The Burma issue continues to be a complicated challenge for Southeast Asian countries. The bloc tries to show commonality of purpose
Unity. This was the concept mentioned repeatedly at the summit of foreign ministers of the governments of ASEAN countries held in Jakarta last weekend. The summit represented the official launch of Indonesia's 2023 rotating presidency. And President Joko Widodo's administration was immediately resolute in its attempt to close ranks on the most politically and diplomatically thorny issue: the crisis in Myanmar. Two years after the military coup, the situation is still far from resolved. The Burmese military's recent decision to extend the nationwide state of emergency by six months has sparked controversy at home and condemnation abroad, as the move was perceived as a signal that general elections promised for next summer will be postponed. The country's transition to civilian rule appears to be receding, while the five-point consensus reached between the military junta and ASEAN remains largely unimplemented. At the end of the summit, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said Jakarta had proposed to member countries a peace plan implementing the five-point consensus, which called first and foremost for an end to violence and dialogue between the military and rebels. According to Marsudi, all regional government representatives have accepted the proposal. This is a positive sign for Indonesia, whose rotating presidency promises to be very proactive on the issue. "This plan is very important as a guide to deal with the situation in Myanmar in a unified way," the Indonesian government claims. From outside and within the Southeast Asian region, moreover, come calls for ASEAN to adopt a more assertive posture and thus make a quantum leap in the face of one of the most complex challenges the bloc has faced in recent times. Indonesia seems willing to facilitate this process, but at the same time President Widodo has warned the major powers not to use Southeast Asia as their own field of challenge. Confirming that ASEAN is not willing to take part in contention or contribute to the return of an opposing bloc logic.
Some exogenous pressures on Beijing have encouraged the relocation of manufacturing production facilities from China to Southeast Asia. The primary beneficiaries of this transition in addition to Vietnam are Cambodia and Myanmar
Global value chains in manufacturing are shifting their production center of gravity from China to Southeast Asia. This is one of those phenomena that the spread of the pandemic has accelerated, triggered by rising Chinese labor costs and then confirmed by exogenous factors such as the trade war between Washington and Beijing in recent years. The exodus of the manufacturing sector thus seems to be rewarding some countries in the southern neighborhood: although Vietnam has always been a popular destination for export orders from China, it is now Cambodia and Myanmar that are the contenders for the role of manufacturing hub in East Asia.
The intra-regional offshoring dynamic had been ushered in by rising labor costs in China, prompting several companies in the manufacturing and textile sectors to explore other markets in the region. Given the restrictions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, Apple, Samsung, and Xiaomi recently moved their assembly lines to Vietnam as Beijing grappled with new variants of the virus. Hanoi offered those multinationals that had once built manufacturing plants in China with a view to minimizing costs and maximizing profits easier access to the promising Southeast Asian market, which has inherited from its northern neighbor the role of the new frontier of globalization.
But in addition to Vietnam, which has long been considered the locomotive of Southeast Asia, other countries in the ASEAN bloc are vying to serve as regional production hubs. According to Wang Huanan, a manufacturing expert, "Vietnam has been a very popular destination (...) but Myanmar and Cambodia have been catching up in recent years." Indeed, Naypyidaw and Pnom Penh have implemented shrewd economic policy strategies to attract as much foreign direct investment as possible, thereby boosting their own domestic growth. Between tax exemptions and policy incentives, they have made themselves attractive in the eyes of East Asian-based multinationals seeking new profit opportunities in the emerging markets of the Southeast.
In Cambodia, total trade volume reached $22.47 billion in the first five months of 2022, up 19.7 percent from the same period a year earlier. Total exports saw a 34.5 percent year-on-year increase, while the most exported goods were garments, leather goods and footwear. On the other hand, Myanmar is a popular destination for Chinese garment factories. The number of these companies, according to experts, has increased from less than 100 in 2012 to more than 500 in 2019. Between 2012 and 2019, the average annual growth of Myanmar's garment exports exceeded 18 percent and in some years exceeded 50 percent. The sector's development was slowed only by the pandemic in 2020 and last year's military coup.
As the Chinese economy recovers from the restrictions of the strict "Zero Covid" policy, multinationals that had benefited from China's low labor costs are now looking to the southern neighborhood for new profit opportunities. Among the emerging markets in the ASEAN bloc, Vietnam leads regional growth. But an eye must be kept on the incipient development of Cambodia and Myanmar, among the biggest beneficiaries of China's manufacturing exodus.
