments are biodegradable and therefore do not break down into microplastics.

Thai consumers are equally addicted to fast fashion. But there is hope on the horizon because a growing number of fashion-loving Thais are choosing homegrown designers who make clothes out of traditional Thai textiles. 

For environmentally and socially conscious customers, Thai handloom fabrics are a part of the answer. Traditional Thai fabrics are spun from silk, cotton or hemp. Moreover, they are ethically made and help develop communities. In Thailand, handlooms are strongly grounded in local villages and organized around women-led initiatives. In fact, they empower women to be the decision makers and breadwinners for their families. Income generated by these enterprises goes back directly to improving the education and healthcare of community members.

 

Ban Hat Siew in Sukhothai province, Northern Thailand: a Tai Phuan woman meticulously patterning a “Pha Sinh Teen Chok,” a kind of sarong for ceremonial use. 

 

Credit: takemetour website:

Ban Phon in Kalasin province, Northeastern Thailand: a Phu Tai woman weaving Phrae Wa silk in Kalasin. 

 

The making of artisanal Thai fabrics is also closely associated with nature.  

For silks, villagers grow mulberry trees and harvest the leaves for feeding silkworms. Leftover waste from growing the silkworms then becomes good quality fertilizer. In contrast to chemical dyes, colors derived from natural sources such as indigo for blue, ebony seeds for grey and black, lac for red, are non-toxic, so they can be discarded without causing harmful pollution. Old traditional techniques therefore, continue to prove better for both the planet and the people. 

However, Thailand’s traditional textile industry might have not seen the light, save for one woman and her powerful vision. 

While accompanying His Majesty the Late King Bhumibol the Great on his many trips to distant villages in Thailand, Her Majesty Queen Sirikit the Queen Mother would receive many gifts of traditional hand-woven fabric from the local women.

The intricate and meticulous designs made a lasting impression on the Queen, whose appreciation for the art of the loom became well known, and wherever she went, villagers would come and present their creations. She inquired them about each piece, paying ample attention to each of their stories. 

Her Majesty grew concerned to hear that this traditional Thai art form was in danger 

of disappearing. Farmers were more interested in sending their children to cities for better opportunities. Handloom was a skill and knowledge passed from one generation to the next. 

What if these women were to organize themselves around a cottage industry to weave in between crop growing seasons as a way to supplement their families’ income? It could be a way to save this cultural heritage from dying out, while supporting rural community employment in the process. 

Her Majesty Queen Sirikit launched the SUPPORT Foundation to institutionalize the royal initiative to develop the cottage craft industries around the country. By providing an outlet for their products to reach the market, the SUPPORT Foundation played a crucial role in making sure the villagers actually had alternative means of income besides farming. As a result, a number of them started to develop the business of handloom fabrics in earnest.

 

The SUPPORT Foundation of Her Majesty Queen Sirikit of Thailand 

Credit: Facebook page of the SUPPORT Foundation

 

Meanwhile, Her Majesty became the trendsetter of traditional Thai fashion. Her elegant outfits made from traditional fabrics from different regions of the country inspired city ladies to send Thai silk and cotton fabric to their dressmakers. She founded a fashionable movement that aroused a sense of pride in the nation’s cultural heritage. In turn, the demand for traditional Thai fabrics transformed small household looms into commercially viable enterprises. Later government policies such as One Tambon One Product (OTOP) would formalize state support for micro enterprises involved in traditional arts and crafts, featuring handlooms as a major product. 

Such is the story of Baan Hua Fai, a village in the Khon Kaen Province in the Isan region, or the northeast of Thailand. The celebrated local mudmee, or ikat, pattern of Thai silk was family wisdom passed on from mother to daughter, made for special occasions such as weddings or given as gifts. When Her Majesty the Queen Mother visited the region in 1983, she was very impressed with the unique artistry of Baan Hua Fai’s silk and invited them to send samples to Chitralada Palace. Soon thereafter, the villagers were granted royal patronage under the SUPPORT Foundation.

 

Examples of local mudmee from Baan Hua Fai Village. 

Credit: Tourism in Isan Website http://i-san.tourismthailand.org/6906/

 

Over the years, Baan Hua Fai has grown to be a village cooperative of almost 200 members, most of them women. Today, it has become a model OTOP enterprise that welcomes visitors and serves as a learning and collaborative center for design and production techniques. Younger generations are adopting new business models according to changing tastes and the marketing environment. They sell products online via Facebook and Instagram, and collaborate with Thailand’s top designers.

The next phase in the growth trajectory of traditional Thai fashion is for it to truly “go global”. In the footsteps of her grandmother, Her Royal Highness Princess Sirivannavari Nariratana spearheaded the creation of the Thai Textiles Trend Book. As the Editor in Chief, Princess Sirivannavari oversaw the compilation of “Thai tones” as well as patterns and material that would make traditional Thai textiles marketable beyond Thailand. Made available for free in both print and electronic version on the Ministry of Culture website, the Trend Book offers ready references for weavers, designers, students and anyone developing new ideas for Thai textiles.

