Asean

Cambodia, Indonesia and Thailand are the three cardinal points of the multilateral summits that marked the return of diplomacy at the tail end of a turbulent year

The difficult recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic, inflation rising at a record pace, the war in Ukraine, and tensions between the United States and China. In short, there were all the ingredients for a huge washout. Instead, the two weeks of multilateral summits in Southeast Asia ended on a high note. Cambodia can breathe a sigh of relief after hosting the ASEAN summit without a hitch. Concerns about the global economy, threats of recession, and food and energy security took center stage over the impasse of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Myanmar problem. Moreover, the 10 ASEAN members managed to make some tough decisions on long-standing issues. Starting with the bloc's announcement that it has accepted East Timor "in principle" as the bloc's 11th member, after more than 10 years of consideration. While eventual full membership will require a "criteria-based road map," East Timor will be able to attend all meetings as an observer member, albeit without decision-making rights. Relations with the United States and India have been elevated to ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, making them the third and fourth dialogue partners to be granted this status, after China and Australia. Phnom Penh has demonstrated its ability to manage great-power rivalry. It has attended and co-chaired two summits with the United States, despite poor bilateral relations, showing the ability to handle difficult situations. Indonesia and Thailand achieved the same, with a final joint statement condemning the war in Ukraine but with a balanced text also accepted as "constructive" by their Russian counterparts. Above all, the G20 and APEC summits served as a springboard for a newfound dialogue between Washington and Beijing, with the important face-to-face meeting between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in Bali. Meeting that was followed by intense diplomatic activity where the West, Asia and the Pacific seemed willing to build bridges in relations. For Southeast Asia and ASEAN, a test of maturity passed with flying colors.

From the bloc's summit in Cambodia to the G20 summits in Indonesia and APEC in Thailand. With elections in Malaysia in the background. Busy agenda with Southeast Asia at the center

Editorial by Alessio Piazza

When we say that ASEAN and Southeast Asia are at the center of the world, never will it be more clearly demonstrated than in these weeks. This is a November in which not only regional leaders but those from around the world are meeting in the area. Among Phnom Penh, Jakarta and Bangkok there is a rapid and crucial succession of appointments and summits that may outline diplomatic scenarios of global importance. At a time when the world is watching with apprehension the war in Ukraine and tensions in East Asia, as well as rising inflation and intensifying competition between powers, Southeast Asia can become the platform from which to start with more comforting prospects for the future. The busy schedule of events includes meetings within ASEAN, including the East Asia Summit scheduled for Nov. 8-13 in Phnom Penh, with Cambodia holding a rotating chairmanship that will pass to Indonesia in 2023. It is precisely in Indonesia, in Bali to be exact, that the G20 summit takes place on November 15 and 16. Just two days later, however, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum will open its doors in Bangkok on Nov. 18 and 19. These meetings will attract leaders from the United States, China, Japan, Russia, India and many other regionally and globally important countries. Italy included. It is rare that so many international fora of this level are scheduled in the same month in the same region. There is great anticipation for the possible bilateral between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20. While the G20 and APEC meetings will focus on economic cooperation, the ASEAN summits will also deal with politics and security, namely Ukraine and tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Indonesian President Joko Widodo also aims to achieve results on soaring energy and food prices, which are hampering global economic recovery after the halt caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Key word: multilateralism. ASEAN and Southeast Asia can become the driving force behind not only economic but also diplomatic restart.

The annual ASEAN summit is being held in Cambodia until 13 November. It is the first of three major events in November, together with APEC and G20, which will see the area at the centre of the international political scene. Between divisions and major issues, here is the agenda of the regional bloc's summit

Article by Francesco Mattogno

A month at the centre of world diplomacy. Home to three major international events, for much of November South-East Asia is a compulsory stop on the agendas of the leaders of the major powers. The first event is the 40th and 41st annual summits of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) taking place in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, until 13 November. The term 'summit' is reductive. It is six days of non-stop bilateral and multilateral meetings, from the Business and Investment Summit (ABIS) to the 25th ASEAN-China Summit and 10th ASEAN-US Summit. Many guests have also chosen to join the heads of state or government of the Association's member countries, including senior international officials such as UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and European Council President Charles Michel.