While Moscow is engaged in the conflict, Naypyidaw once again counts low on Russia's list of priorities. And China is preparing to fill this void despite mistrust on both sides
"Neither with Russia, nor with Ukraine" is a slogan that would sound unpleasant to the ears of the ruling military junta in Myanmar. The friends of the Burmese army, the Tatmadaw, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. And among these, Moscow and Kiev were the best partners on the arms market, the only means to legitimize their power by force after the coup of February 1, 2021. With the Ukrainian crisis, Myanmar has some inevitable points in common, the same as in all conflicts: poverty, destruction and chaos. As reported by the UN envoy to Myanmar Andrew Kirkwood, the number of Burmese in absolute poverty has reached three million, while basic public services have collapsed, especially in rural areas. What has not stopped is the violence of the clashes, which continue to cause civilian deaths. In this context of a profound economic and political crisis, it is no longer certain that the Tatmadaw will be able to (re)shape the country in its own image and likeness. Above all, it no longer has its back covered. With Russia distracted it may have to look elsewhere for a protector, looking towards China. A choice that the Burmese army has always tried to delay because of the historical distrust towards Beijing, which had deep relations with the government of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Since the armed forces have regained power, the unequal struggle between almost unarmed citizens and a Tatmadaw equipped with military means as well as tools for surveillance and tracking of rebel nuclei, the groups that identify themselves in the People's Defense Forces (PDA) or in the more structured ethnic armies, has immediately emerged. To them, too, the news of two fewer players on the market somehow adds further difficulties in a context of increasing scarcity. The Pdfs struggle to find full armed support from the democratic government-in-exile (the National Unity Government of Myanmar, or NUG), and even more elusive is support from Western countries. In recent weeks, the US State Department has officially defined the repression of the Rohingya as "genocide", but on a concrete level, Western pressure on the coup government has weakened, also due to the Ukrainian "distraction". The same applies to the armies of the ethnic groups, often in conflict with each other. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict could erode both traditional commercial networks and the more opaque trafficking of raw materials and drugs - often the basis of the informal armies' income.
Meanwhile, the coup has severed most trade and diplomatic ties with the West, leaving little room for maneuver for the military junta's business. The threat of an increasingly self-focused Russia risks reducing not only the Tatmadaw's war potential, but also trade in drugs and other essential goods in favor - once again - of Beijing. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Western powers are struggling to find the right channels (unrelated to the junta) to provide the necessary aid. Of the 350 million dollars requested by the UN envoy in 2021, for example, only a third has arrived and this does not remove the risk of repercussions from the army. The same natural resources that abound in Myanmar do not seem to represent an incentive attractive enough to draw the attention of Western partners beyond the sanctions issued in the past and the embargo on arms sales.
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Myanmar seemed naturally headed for the emergence of new pseudo-democratic institutions. The Tatmadaw, in fact, is gearing up to take off its uniform and put on the clothes of politics. The current State Administrative Council (Sac), the governmental institution created ad hoc after the coup, is talking about calling new elections by August 2023: a pluralistic competition of façade, necessary to try to regain the trust of trade partners, investors and international donors. Among these, China is playing in advance: the NUG has disappeared from official statements and bilateral initiatives now involve the diplomatic arm of the Tatmadaw, former colonel Wunna Maung Lwin.
He was invited in March 2022 as part of an Asean delegation visiting Beijing to talk about the "negative effects of the Ukrainian crisis in Southeast Asia." Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi then met with him in Anhui on April 1 to confirm China's "utmost support" for Myanmar's development "regardless of how the geopolitical situation changes." These statements, along with projects such as the construction of new infrastructure (e.g., a new gas pipeline) and the launch of industrial zones along the border, come at a crucial time. A moment in which a "no" becomes increasingly unthinkable, even in the face of the Tatmadaw's historical distrust of the People's Republic. In the meantime, the possibility of an unstable Myanmar for a long time to come with Russia's departure is bringing Beijing closer to ethnic groups. A strategy that keeps all possibilities open, but that the president of the NUG (criticizing Beijing for approaching a government it defines as "illegitimate") has defined as "dangerous" because it could "continue, and not cease, internal conflicts.
