Asean

Shangri-La Dialogue, ASEAN calls for peace

During the Asia-Pacific Security Summit in Singapore, the centrality of ASEAN, whose countries are calling for more dialogue at the international level, was reaffirmed

Editorial by Lorenzo Lamperti

"South-East Asia has paid more than others for the devastating consequences of the clash between great powers. We do not want this to happen again'. Ng Eng Hen, Singapore's Minister of Defence, made this clear in his speech during the last plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific's top security summit held in the city-state from 2 to 4 June. Singapore and the ASEAN region in general once again confirmed itself as a crucial crossroads of global diplomacy. At a complicated time, to say the least, between the war in Ukraine and tensions between the US and China, the South-East is making its voice heard, asking world leaders for wisdom. "Military spending is also increasing exponentially in the Asia-Pacific," says the Singaporean minister. "It is not a source of instability per se, but in the absence of proper dialogue between the powers then it risks leading to a rearmament race that can destabilise the entire region." During the meetings, which were also attended by the US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, and the Chinese Defence Minister, Li Shangfu, the 'centrality of ASEAN' and the goodness of the ASEAN way was mentioned several times. And all the representatives of the South-East Asian countries emphasised their willingness to maintain relations with both Washington and Beijing, promoting multilateralism based on trade and international rules. But also and above all on dialogue. "Both Austin and Li assured that the US and China are not asking ASEAN countries to choose sides, but we also hope that these two countries can talk to each other again," said Ng Eng Hen. "Both have been in the Asia-Pacific for a long time and both will not leave. We have to find or rediscover a way to ensure stability and security for the region'. The same concept was also expressed by the IISS, the international institute that has been organising the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore for the past 20 years, where the intelligence chiefs of several countries, including the United States and China, also met behind closed doors. Proof, once again, of how Singapore and the South-East provide an exceptional platform for confrontation. If the future of the world will be written (also or especially) in this region, perhaps it would be worth listening to it.

Quem portum petat: geography and economics of ASEAN ports

The sea is the natural space for globalisation. The majority of goods moves by cargo ships. Efficiency in handling containers, combined with strategic location and economic-political relations, makes the ports of East Asia the busiest in the world. Among the 50 most active ports worldwide, nine are in ASEAN and 18 in China.

For those who do not know which port to steer into, no wind is good. Although this aphorism of Seneca comes from a ‘moral epistle’, we could return the metaphor to its original context – navigation – and draw a new lesson from it. Today, global maritime trade responds to partly different rationales than in the days of the Roman Mare Nostrum. While environmental conditions (wind, currents, distance of the sea voyage) affect colossal container ships less, the choice of ports remains essential for those who must design trade routes. And the sea is still the main trade route for goods: according to EU data, more than 50 percent of its external trade moved by ship in 2021. Another interesting fact is that, in the ranking of the world's top 50 ports, 18 are Chinese (the first is Shanghai and six other Chinese ports occupy the top ten), nine are in ASEAN countries (the second worldwide is Singapore) and seven are European.

It is no surprise that Asian ports are so numerous in the ranking. The title of 'factory of the world' can now be awarded not only to China, but to much of the continent as well. The dragon is joined by a growing group of tigers. According to the UNCTAD, in 2021 Asian ports discharged and loaded 64% and 42%, respectively, of all world goods per ton. It is interesting to note that in Asia, as well as in Europe (including Russia), more goods are discharged (thus imported) than loaded (exported). This figure should be accompanied by another recent trend in shipping. In 2015, developing countries in Asia were exporting more tons of goods than they were importing, while the opposite case was in developed countries. Data from 2021 show that this ratio has reversed. According to the UNCTAD again, this change can be explained in light of the fact that merchant ships are increasingly carrying dry cargo in containers instead of tanker cargo (goods 'in tanks', such as refined petroleum products, chemicals, and gas). Whereas, in the 1970s, more than half of sea trade was made of tanker cargo – thus, largely by raw materials and low-processing products –, today, three-quarters is made of dry cargo, a much broader category that includes, inter alia: minerals, components, advanced machinery, consumer products...