As for the ASEAN countries, Min Aung Hlaing is not present. This is the second year in a row that the general and coup prime minister of Myanmar has not been invited to the summit, a consequence of the civil war unleashed following the military coup on 1 February 2021. As for China, no trip to Cambodia for Xi Jinping: in his place Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Li arrived early to meet both Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni and Prime Minister Hun Sen. Joe Biden is instead expected to attend the meetings on 12 and 13 November. This is the first trip to Cambodia by a US President since 2012, when Barack Obama visited the country at the very last ASEAN summit chaired by Hun Sen before that.  

The non-decisions on Myanmar have highlighted gaps in the ASEAN decision-making process and reignited the debate on overcoming the 'consensus principle', whereby every member state must agree at the time of a resolution. All material for the Phnom Penh summit, where issues such as the environment, energy and post-covid recovery will probably only frame questions on politics and security. So much so that Hun Sen himself had tried, unsuccessfully, to make the summit the venue for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine. 

And politics is always at the heart of the American and Chinese presence at the summit. China winked at ASEAN by concluding a series of agreements with Vietnam and Singapore just a few days before the summit (the Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first to meet Xi Jinping after the 20th Congress). On 26 October, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also received ASEAN diplomats in Beijing, saying he hoped the Association would remain 'independent' in the future.

In turn, Biden had invited the bloc's leaders to Washington last May, ushering in a 'new era' of US-ASEAN relations. For this reason, the US President could focus on emphasising the benefits of cooperation in the fields of economic, digital, and environmental development, trying to show himself as an alternative to the People's Republic. Indeed, the US and ASEAN could establish a Global Strategic Partnership, the same one signed at last year's summit between the Association and its main trading partner: China. It is somewhat the state of normality in South-East Asia, pulled to either side. The region's aim is to remain in balance between the great powers, just as they are all knocking at its door.

The declared goal of the Indonesian presidency was to bring attention back to emerging and developing countries, but unfortunately geopolitics and the war in Ukraine got in the way

By Ilaria Zolia

Indonesia is finalising preparations to host the 15-16 November G20 summit in Bali. Joko Widodo, Indonesian President and G20 President-in-Office, visited Kiev and Moscow in late June to meet with Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin, becoming the first Asian leader to meet with both heads of state since the start of the war. Widodo's visit, stressed Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, 'underlines the concern for humanitarian issues, in an effort to help solve the food crisis caused by the war, as well as its consequences'. In various forums on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Marsudi repeated the same mantra: 'As a host nation, Indonesia is intent on advancing multilateralism and promoting post-pandemic economic growth'.

At the dawn of his G20 chairmanship and picking up the baton from Italy, Widodo had said that Indonesia hoped to provide a platform for global partnerships and international financing to support the energy transition to cleaner renewable sources during his presidency. Jakarta is well aware of the difficulties emerging economies face when faced with the transformation that the energy transition requires. What is considered one of the main solutions on the table is, for developing countries, a challenge that requires first and foremost universal access to quality electricity. Indonesia alone has sovereignty over 17,500 islands and a sinking capital city, while economic policy is deeply rooted around fossil fuels. The projects are many and ambitious, such as a solar park in Java that will be completed by the end of 2022 and will be, with its 145 Megawatts, the largest in the country. 