 

Book launch event: “Thai Textiles Trend Book SS 2022” 

Credit: Hommes Thailand website https://hommesthailand.com/2020/12/thai-textiles-trend-book-ss-2022/

 

Besides drawing upon Her Majesty The Queen Mother’s legacy for inspiration, Princess Sirivannavari’s envisions sustainability to be interwoven with traditional Thai craftsmanship and local wisdom. The use of natural pigments, fibers and low carbon production techniques corresponds to the Bio-Circular-Green Economy Model of sustainable consumption and production that the Thai government is promoting. Thailand’s village handloom enterprises also represent success stories in achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These include SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), among others.

The story of Thailand’s sustainable fashion industry gives us an important lesson – that we can look back into our past to find answers for the future. For Thailand, the Royal Family has been instrumental in preserving traditional knowledge and local wisdom, which have shown the way for our people to live in balance with the natural environment for centuries.

It is almost innate in the real Thai way of life.

* * * * *

Dr. Vilawan Mangklatanakul, Deputy Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, a career diplomat since 1995, has built her expertise in Thailand’s foreign policy and international law, having served as the Director of the Office of Policy and Planning, the Director-General of the Department of International Economic Affairs, and Director General of the Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs.

In November 2021, the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly elected Dr. Vilawan to serve as one of the 34 members of the International Law Commission (ILC) for the term 2023 – 2027. She is Thailand’s first and only woman candidate from the Asia-Pacific Group, and the first woman international lawyer from ASEAN to be elected to such a position. During her campaign for the ILC, Dr. Vilawan advocated for women’s empowerment and for communities to be better prepared for future challenges.

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Valerio Bordonaro published in Asean, Economy and trade

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Southeast Asian countries must accelerate the energy transition and stay true to climate change mitigation goals. According to a report by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), an average annual investment of $210 billion is needed to be invested in the renewable energy, energy efficiency and related infrastructure sectors by 2050 to limit a global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C. Such an investment would be more than two and a half times the amount currently planned by the governments of ASEAN countries. The Southeast Asian region is home to 25% of the world's geothermal generating capacity, but the region also has significant coal reserves. Indonesia, for example, has enacted a new clean energy regulation. It is one of the world's largest exporters of coal, which currently supplies about 60 percent of the country's electricity needs. The recent measure is designed to diversify the energy mix and increase the share of renewable energy to 23% by 2025. So far it stands at about 12%. The regulation also stipulates that no new coal-fired power plants will be built, although those already in operation may continue to remain in operation. Emissions from these power plants, however, will have to be contained. The government has also established a new pricing system for clean energy sources to encourage investment. To increase investment, the government will also provide tax incentives, including financing. According to the report, if Southeast Asian countries really want to contribute to the fight against climate change, collective and concerted action is needed; recent steps in this direction appear concrete. According to IRENA, the region aims to derive 23% of its primary energy from renewable sources by 2025. And investment is on the rise, with ample room for cooperation even for international governments and businesses, starting with Europe and Italy.

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Pierfrancesco Mattiolo published in Asean, Global Lens

The Chip4 alliance and its impact on ASEAN semiconductors

The semiconductor game gets political and becomes a team sport. At least on one side of the field. The four-party alliance wanted by the US aims to contain China. On which side will the ASEAN countries play?

Semiconductors are essential to the life and growth of digital society. A secure supply of these products is now a priority - and a headache - for governments around the world. There is still a global crisis in this industry's supply chains - a crisis that is part of a broader context of 'globalisation in turmoil' - which makes it difficult for other sectors to procure the necessary components. The problem is made even more complex by its political fallout. Indeed, the United States and China compete in the data economy and the development of new applications of artificial intelligence. This leads the two giants to demand a huge amount of chips and try to limit their rival's grip on the market. In the last months, Washington has taken the first steps towards the formation of a four-way semiconductor alliance with its historical partners on the China Sea - Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - in order to be able to develop 'democratic' supply chains, from the factory to consumers, without necessarily involving China. Beijing looks at the US initiative with concern, fearing being 'excluded' from the most important value chains in the globalised world.

The fragility and strategic importance of semiconductor supply chains have prompted governments to take action to secure their technological sovereignty. Many countries have taken steps to strengthen chip production in their own territory, in collaboration with the giants of the sector: just to mention two initiatives, Taiwanese TSMC is building a 12 billion production plant in Arizona with the support of the state and federal governments; Intel and the Italian government are closing negotiations for the creation of a production site in the Veneto region. Nevertheless, the semiconductor value chain cannot be enclosed within the borders of a single country, nor can it be so easily reorganised. Each stage of the production chain requires strong specialisation of entire industrial districts and high-tech equipment. At the moment, it does not seem possible to make chips without the involvement of East Asian countries. Therefore, governments are also trying to strengthen their international partnerships to secure supplies and overcome certain bottlenecks in production. Each of the Chip4 economies is particularly strong in one of the links of the chain and the alliance would be able to organise supplies between partners without relying heavily on external players. There are not only economic considerations behind Washington's initiative, however. The four countries are like-minded democracies that watch with some attention the growing Chinese influence not only in the region but also in the digital economy and some of its cutting-edge sectors. In a scenario of growing tensions with Beijing, the Chip4 countries might have an interest in not being dependent on the Chinese semiconductor industry.

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