Asian and European economies, therefore, seem hungry for products for their own domestic consumption and, more importantly, to turn them into other, more advanced goods to export. In the ASEAN, Singapore stands out as a major world port, following a destiny already charted during the British colonial rule. In 1819, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles purchased the island from the Sultan of Johore to establish a settlement and compete, from a strategic position, with the nearby port of Malacca, under Dutch control, for the Straits trade. Shortly after the purchase, Raffles wrote: The Port of Singapore is a free port, and the trade thereof is open to ships and vessels of every nation, equally and alike to all. Raffles is remembered positively in the Lion City and is considered the founder of modern Singapore rather than an agent of colonial domination. In addition to determining the commercial vocation of the future city-state, he is credited with the first urban and infrastructure plan to open the island to international trade. The intuition of Raffles and the British, in whose wake Lee Kuan Yew, the first leader of independent Singapore, also moved, and the island's strategic location represent the roots of the port's success. However, it is more recent industrial policy choices that have consolidated its fortunes: the port infrastructure continues to be enlarged and modernised. Over the next two decades, work on the expansion of the Tuas 'mega port' will continue, following a four-phase project. The first phase alone, completed in 2021, cost $1.76 billion. The port can also rely on good governance, based on public-private partnerships, and Singapore's wide network of free trade agreements, including one with the EU.

Next on the list of the world's top 50 ports are Malaysia's Port Klang (12th place) and Tanjung Pelepas (19th), both on the Straits of Malacca. They are followed by the Thai port of Laem Chabang (20th) and Jakarta's Tanjung Priok (23rd). In Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh region is served by the city's port on the estuary of the Mekong (26th) and the port of Cai Mep (50th), while the industrial district of Hanoi relies on the port of Hai Phong (33rd). Finally, the Philippine capital Manila ranks 31st. The main reason for the success of ports in the ASEAN and the rest of East Asia lies in the efficiency with which port infrastructure is able to load and discharge containers from ships and transfer them to another vessel or mean of transport, as revealed by the Global Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) curated by the World Bank. Logistical efficiency can make a port a major hub of trade even if its 'inland' economy plays a relatively small role in the global economy or manufacture (as for Singapore). Moreover, companies might move their goods through another country's port, if its national ports, even when geographically close, are not as punctual and reliable time-wise. In conclusion, it almost seems that ‘knowing which port to steer to’ is more important than having ‘good wind in your sails’, that is, reaching the nearest port. In light of this consideration, we can also read the data on EU ports. In the world ranking, the three ports of Rotterdam (10th place), Antwerp (14th) and Hamburg (18th), all three on the North Sea and located on a river, stand out. These three cities represent the main trade route between the European ‘blue banana’ and the rest of the world. In addition to efficiency, a factor that increasingly influences companies' choice of ports is sustainability: reducing emissions from transportation is a necessary step in achieving the carbon neutrality of the supply chain. Antwerp, for example, is a ‘sustainable port’ recognised at the international level. And in the Mediterranean? Interesting cases appear in the ranking, e.g. Athens’ Piraeus (28th place) and the Spanish cities of Valencia (30th) and Algeciras (34th). Piraeus owes its importance to trade with Asia and is at the centre of a delicate political issue since, in China's plans, it should become the end point in Europe for its Belt and Road Initiative. Algeciras, on the other hand, in addition to its strategic location on the Strait of Gibraltar, can boast of being the top European port in terms of efficiency, according to the aforementioned World Bank CPPI ranking. Italy and France ports are absent from the top 50. Although the Mediterranean is still at the centre of global maritime traffic, Italian ports should modernise their infrastructure and strengthen their logistics in order to compete with other global ports.