From the Internet and social media boom in 2013 to their shutdown intermittently starting in 2021. How the Burmese military's coup has changed social media use
War and social media, a binomial founded on a mutual dependence and that has developed since the middle of the 19th century with the birth of modern information tools. Since then, this relationship, almost intrinsic, has not failed but, on the contrary, it has reinforced and led to a growth in the informative exposure of conflicts. Two elements of this relationship are interesting: the first is the attempt to control information traffic, the second is the intensive use of social media as weapons.
Both of these processes are known to the Military Junta and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), respectively, two of the main actors in the situation in Myanmar.
After February 1, 2021, the date marking the third coup in the country's history, and following the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the long-hidden discontent erupted on the streets of Burma making itself heard loudly through the CDM, with social media playing a key role in its creation and in its struggle.
The history of Myanmar is sadly surrounded by conflicts, starting from the Anglo-Boer ones up to the invasion of Japan. This time, however, the role of social media has taken on a strong central role, thanks to the fact that it was only in 2013 that the state monopoly on telephone services came to an end, thus allowing a higher fruition of the Internet and associated services. Nevertheless, the policies of the Military Junta against freedom of opinion and expression, implemented since February 2021, have considerably modified the structure of social media users. In fact, while there were 23.65 million Internet users and 29 million social media users in January 2021; one year later, the number has risen to 25.68 million - an increase of +7.1% during 2021 - while there is a sharp collapse in social media users, which stood at 20.75 million in January 2022, practically ⅓ fewer users. According to Statcounter Global Stats in March 2022, the most used social media in Myanmar is Facebook (87.21%), followed by YouTube (5.48%), Pinterest (3.5%), Twitter (1.67%), VKontakte (1.21%), and Instagram (0.38%).
In addition to its predominance in the country, Facebook is also known to have played a complex role in Myanmar. In point of fact, if on the one hand it has succeeded in unifying Burmese citizens and creating direct communication between the people and the government in charge, on the other hand it has not been able to control the difficulties arising from the rapid spread of social media in a short period of time, such as hate speech and misinformation problems related to the absence of the so-called "critical digital literacy". Despite the fact that Facebook has adopted tools and policies aimed at solving the above-mentioned problems, they did not disappear but re-emerged with force on the occasion of the 2020 elections and, subsequently, after the coup d'état which was followed by the ban on the use of Facebook. The military junta believed that this move could stop the manifestations and activism of the CDM but, on the contrary, it led to an exponential increase in the use of Twitter which, however, was not able to solve the problems of misinformation and hate speech that plagued its brother-Facebook.
According to Freedom House's analysis, Internet freedom in Myanmar has suffered an acute setback since the coup and marked "the most serious decline ever documented by Freedom on the Net", as noted in the introduction to the Report, which gives the country an overall score of 17/100.
Although social and Internet platforms are obscured and blocked in Myanmar by the military government, protesters are capable of bypassing these bans through encrypted messaging - such as Signal, Viber, and Messenger - and VPNs; moreover, applications such as Bridgefy ensured that protesters could communicate with each other even during moments of total Internet blackout. This shows how limited and antiquated the practice of Internet shutdown is, but also how strong the resistance of citizens is.
In conclusion, even though social media is not without its flaws and headaches and the road to its conscious, effective use is still long, it must be acknowledged that it played a crucial role in the birth and survival of the CDM. They have been able to keep the attention on the issue alive at an international level, they have been capable of bringing among Burmese citizens the value of inclusiveness, since the main language used in social media was Burmese and they have been a place - albeit virtual - where the key words were resistance and solidarity.
Myanmar promises to still be at the center of Southeast Asian dynamics during 2022. With internal rifts deepening and in the absence of a recognised national government, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's recent visit has set the dust on fire
By Tommaso Grisi
Myanmar continues to be at the center of attention. Following the coup that overthrew the government of Aung San Suu Kyi, the relationship with the military junta has created many problems for diplomats in South-East Asia and the rest of the world. While the stance taken by Western countries was predictable, with the United States and the European Union adopting economic sanctions against the country from the outset, it is on ASEAN that the biggest questions are now being asked. The South-East Asian organization seems to be the only actor capable of exerting serious pressure on the country, given the ineffectiveness of the economic measures adopted and the impossibility of intervention by the United Nations, where China and Russia have vetoed the Security Council. The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, is also aware of this, and last December he led a diplomatic mission to South-East Asia, expressing strong concerns to the leaders of partner countries about what is happening in Myanmar.