The declared aim of the Indonesian presidency was to bring attention back to emerging and developing countries, but unfortunately geopolitics and war got in the way. Much of the discussion in the months leading up to the summit focused on the presence of Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Joe Biden and possible bilateral meetings between the three leaders of Russia, China and the United States. In his remarks at the Global Governance Group Forum held in New York, Marsudi emphasised the need for the G20 summit to produce results that benefit everyone, without being overburdened by current geopolitical issues. Former Indonesian leader Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono invited US President Joe Biden to meet with Russian and Chinese counterparts Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Bali next month to avert the 'real possibility of a third world war'. It would be Biden's first meeting with both leaders from Moscow and Beijing since the start of the war in Ukraine. "Europe and East Asia could breathe a sigh of relief" if the Bali summit is a success, says Yudhoyono.

Against this backdrop of tensions, the Indonesian G20 presidency has long been walking a tightrope to defend its neutral stance on the war in Ukraine. Rivalries between the West and the Kremlin will pose a challenge for the summit host country, which has never openly taken sides by maintaining the ASEAN 'third way' line based on neutrality and pacifism. Despite the pressure, Indonesia has so far 'successfully handled the pressure', according to Ina Hagniningtyas Krisnamurthi, Indonesian Ambassador to India. "We hope to have a joint communiqué... and we hope to be a good host for all those who come to Bali," she told the Indian newspaper The Economic Times.

For Jakarta, the G20 is still a forum with economic development at its core to boost cooperation between emerging economies and global powers. According to Teuku Rezasyah, an expert on international relations at Padjadjaran University in West Java, the summit is likely to end without a joint communiqué due to the heated tensions between the members, which would be the same outcome as the preparatory meeting for the Foreign Ministers' Summit held on 7-8 July in Bali. "If there is no joint communiqué, there should be a statement by the President outlining the issues contested by the G20 members, so that we can see which members violate the G20 principles and which support them," he added. Indeed, at the meeting the Foreign Ministers of the participating G20 countries failed to find common ground on the war in Ukraine and its global impact. Also present at the meeting was Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov, who left the ministerial session while his German counterpart Annalena Baerbock was criticising Moscow for the war in Ukraine. Widodo has always stressed the importance of the participation of all leaders. In an interview with Bloomberg on 19 August, he said: 'We are going through a food crisis and an energy crisis. Indonesia wants to be friends with all countries, we have no problems with anyone. What we want is for this region to be stable, peaceful, so that we can build economic growth. And I think not only Indonesia, but also Asian countries want the same thing,' he concluded. During its chairmanship of the G20, Indonesia has developed an agenda that reflects the interests of developing countries in global health architecture, digital economy transformation and energy transition. Jakarta hopes that somehow its agenda will not be erased from geopolitics altogether.

The Southeast Asian bloc already has many strengths, but also the potential to further strengthen its functioning and role

Editorial by Lorenzo Lamperti

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations plays a key role regionally and globally. But there is still room for improvement to make ASEAN increasingly integrated and effective at all levels. How? By succeeding in integrating and involving in decision-making and organizational processes the various collateral bodies that can help bring strategic and intellectual guidance to the bloc's actions. A positive case in point is the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a regional organization created in 1993. It is an informal mechanism that includes the strategic study centers of ASEAN member states and the 17 non-ASEAN states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), thus allowing intellectuals, scholars and policymakers to exchange information and views on the future of the region. In an editorial published in recent days, The Diplomat lines up a number of examples where more can be done instead and are worth mentioning. According to the author, Teh Pi Li, there is little coordination among national think tanks, ministries, and ASEAN institutions, with most research institutes dealing mostly with national security issues and regional social or cultural questions not being a priority. "In a broader sense, ASEAN has not clarified how scholars or stakeholders can be involved in the ASEAN-led mechanisms mentioned in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), through which ASEAN hopes to engage stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions," reads The Diplomat, which states that "there is a lack of formal mechanisms through which stakeholders can exchange ideas and information." The economic front is then mentioned, with linkages between the various ASEAN trade councils and those of the bloc's external partners in need of great strengthening. ASEAN sees itself as a "community," and it already is in so many ways. But to navigate the turbulent waters of the present, there is perhaps a need to further strengthen a ship that is already steadfast but can become even more secure as it proceeds into the future.