Italy at the 2nd EU-Indo-Pacific Forum

By Maria Tripodi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

On 13 May, together with European Foreign Ministers and partners from Asia and the Pacific, I attended - by delegation of VP/Minister Tajani - the 2nd EU-Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum, organised in Stockholm by the Swedish EU Presidency and the EEAS. The initiative was initiated by the French EU Presidency, with the event on 22 February 2022, in Paris. In my speech, I emphasised Italy's concrete commitment to follow up on the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy. I highlighted our growing projection in the area, whose geopolitical, economic and demographic relevance places it at the centre of the complex global challenges underway, aggravated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. These include threats to security and the rules-based international order, energy security, the food crisis, the (often devastating) consequences of climate change and sustainable development. It is precisely on climate that I wanted to focus, speaking at the panel discussion 'Pursuing green opportunities and overcoming global challenges'. The Indo-Pacific is home to some of the states most exposed to climate change and also most in need of energy, given their high economic and population growth rates. Italy, which is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 and to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, is supporting these countries with numerous initiatives, including the support to Vietnam and Indonesia in the framework of the G7 initiative 'Just Energy Transition Partnership'; the organisation of training courses on civil protection and sustainable development in favour of ASEAN countries and the 'Pacific Islands Forum' of which Italy is respectively Development and Dialogue Partner; the participation, through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, in the 'ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility' and in the 'Team Europe' initiatives in favour of ASEAN. With these and other measures being devised, we intend to ensure that no country is left behind and that the area's emerging economies are equipped with the necessary tools to pursue inclusive and sustainable growth, an essential condition for the maintenance of peace and stability in a region that is increasingly crucial for world equilibrium.

Prosperity and doubts: the two-faced relationship between China and the Southeast

Article by Vittoria Mazzieri

Regional investment targets, ideological allies, security partners, players in territorial claims: since the beginning of diplomatic relations, Southeast Asian countries have assumed changing and complex roles in Beijing's eyes. In terms of geographic proximity and economic cooperation, ASEAN occupies a priority role in Chinese foreign policy

Deng Xiaoping's 1979 trip to Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore marks an important point in relations between Beijing and the countries of Southeast Asia. The "little helmsman" was amazed by the socioeconomic progress in an area he had mistakenly regarded as economically backward. As noted in an essay on the subject by Singapore's Nanyang Technological University professors Zhou Taomo and Hong Liu, what particularly struck Deng was the city-state south of Malaysia. In the aftermath of his meeting with then Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the People's Daily moves from describing Singapore as the "watchdog of American imperialists" to painting it as an "island of peace," a "garden city worth studying." Deng, on the other hand, receives yet another confirmation of the need to abandon the ideological lenses with which the Communist Party has hitherto interpreted relations with Southeast Asia.

Relations between the Asian giant and the city-state demonstrate the People's Republic's changing relations with the area traditionally known as Nanyang 南洋, "South Seas." In addition to the domestic political context, Beijing's relations with the region have been influenced by issues related to the identity of diasporic communities (in Singapore, 75 percent of the population is ethnic Chinese), territorial disputes, and various infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.

The first years after the People's Republic's emergence are characterized by a moderate and flexible approach: Beijing advocates a "third way" that can offer an alternative to the two Cold War blocs even to countries ideologically unrelated to the Communist Party. The promulgation of the Five Principles for Peaceful Coexistence in 1954 presents a new framework of international relations based on mutual respect for territorial integrity and the principle of non-interference, even for ideologically unrelated countries. The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty, signed the following year, ends the policy of granting nationality to all ethnic Chinese. China thus encourages overseas communities to adopt the nationality of the countries in which they live, thereby aiming to assuage the concerns of some Southeast Asian countries, fearful that communities of Chinese could be used by the Party to engage in subversive activities. 

Over the years ethnic Chinese minorities became the target of heavy-handed discriminatory policies: in 1959 Indonesian President Sukarno revoked the license to operate retail businesses from all "foreigners," mostly Chinese. As a result, in some places, the feeling of belonging to the motherland is strengthened. With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, groups of ethnic Chinese students began wearing Mao Zedong badges in schools in Rangoon, in present-day Myanmar. A wave of large-scale ethnic riots and a drastic deterioration in bilateral relations ensue.

Since the late 1960s, Chinese foreign policy in general has tended to radicalize, partly because of the economic recession following the disastrous Great Leap Forward. The establishment in 1967 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand from an anti-communist perspective, is perceived by Mao Zedong as a tool of imperialism. Ideologically neighboring countries are asked to recognize as the main targets of the revolution, in Premier Zhou Enlai's words, "imperialism, feudalism and comprador capitalism." An approach that would change dramatically in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. As explained in an article for ISPI by Ngeow Chow-Bing, director of the Institute of Chinese Studies at the University of Malaya, in this scenario ASEAN assumes strategic importance for Beijing to contain the expansionist aims of the government in Hanoi (with which relations have deteriorated irretrievably) over Indochina and the entire region.