For their part, the ASEAN member states have already declared that they do not want to follow the path of economic sanctions and prefer a softer but constructive approach. It was with this in mind that a five-point plan was initially drawn up, aimed at providing humanitarian aid to the population and establishing a political dialogue between the parties.
However, the divisions among the member states and the lack of cooperation of the parties involved have led to a deadlock, with the region's chancelleries undecided on what to do. Despite the common will to bring the country to a more stable condition as soon as possible, in fact, several knots remain to be unraveled within the organization, starting from the recognition or not of the governing role assumed by the military junta, currently excluded from ASEAN meetings, and the need to review the traditional principle of non-interference that has so far guided the actions of Member States.
In this respect, the visit of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was significant and met with strong criticism. Opponents of the junta accuse him of trying to legitimize the established regime, especially in light of the fact that Hun Sen himself took power in Cambodia in a military coup in 1997. The issue is all the more important considering the fact that the Prime Minister has been visiting the junta in two capacities: as President of ASEAN and as the first head of government to visit the country since the military seized power. This is certainly nothing new for the Cambodian Prime Minister, as he had already been criticized in the past for taking an overly open stance towards the Burmese junta, especially after proposing to extend an invitation to attend ASEAN meetings to those responsible for the coup. Despite this, the Cambodian Prime Minister seems intent on continuing along this path, having appointed his Foreign Minister, Prak Sokhonn, as the new special envoy representing ASEAN to Myanmar.
Exclusion from ASEAN meetings could indeed be a point of leverage. The access to the meetings of the governments of South-East Asia would constitute a de facto recognition for the military junta, fundamental to be able to interface as equals with the other countries of the region. It is precisely on this point that the credibility of ASEAN seems to be at stake. If the organization were to give in to the junta's pressure, in fact, it would be impossible not to suffer a severe blow to its international image, given that in recent months there has been no lack of tension between the Member States with reference to the Burmese issue.
The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, which have openly criticized Hun Sen's visit to the country, as well as Singapore, are in strong opposition to Cambodia's positions, while representatives of Laos, Thailand and Vietnam have lined up in support of him. In short, the cracks within the organization seem to be deepening.
On February 1, 2022, 365 days will have passed since the coup that brought Naypyidaw back under the control of the military junta. The outlook for the country that represents a dilemma for Southeast Asia. From the China Files mini e-book "In China and Asia 2022", realized in collaboration with Associazione Italia-ASEAN
It's any day in December 2021. Typing "Myanmar 2022" on the search bar, three of the results concern a possible reopening for tourism, while three others take up the UN alarm on the escalation of the humanitarian crisis. This schizophrenia of images reinforces the uncertainty about the future of Myanmar, which almost a year after the coup is crystallized in a social (and armed) conflict that seems destined to continue. On February 1, 2022, exactly 365 days will have passed since the deposition of the elected government by the Tatmadaw, the national army.
Humanitarian crisis
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has noted a sharp decline in the living conditions of Burmese citizens since the arrival of General Min Aung Hlaing in government. According to its survey, nearly half of Burmese citizens (46.3%) could end up below the poverty line by the end of next year. For the urban population, it would mean a spike in poor residents three times the 2019 figures (37.2% vs. the previous 11.3%). Of 1,200 households surveyed, nearly half say they are running out of savings. 68% are tightening their belts on food consumption, 65.5% have borrowed from loved ones, others from loan sharks or lenders. In a nutshell: the double Covid19-golpe emergency is taking the country back to 2005, wiping out the political and socio-economic achievements of the last 16 years.
Added to this situation is the serious situation of the health sector, which already before 2021 was not in good health. To date, the interests of the military leadership are far removed from services for the citizenry, with the result that many medical facilities remain unstaffed - a factor also due to the civil disobedience movement, which refuses to work for a government it does not recognize. To date, 74% of medical costs are still borne by the individual: Myanmar is the Asean country with the highest private spending on treatment per capita.
Finally, the continuity of internal violence between ethnic groups and the armed forces is no less worrying. On the one hand, youth have joined the civil disobedience movement; others have joined ethnic armies to receive military training. The Tatmadaw, in turn, has resurrected compulsory training for children of soldiers aged 14 and over, despite treaties signed with the UN to hinder the enlistment of child soldiers. Participation in training is now also extended to the wives of military personnel.