A debate has arisen within the bloc of South East Asian countries on the Association's decision-making mechanisms

Editorial by Valerio Bordonaro

Director Associazione Italia-ASEAN

That of consensus "is the fundamental principle of ASEAN for mutually beneficial cooperation and to ensure the continuity of the Association in fully integrating the bloc, so as to realise the building of the ASEAN community". It is the so-called 'ASEAN way' characterised by neutrality and pacifism that we have talked about several times. And which Cambodian Chun Sovannarith also talks about. That is the key, in his view, to the 'extraordinary success' of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in making the region 'stable, peaceful, inclusive, sustainable, resilient and prosperous for over five decades'. For 55 years, ASEAN has been making its decisions based on the consensus model, which is cited six times in the 55 articles of the association's Charter. Through this shared decision-making process, an alternative to the majority principle, a mechanism of integration and continuous consultation between all member states has thus been produced. Lately, however, an idea has been circulating that, if applied, could make some changes to this historic unity of purpose. On the model of the 'ASEAN Minus X' (a formula that allowed some states of the group not to implement tariff and trade policies adopted in common), there are those who imagine the creation of a 'majority with super-vote' model aimed at improving the institutional effectiveness of the association in cases where consensus is not reached on regional or international issues of common interest. A position on which it may be worth opening a debate, but according to Chun Sovannarith, 'one must ask whether or not any new model would fit the current context, considering that the consensus principle already works effectively for ASEAN's unity in diversity, under the motto of one vision, one identity and one community'. In this sense, it can also be said that this idea 'may not be consistent with the very nature of ASEAN', he adds, expressing a position that matches that of the Cambodian government. Based on the articles of the association's Charter, Chun continues, 'the legal personality of ASEAN must take precedence over political decision-making by far, as the leaders' decision-making is legally bound by the principle of consensus'. Opinions aside, it should be considered that to change the decision-making model and amend the Charter would require the consensus of all ASEAN states.

South-East Asian nations condemn the Russian offensive in Ukraine but cannot afford sanctions that affect their economies

South-East Asia holds on to its commercial relations with Moscow, while the West and its Asian partners continue to impose sanctions and condemn Russia for its offensive in Ukraine. Geopolitical tremors triggered by the invasion spread internationally. However, if among the ranks of Moscow's detractors it is China that is described (wrongly) as the only 'defector', the South-East Asian countries have opted for a 'third way' of their own. On the one hand, they have joined the chorus of condemnation at the multilateral level; on the other, Singapore is the only representative of the region to have imposed sanctions on Moscow. Countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Indonesia, prefer to remain cautious so as not to jeopardise the resilience of their economies, while Myanmar’s militarist junta refuse to give up Russian arms flowing into the country.

The post-pandemic economic crisis has forced some ASEAN member states to take stock of their resources before adopting an untenable diplomatic stance vis-à-vis Russia. Indeed, most South-East Asian nations consider the war in Ukraine a regional crisis that does not involve them. Moreover, ASEAN's paradigm of values hinges on the principle of neutrality, borrowed from the colonial experience to which these territories were subjected for decades. For this reason, Southeast Asia is reluctant to close trade and political relations with the Russian Federation and condemn it to political and economic isolation.

Thailand has declared that it will restore regular air service between Moscow and Phuket at the end of October, a move to reinvigorate the tourism sector hit by the pandemic. Between January and February, before the invasion, Russians accounted for the majority of tourists travelling to Thailand. But the popular Moscow-Phuket service was suspended just after the outbreak of the conflict. Since Beijing's 'zero-Covid' policy is restraining Chinese tourists from organising trips to Southeast Asia - and flights from China used to be an important income for Bangkok - Thailand will focus on attracting at least one million Russian tourists this year. In addition, Moscow and Bangkok aim to expand bilateral trade to reach a trade volume of $10 billion in 2023 (about four times that of 2021), as Thai Trade Minister Jurin Laksanawisit said on the sidelines of APEC meetings in May.