The record-breaking economic development affecting the People's Republic since the 1990s is a key element in the expansion of its soft power influence, as Joshua Kurlantzick, fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, has written. China's economic performance attracts the interest of developing countries and also has the effect of enhancing the reputation of Chinese communities living in the region.

It is during those years that what official Chinese rhetoric describes as the "golden decade" of relations with ASEAN (which as of today, in addition to the founding countries, also counts Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor, Laos, and Vietnam) begins. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Beijing made the symbolic decision not to devalue its currency, offering itself as a guarantor of stability. In the following years it initiated relevant multilateral agreements: the Chiang Mai Currency Exchange Initiative, the 2002 Free Trade Agreement, and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which stabilized territorial disputes, in the same year. 

But with Xi Jinping's rise to power, Chinese foreign policy acquired a more proactive and assertive profile. The deterioration of relations over the past decade, especially with the Philippines and Vietnam, is inextricably linked to territorial claims in the South China Sea area. Since the 1970s, disputes with Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracelsus Islands have turned into a regional, or even global, dispute. Of little or no use was the 2002 Code of Conduct, which while celebrated at the time as a means of ensuring a "peaceful, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China Sea," did not include provisions on enforcement or dispute resolution mechanisms. 

Tensions, therefore, grew, even reaching Indonesia for the first time in 2016. In the same year, a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rejected Beijing's claims, represented by the so-called "nine-point line." Beijing did not accept the decision recognizing Manila's rights to exploit resources within the 200 nautical miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Rather, it accused Washington of pushing the Philippines to resort to the court to "sabotage relations between China and ASEAN countries."

Despite its maritime claims, China has never stopped courting countries in the region. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the historic agreement sealed in 2020 after eight years of negotiations and entered into force in January 2022, has served Beijing to consolidate economic cooperation in the area. But mutual trade relations cannot be explained without bringing up the Belt and Road Initiative, the ambitious new Silk Road launched in 2013 that counts Chinese investments worth about 85 billion a year. As early as the early 2000s, Southeast Asia emerged as an important regional target for Chinese foreign direct investment. In 2020, at the height of the pandemic crisis, ASEAN rose to the top spot among BRI investment destinations. 

The initiative has met with varying degrees of acceptance in countries in the region. Despite tensions over territorial disputes, many nations involved have continued to desire Chinese investment in infrastructure and manufacturing. Unlike its more welcoming neighbors, Hanoi has taken a cautious approach: the Vietnamese strategy seems to aim to avoid confrontation with China while averting the risk of economic dependence. To date, the only BRI project implemented in the country is the Cat Linh-Ha Dong tramway, which has attracted widespread criticism because of its high cost.

The derailment of a high-speed train of the ambitious Jakarta-Bandung rail project shows that safety risks can undermine the People's Republic's credibility. A recent report by Malaysian lending institution Maybank suggests that the post-pandemic recovery may be less strong than expected. Projects could suffer setbacks because of growing government distrust of, for example, social and environmental costs: in 2014, Chinese-owned bauxite mining operations in Vietnam's central highlands sparked widespread protests over environmental damage and noncompliance with local laws. For other countries that have been more actively engaged in the BRI, such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, fears about the "debt trap" periodically return from economists and observers. 

Overall, Southeast Asian countries remain essential to Beijing for numerous reasons. For example, as partners toward whom China can accelerate the spread of "soft" infrastructure such as health services and the digital economy. Or as useful players in subverting international balances and increasing the relevance of the Asia-Pacific. Against the backdrop of tensions with the United States, the People's Republic aims to present itself to ASEAN countries as a non-assertive actor, willing to pursue "mutual respect," "dialogue," and "win-win" synergies, as claimed last year at the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI). On the other hand, China's investments are shaping up as unmissable resources for developing countries in the region: the GSI's sister initiative, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), represents Beijing's willingness to name itself a central role in multilateral development promotion. ASEAN has become the largest regional group to benefit from it, nabbing 14 projects out of a total of 50 from the first batch of the GDI Project Pool.