Economic and political stagnation
The economic situation is not good at the national level, although there were those who hoped for an initial phase of chaos followed by a slow reestablishment of business. GDP per capita is falling back to the levels before the first free elections in 2015. The local currency, the kyat, has lost more than 60% of its value against the US dollar. Meanwhile, prices are rising and gasoline shortages have already led to the temporary closure of many stations. The International Food Policy Research Institute predicts a drop in fertilizer purchases during the monsoon season, with serious consequences for agricultural production. Trade is slowing, and restrictions along the borders due to the health emergency are only contributing to the halt in activity. The junta has already restricted imports of goods considered "non-essential," while other goods such as pharmaceuticals are becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to source.
In a climate of serious lack of governance, economic power is likely to be concentrated in the hands of the Tatmadaw and ethnic militias in their areas of influence. The specter of illicit trafficking linked to the smuggling of drugs, precious stones, wood and metals returns. And of human trafficking: according to the Global Slavery Index in 2018 at least 575 thousand Burmese citizens were living in conditions of slavery, a figure that could rise again due to growing personal debts.
International relations
Myanmar today seems an increasingly isolated country, an image that resonates familiarly with that of just a few years ago. Foreign companies are slowly leaving the country, as in the case of Norwegian telecommunications giant Telenor, German wholesaler Metro, and British American Tobacco. Not all of the economy is frozen. Despite sanctions against individuals and organizations linked to the Tatmadaw, some large capital flows continue to bring weapons and funding to the Burmese military. As reported by the group Justice for Myanmar, there are still many companies that sell weapons and surveillance systems to the Burmese army (including Italy).
While the response of Western powers - especially the U.S., EU, Australia and Canada - remains on the ropes of economic restrictions, Asean is still struggling to find its position. Or rather, it remains open to negotiations. After an initial phase of dialogue with General Min Aung Hlaing, the group has also broken off contact: the junta has not kept its promise to adhere to the five points requested by the Association, and is therefore isolated even among its neighbors (including "immediately cease violence in the country"). Cambodia's arrival in the presidency, however, could normalize relations by increasing engagement with the military junta. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen came out in defense of Naypyidaw: "According to the ASEAN charter, no one has the right to expel another member." More attempts at dialogue could follow after the early January visit. In the same days as Hun Sen's declarations came the official condemnation of Aung San Suu-Kyi to four years in prison. The road back to democracy, once again, is far away.
Foreign companies operating in Myanmar are struggling to continue their operations given the political and economic situation. But they are also reluctant to leave: let's see why.
Following the COVID-19 pandemic and the political and economic crisis triggered by the military coup last February, foreign companies present in Myanmar are in a very critical situation, as confirmed by the collapse of investments that these companies have made in the country, at their lowest since eight years.
The Burmese economy, according to the Asian Development Bank, has contracted by 18.4% in the last year and the situation does not look set to improve in the near future, so much so that the International Monetary Fund has recently revised downwards its forecasts for the rate of economic growth in 2022. At the root of this, there is the collapse of the local currency, the kyat, and the significant increase in food prices, all factors contributing to the growing unease of the population.
Political uncertainty, slumping local demand and currency volatility have prompted many foreign companies to close or downsize local operations. Liquidity shortages and banking sector dysfunctions have also limited the ability of businesses to pay employees and suppliers. Internet access was also severely restricted in the three months following the coup. These shocks weakened consumption, investment and trade and also limited the operations of companies in the supply of labor and other inputs.
Already in the first months after the coup of the regime, large companies such as the energy giants EDF and Petronas, but also the Thai group Amata and the Singaporean engineering company Sembcorp ceased or suspended operations in Myanmar. In addition, British American Tobacco (BAT) announced last October that it would leave the Burmese market at the end of 2021, although its departure was officially motivated by purely commercial decisions. In fact, having started operations there in 2013 with an initial investment of $50 million, BAT's exit from Myanmar after less than a decade reflects the critical situation the country has plunged into. Also in the same month, the Kempinski Hotel, in the capital Naypyidaw, which had also hosted President Barack Obama during his state visit in 2014 and was an important symbol of the country's openness, ceased operations.
But exiting Myanmar is not an easy step for all companies. Many, in fact, have invested in multi-year infrastructure, and an immediate exit strategy is impractical. This is the case, for example, of Australian natural gas giant Woodside Energy, which merely states that "all business decisions in Myanmar are under review."