Vietnam, on the other hand, focuses on food supply. On 18 August, talks were held to expand trade in wheat, the flow of which from Russia in 2021 had already fallen below 190,000 tonnes - from around 2.6 million in 2018 - due to the presence of potentially invasive thistle seeds. Then, on 6 September, a new connection between sea and rail freight routes between Russia and Vietnam was launched, which will facilitate logistical interactions and enable the direct transfer of goods. Financial cooperation is also a crucial issue for Russia and ASEAN countries, which have discussed the possibility of switching to payments in national currencies, in particular with the Vietnamese dong and Indonesian rupiah. The possibility of finding alternative payment systems to the traditional ones, such as the Russian MIR circuit, would also be on the table.

Moscow is also the leading arms supplier in South-East Asia. President Vladimir Putin has always recognised the region's great political and commercial potential, and has opted to use defence diplomacy to strengthen cooperation with the region's players. One of the main destinations for Russian military equipment and armaments is Myanmar. In a meeting on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok in early September, the leader of Burma's coup military junta Min Aung Hlaing addressed President Putin with these words: 'We should call you not only leader of Russia, but also leader of the world, because you control and organise the stability of the whole world'. As Channel News Asia suggested, Min Aung Hlaing's comment comes at a time when both governments find themselves diplomatically isolated: Moscow over its military intervention in Ukraine, Naypyidaw over a military coup last year. In the ASEAN-Russia relationship, the complexity of international relations in the age of the globalised economy becomes clear. Most of ASEAN's trade with Russia involves Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam. The growth of high value-added products sold by ASEAN is also increasing, partly due to the vacuum left by European suppliers who have left the Russian market. These economic performances seem to contradict the international community's almost unanimous condemnation of the offensive in Ukraine. At the multilateral level, ASEAN countries joined the UN's calls for peace. But when the General Assembly voted to suspend the Russian Federation from membership of the UN Human Rights Council in April, many Southeast Asian countries abstained. These included Singapore, as well as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia, while Vietnam and Laos voted against. This progressive softening towards Moscow is justified by assessments of economic and political pragmatism. The different postures adopted in the multilateral sphere on the one hand, however, confirm the regional actors' adherence to the rules of international law. On the other, they manifest a refusal to isolate Russia, with a message that implies that the multilateral system is moving - despite the crises or precisely because of them - towards greater inclusiveness.

Some ASEAN countries still host some of the richest royal families in the world. How do the monarchs of Southeast Asia live today and what role do they play?

Elizabeth II is dead, Rama IX is dead...and I don't feel so well myself. Monarchs in ASEAN countries continue to influence, to a greater or lesser extent, the political, social, and economic dynamics of their countries. With the only exception of Brunei, where a regime of almost absolute monarchy remains, the other states of the region have long begun a process of governance redefinition facing an increasingly modern world.

Many prerogatives of power and representation are still part of for royal families’ duties. They also remain influential figures due to their enormous wealth. Nonetheless, Asian dynasties are part of the national identity and reflect some distinctive features of their homeland, such as religion or ethnic majorities’ traditions. Public opinion on their behavior is equally varied: in some countries, monarchs are put in a bad light by corruption and fancy habits, while in others they are the most appreciated public figures since they promote social development and social rights.

Thailand

The 2014 coup was not the only event that upset Thailand’s public order in recent years. In 2016, the death of King Rama IX (Bhumibol Adulyadej) after 70 years of regency became the subject of one of the most spectacular national mourning in the world. Over 250,000 people flocked to the capital to celebrate the monarch's funeral, who was cremated in a building specially built for the occasion. A whole year of national mourning followed, which included (for the first 30 days) a ban on organizing parties or playing music.