 

How the 42nd ASEAN summit went

The summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations took place between May 9 and 11 in Indonesia. Here are what documents were signed and the final joint statement

In the Joint Declaration adopted at the 42nd ASEAN Summit, held in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia, May 9-11, ASEAN leaders stressed the need to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They emphasized the importance of the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the Eastern Sea (DOC) in its entirety, while highlighting the need to strengthen mutual trust, exercise self-control in conducting activities that may complicate or exacerbate disputes and affect peace and stability, and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation. They welcomed the ongoing efforts to strengthen cooperation between ASEAN and China, as well as the progress of substantive negotiations toward the rapid conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC); and the initiative to accelerate COC negotiations, including the proposal to develop guidelines to expedite the rapid conclusion of an effective and substantive COC. ASEAN leaders also stressed the need to maintain and promote an enabling environment for COC negotiations. Among the 10 documents endorsed at the summit were the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Developing the Regional Electric Vehicle Ecosystem; the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on the One Health Initiative; the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Advancing Regional Payment Connectivity and Promoting Local Currency Transactions; and the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Combating Trafficking in Persons Caused by Misuse of Technology. The leaders endorsed the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Family Members in Crisis Situations; the ASEAN Declaration on the Placement and Protection of Migrant Fishermen; the ASEAN Leaders' Joint Declaration on the Establishment of an ASEAN Village Network; and a roadmap for the admission of Timor-Leste as an official member of ASEAN. They also adopted the ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Developing the Post-2025 Vision of the ASEAN Community, which aims to promote strong, comprehensive and inclusive growth and solve the region's internal and external challenges over the next 20 years. Also endorsed at the summit was the ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Strengthening ASEAN Capacity and Institutional Effectiveness, which reaffirms the commitment of ASEAN leaders to maintain centrality, unity and relevance amid the challenges facing the region. The leaders also discussed the implementation of the five-point consensus on Myanmar and condemned the attack on a convoy of the ASEAN Coordination Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) and the ASEAN Monitoring Team in Myanmar.

Click here for the summit's final joint statement.

South-East, a model for managing tensions

The region has rapid growth and expanding economy suggest that the region can become a model for managing competition between major powers

"South-East Asia is far from a monolith: its countries have different foreign policies and objectives, some of them at odds with each other. But the region's rapid growth and expanding economy suggest that its countries will become more powerful over time and, with them, probably more able to avoid external interference. South-East Asia may have been defined in the past by conflict between great powers, but today it may become a model for managing competition between great powers'. Thus judges an analysis by Huong Le Thu, published in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. South-East Asia has worked hard to maintain and expand diplomatic and security stability. In addition to the ASEAN-led multilateral security architecture, the region has established many plurilateral and bilateral agreements with third states. These are ad hoc groups, such as the joint patrolling of the Mekong River by China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. According to Foreign Affairs, as geopolitical tensions rise, the already large number of these partnerships is set to increase. These complex and often overlapping agreements are central to Southeast Asia's efforts to engage with all, but without making exclusive commitments to any. Southeast Asian states are also becoming more active in groups that include participants from outside their neighbourhood. Last year, for example, Cambodia hosted the high-profile East Asia Summit, Thailand held the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and Indonesia chaired the G20. Individually, Huong points out, some South East Asian governments have learnt that competition between the US and China has advantages. The clash between Beijing and Washington may scare politicians in the region, but it has led both governments to try to win the hearts and minds of non-aligned countries. This has helped South East Asian countries, home to young populations and cheap labour, reap all kinds of economic benefits. Vietnam, says Foreign Affairs, has benefited enormously from the US breakaway from China, as American companies have moved production to Vietnamese factories. Indonesia has also received an investment boost from US companies, including Amazon, Microsoft and Tesla. The region is also becoming increasingly critical for global supply chains. And it may point the way forward for continued prosperity.

ASEAN prepares its future

The post-2025 vision of the Community of Southeast Asian Nations will be extended to 2035 to 2045

The ability to develop long-term strategies has always been crucial and has become even more. In Asia, it is something that is traditionally more emphasized. Further proof comes from ASEAN's decision to extend its post-2025 vision by an additional ten years, taking it from 2035 to 2045. The decision was announced recently by Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn during the seventh meeting of the High-Level Task Force on the ASEAN Community's Post-2025 Vision. Between now and 2025, the task force will have to provide an answer to the Southeast Asian region's most important challenge: how to come up with a sustainable vision in the medium to long term, to continue to sustain economic growth and accompany the foreseeable increased trade and geopolitical role of the region, given that in the coming decades, ASEAN could conceivably become the world's fourth largest economic power after China, the United States and Japan/India. In recent months, the task force has held so-called 'interface consultations' with ASEAN-related agencies, including the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity and the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (Abac). In 20 years, ASEAN could have the world's third largest population after China and India. And presumably it will also be larger in numbers. The Bangkok Post predicts that new members will join the Association in the coming years, including East Timor and, in the years to come, Papua New Guinea, which has been the group's longest-serving observer since 1986. There may also be other new members from the Indo-Pacific region. At that point, the Thai newspaper points out, ASEAN would need a several-fold increase in its budget at the Jakarta-based secretariat. The main challenge will still be to adapt to a world with polarizing trends, strengthening the bloc's centrality in order to increasingly become a major global player and preventing South-East Asia from being drawn into confrontational and oppositional logics. ASEAN has all the credentials to succeed in this.

ASEAN chipmakers benefit from the technology clash between the US and China

The technology clash between the US and China is intensifying. Third countries and companies are trying to rely less on Chinese semiconductor suppliers to avoid sudden breaks in supply chains. ASEAN countries can take advantage of the situation.

In Singapore, the French company Soitec will invest EUR 400 million to double its wafer production plant. The American Applied Materials will spend a little more, 405 million, to build a new plant. Another American company, Global Foundries, is already building a 3.6 billion plant, again in the Lion City. The shopping list of European, American and Asian companies investing in the island and some other ASEAN countries is long and impressive. And it is destined to increase if the tension between the US and China does not abate.

The clash between the two great Pacific powers is reshaping technology supply chains. Washington is trying to slow the growth of China's semiconductor sector by blocking the export of high-tech products and encouraging companies to buy chips elsewhere. US policies also affect companies in third countries. The Dutch company ASML, the world's leading manufacturer of lithographic machines (one of the many parts of the supply chain), will be subjected to much stricter export control rules after The Hague chose to follow the American line. Although the Dutch government measure does not name names, the implicit target of the measure is China.

However, there is no need to resort to legal constraints to redirect companies' strategies. The increasingly heated tones between Washington and Beijing, and the growing tensions around Taiwan, are pushing companies to shift their orders from China to other Asian countries. The economic and technological decoupling hoped for by the US is already happening to a small extent. Yet, it remains difficult to achieve given that the world's two largest economies play very different roles in global trade (and financial) flows. Each of the two contenders does not seem to be able to give up on the other and the same goes for third countries, from ASEAN to the EU, without facing harsh economic consequences. And indeed, ASEAN countries try to maintain a cordial and pragmatic equidistance between the US and China.

Working with both powers, without renouncing ties with either. This strategy, followed by most countries in the region, has diplomatic and economic reasons. On the diplomatic level, ASEAN governments would prefer a less assertive Beijing in the South China Sea (in fact, they are also increasing their defence spending), but not isolated, as they would like in Washington: maintaining good relations with China seems to be the best way to guarantee the region's security, according to the ASEAN chancelleries. Economically, both dollars and yuan are needed to finance the region's development. US and Chinese consumers and companies are interested in ASEAN-made electronic products, especially if buying goods produced by the rival becomes more difficult. Investments in facilities and infrastructure also matter: Beijing and Washington are also competing in this field, respectively with the Belt and Road Initiative and the Build Back Better World plan.

The prospects look bright for semiconductor manufacturers in the ASEAN countries (Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia, but also Indonesia and Thailand). The clash for technological dominance in the XXI century between the eagle and the dragon assigns to the new 'ASEAN tigers' the role of the world's alternative factory, capable, however, of exchanging products and cooperating with both sides. That is, unless the two powers demand from the governments of third countries to take sides or renounce cooperation with their rival. An impossible choice for the ASEAN countries, but perhaps also for the parties to the technology dispute themselves. In this scenario, the strengthening of ASEAN's regional integration, politically and economically, could defend the diplomatic autonomy of its members and foster the development of chip value chains.