The Chakri dynasty ascended to the throne in 1782 and experienced years of prosperity and expansion of its influence in the region. In the 19th century, King Rama IV also managed to negotiate agreements with the United Kingdom that allowed the country to maintain a certain independence (unlike the other kingdoms and sultanates in the region) and start the construction of a modern state. The accession of King Rama IX to the throne in 1946 plays a pivotal role in Thai history: he attempted to hold the country together in the face of numerous coups and promoted social development through educational programs and financial support. On the contrary his successor, Maha Vajiralongkorn (Rama X), has been largely criticized. As Forbes estimated in 2011, the Thai royal house is the richest in the world, with an estimated assets of at least $ 30 billion. Thailand has one of the strictest Lese Majesty laws, which in recent years has often been used to thwart anti-government protests that have sometimes resulted in anti-monarchist positions.

Cambodia

Cambodia also introduced a lese majesty law in 2018. Starting in 1993 the King of Cambodia is elected by the Royal Council of the Throne, a group of nine Cambodian authorities that includes the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate. The criterion for accessing the selection? Be at least thirty years old and descend from the family of King Ang Duong (1796-1860), who today is divided into the houses of Norodom and Sisowath.

King Norodom Sihamoni continues to have some decision-making power in the choice of some government positions, including the prime minister. Sihamoni enjoys a certain respect even abroad, unlike the rest of the royal family, which in 2006 US officials in the country had defined "a tragedy, comedy and melodrama all rolled into one that could have provided grist for at least a half dozen Shakespeare plays” (comment exposed by Wikileaks).

Malaysia

Cambodia is not the only country to have adopted a constitutional monarchy that differs from the hereditary standard of a single dynasty. Malaysia also adopts a governance system that provides for the election of a monarch every five years, according to a shift among the sultans of nine of the thirteen states into which the country is divided. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong ("He who is made Lord") plays above all a representative role of the Malay and Muslim community. In fact, starting from the 1990s, the sultans gradually lost their powers, until the elimination of the same political immunity.

Yang di-Pertuan Agong can choose the prime minister but cannot dismiss him. He plays a representative role in diplomatic missions and is considered the symbolic leader of the armed forces. The sultans, who also play the role of "Guardians of Islam", have often exposed themselves to the issues of corruption in the ruling class and Islamic extremism (whose values ​​are often intertwined with Malaysian supremacism). In recent years, for example, they have opposed the implementation of the Hudud, a subset of Sharia law (the body of precepts derived from the Qumran and which some Islamic countries integrate into their own system of laws).

Indonesia

Even more marginal is the role of Indonesian royal families, who do not officially hold power but maintain a status of representation. The identity connotation, in this case, is still strong: in some areas of the country, such as Java, Bali and Borneo. An example of this is the survival of the Javanese Halus ("refined") culture that revolves all around the ceremonials of the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. King Hamengkubuwono X is the only sultan recognized by the government and has risen to the headlines for removing the compulsory male ancestry to the throne. A decree of 2015, in fact, made the title of sultan neutral, thus opening the royal career to his five daughters. He also put an end to the traditional polygamy of the Sultans of Java, always with a view to modernizing the sultanate and to give more rights to women.

Brunei

The influence of the Sultan of Brunei, the only monarch who still holds absolute power in Southeast Asia, is quite different. And it is not the only record: the Guinness Book of Records classifies Istana Nurul Iman ("Palace of the light of faith") as the largest royal residence in the world. The building occupies over 200,000 square meters with its 1788 rooms, 257 bathrooms, a banquet hall that can accommodate up to 5,000 people and an air-conditioned stable that houses 200 polo ponies. Hassanal Bolkiah, in addition to being one of the richest rulers in the world, has also become the longest-serving monarch after the death of Elizabeth II and has reigned continuously since 1967.

The Legislative Council of Brunei was established with the 1959 Constitution but, in fact, its members only have advisory powers. In fact, on the occasion of the revolts of 1962, the king obtained full powers by declaring a state of emergency, which is still in force today. Unlike Malaysia, Sharia laws are part of the regulatory body of Brunei along with some laws inherited from the colonial period.