World moves closer to ASEAN

Increasing cooperation between Southeast Asian countries and global platforms such as the G7. And beyond. With the hope that more and more governments will follow the bloc's "third way"

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is increasingly involved in global decision-making mechanisms. A very timely example is the historic first meeting between G7 justice ministers and those of the regional bloc. A joint meeting is scheduled for July, with Japan, the host country and G7 chair. A similar Japan-ASEAN meeting is scheduled for the same days. On the other hand, since the start of the war in Ukraine, it has sharpened the distance between the West and some countries. ASEAN, with its third way of neutrality and pacifism, can serve as a crucial connector in this global phase. Southeast Asians fear that the use of force to change the status quo, as Russia did in Ukraine, will spread to the Asia-Pacific. Most of all, they fear getting involved in disputes where they do not belong. "ASEAN must remain independent and a zone of neutrality amid the escalating rivalry between the U.S. and China," Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim said in recent days, stressing that ASEAN was formed to promote peace and stability in the region. "This position continues. We do not want the region to be the basis for military competition. This position has been quite consistent, although we remain friendly with all countries," he explained. Recent multilateral agreements that threaten to set the stage for an arms race are frowned upon. In 1995, 10 ASEAN member states signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, or Bangkok Treaty, which designates the region as nuclear weapons-free. The treaty also includes a protocol open for signature by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. So far no one has signed it, but we are finally seeing the first movements. Recently, China expressed its intention to sign the protocol for the ASEAN Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. But it will not be easy to get everyone to join. The bloc's hope is that by participating more and more frequently in global platforms, the world will increasingly choose to follow that third way it has been indicating for several years now.

The path of future food in ASEAN

By Chiara Suprani

Southeast Asia shows possible developments in the global food market. Applications for cricket flour could be countless in the Italian market, such as being used as a base or addition to cereal bars, or whey powder

As of 24 January 2023, the European Union allowed the buying and selling of flour products from Acheta domesticus, or more commonly, house cricket. Two days later, the marketing of Alphitobius diaperinus, the lesser mealworm, was launched. Brussels believes that insects are a viable alternative to increasing the costs of animal meat production, both because of their lower environmental impact and because of their protein supply, which is higher in percentage than that of animals. But while the applications for cricket flour could be countless in the Italian market, such as being used as a base or added to cereal bars, or to whey powder, a Coldiretti survey revealed that 54% of Italians are against the inclusion of cricket flour in their diet. Introducing insects, or novel foods, into the food market requires specific labeling requirements especially for allergenicity, but not only. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is aware that at the current stage, the consumption of insects on the European market is limited, but the potential and benefits are there, as are the risks, especially when legislation is not yet defined. Due to different eating habits, legislation for insect consumption is more advanced in South-East Asia. In Thailand, edible insects fall under the Food Act B.E. 2522 (1979), which is the general law regulating food quality and integrity. Also in Bangkok, on 29 March, SPACE-F, Thailand's first global food-tech startup incubator and accelerator programme, the result of a partnership between the National Innovation Agency, Thai Union Group PCL, Mahidol University, Thai Beverage PCL and Deloitte Thailand, launched a mentorship programme for FoodTech startups with the aim of making Thailand the world's first foodtech hub. Earlier this year, the Malaysian Minister of International Trade and Industry successfully secured USD$4 billion worth of investments from three novel food and food tech companies: Sea Ltd, Yondr Group and Inseact. The latter specialises in insect proteins for animal feed and aquaculture and plans to open a production plant in Johor, Malaysia, the first in the region, to meet Asia's growing demand for sustainable food sources.

Telemedicine? A big growth market in ASEAN countries

The consumer-focused digital health market in Asia could grow from $37.4 billion in 2020 to more than $100 billion in 2025. This growth will be driven primarily by telemedicine

Increasing population and demand for medical services is straining the health care system in several Southeast Asian countries. In Indonesia, for example, the combination of the urban expansion of the capital Jakarta and the geographic nature of the territory divided into archipelagos has made it difficult for the more than 270 million inhabitants to access health care. Data compiled by the World Health Organization (WHO) report that in 2021 the Indonesian health service could offer 6.95 doctors per 10,000 people, a figure below the 9.28 doctors per 10,000 in Thailand and 7.51 in Myanmar. Indonesia, the fourth most populated country in the world, thus appears to have far fewer doctors per capita than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average. In fact, these numbers are worrisome when compared, for example, to the figure for Italy where there are 17.3 physicians for every 10,000 inhabitants-already believed to be a lower number than needed-or when compared even to the figure for Japan where there turn out to be 26.14 physicians for every 10,000 inhabitants. 

Companies offering telemedicine services fit into this context. These companies offer remote medical consultations through apps thus making the health care offered to citizens more convenient and faster. During the Pandemic from Covid-19 and to follow, competition among companies in this market has grown exponentially leading to an expansion of services offered in this field. Some of these apps, in fact, offer not only consultation services but also home delivery of prescriptions and medications. 

For example, Halodoc, a telemedicine app launched in 2016, in addition to allowing customers throughout Indonesia to have online consultations with more than 20,000 licensed physicians in the country at any given time, already delivers prescriptions and medicines in 400 Indonesian cities, managing, in 30 percent of them, to make delivery in just 15 minutes. This Indonesian start-up already has 20 million monthly users in the country but aims to reach 100 million in the next few years by aiming to expand its reach to Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Alodokter, a telemedicine company founded in 2014, also stands out in the Indonesian context. This app boasts more than 80,000 affiliated doctors who can prescribe drugs and send them within hours to their patients.

Also in Indonesia, Harya Bimo, chief executive officer of Klinik Pintar, is instead determined to maintain a hybrid model in which technology does not preclude clinics where patients can go to be present on the ground. In fact, Klinik Pintar is an Indonesian health technology startup that not only helps its users book teleconsultations, virtual health services but also offers its clients in-person clinic sessions.

The telemedicine sector appears to be growing strongly in other Southeast Asian countries. For example, in Singapore, the telemedicine company Doctors Anywhere, which has a user base of 2.5 million in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam, plans to acquire Asian Healthcare Specialists (AHS) a multidisciplinary medical group with more than 10 facilities providing services, including anesthesia, dermatology, family medicine, and gastroenterology. In this way, the company could follow up on online consultations by also providing patients with visits to AHS centers. In the Philippines, citizens will also be able to benefit from a single technology super-app starting in the coming months resulting from the consolidation of three health care companies-KonsultaMD, HealthNow and AIDE-promised by the Philippine Ayala Group.

The apps mentioned are just some of the telemedicine startups being developed in ASEAN countries. A McKinsey report predicts that the consumer-focused digital health market in Asia could grow from $37.4 billion in 2020 to more than $100 billion in 2025. In this context, telemedicine, followed by electronic pharmacies, will be the main growth driver.

Energy, so many opportunities in ASEAN

The bloc of Southeast Asian countries will double its demand for natural gas to 350 billion cubic meters by 2050

ASEAN will double its demand for natural gas to 350 billion cubic meters by 2050. In fact, even more. A truly impressive trend that accelerates in tandem with the abandonment of coal-fired power generation. Identifying the 350 billion cubic meters of demand over the next three decades was the secretary general of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, Mohammed Hammel. The share of natural gas in the region's energy mix is projected to grow steadily to 24 percent by 2050. GECF data show that ASEAN's natural gas demand will stand at 160 billion cubic meters in 2021, of which 80 billion cubic meters will be used for power generation and 50 billion cubic meters will be used by the industrial sector. These two sectors will continue to take the lion's share of the bloc's natural gas demand in 2050. Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia will also be major contributors to demand. Coal accounted for 24 percent of the region's energy mix in 2021, but will likely drop to 13 percent in 2050 as the share of cleaner energies increases. According to GECF data, Thailand is the largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the region and will maintain this position in the coming decades. ASEAN's natural gas production will continue to be around 180 bcm in 2050, and the region will extract its gas mainly offshore. When combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, natural gas could cut down an additional 735 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions in the power sector alone by 2050. Hidetoshi Nishimura, president of think-tank ERIA, said natural gas can reduce emissions through its expanded use in the initial phase of the clean energy transition from 2020 to 2030 by applying existing, affordable fuels and energy technologies. In the long run 2030-2050, many advanced technologies such as co-firing with hydrogen and CCUS (carbon capture, utilization and storage) will be employed. The process will ensure many opportunities on the energy front for international players.