Another company that is struggling to leave the country, albeit for other reasons, is Norwegian telecommunications giant Telenor. The latter is strongly motivated to cease operations in Myanmar not only because of the serious deterioration of the business environment, which has resulted in a loss of over 782 million US dollars, but also in order not to give up to government attempts to control the company's activities. More specifically, the military junta has tried several times, although in vain, to force Telenor to limit web traffic and intercept users in order to allow the authorities to spy on calls and messages.
However, the company is still waiting to obtain the approval for the sale of the activities to the Lebanese company M1. This comes in the wake of a confidential order, issued last June, requiring senior executives of both foreign and Burmese telecommunications companies to leave Naypyidaw only with special permission, which does not seem to be forthcoming.
Moreover, it should not be underestimated that the problematic financial situation only complicates the possible exit of the companies. The banks, which were stormed by long queues at ATMs at the beginning of this year, are still under pressure and liquidity is scarce, making repatriation of the remaining capital extremely difficult. As if that were not enough, the pandemic has also arrived, imposing travel restrictions and onerous quarantine requirements for those crossing borders.
There remains a profound unpredictability about the political situation in the medium and long term, which increases the margin of uncertainty for foreign companies as to whether or not they should remain in the country. These companies, which have been investing in Myanmar since 2011, when it was hoped that the process of democratic transition would be irreversible, are now in doubt whether to pack their bags or ride out the storm.
The products’ boycott, the opinion of the international community and the economic crisis are shaking the international companies in the country.
The coup in Myanmar has inflicted a severe blow to the country's economy, already weakened last year by the emergency of COVID-19. The massive protests of the last five months, the workers’ strikes and the violent actions perpetrated by the Burmese army have led workers to leave the major cities and their jobs, seeking refuge in small villages and forests.
With the interruption of public and banking services and with daily internet shutdowns, the economic crisis has expanded dramatically, and the data of the latest report drawn up by the World Bank are clear: Burma's industrial sector has suffered a contraction of 11 percentage points compared to 2020, while services sector lost over 13 points. Over the years both sectors have made an important contribution to the country's economic growth: from 2014 to 2019, 6% of Burmese annual GDP growth came from the secondary and tertiary sectors, but these numbers dropped to 1% in 2020, and with 2021 forecasting even more negative figures.
These signs had already been perceived at the beginning of March when, due to the coup, 13% of companies in Myanmar had had to close their offices, waiting for a return to normality. The instability of the banking system and the inability of making online payments has inflicted a notable blow to companies: according to research involving 372 firms operating in Myanmar, 77% said that it is precisely the fragile banking system that has led to a drop in turnover.
Furthermore, as there is not much liquid money, citizens have been forced in recent months to make essential purchases with the few kyats that could be withdrawn from Burmese banks.
Five months after the military coup, international companies have now two alternatives: close their offices or bite the bullet while waiting for a stable situation in Myanmar. Foodpanda, a leading company in the food-delivery sector owned by the German Delivery Hero, has decided to continue operating in Myanmar despite the difficulties encountered in recent months with the blocking of internet and online purchases.
A different choice was taken by Telenor, the Norwegian telecommunications giant which was forced to cancel contracts and all operations in the country for an estimated loss of around 780 million dollars.
With regard to companies, the Burmese Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is also playing an important role in boycotting those companies that collaborate and fund the military government of General Ming Aung Hlaing: in recent months has been created the application "Way Way Nay ” which allows people to know if a company is directly connected to the military junta, so you can boycott it and decide to not buy its products. This has led to the boycott of products created by Chinese companies, as retaliation against Beijing, which until now has never taken a clear stance and which has repeatedly voted against the economic sanctions provided by the United Nations against the military regime.
Finally, the influence of the international community should not be underestimated: some international brands have decided to interrupt contacts with the military government driven by the fear of episodes that could damage the brand’s name (this is the case of international brands such as Nike and Adidas which recently announced that they no longer want to use the cotton produced in the Xinjiang region).
In Myanmar, H&M - the leading company in the clothing sector - announced last March that it has for the time being interrupted the relationship with its suppliers in Myanmar due to the dramatic events regarding the violation of human rights by the Burmese army.
Like H&M, other international companies such as McKinsey, Coca Cola and media agency Reuters have abandoned their offices in Sule Square, a giant shopping complex in Yangon owned by the Burmese army, so as not to fund the military junta.
On 8th November, a day of semi-free elections in Myanmar’s ‘disciplined democracy’, Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese Army, pledged to accept the will of the people and the results of the vote. However, less than three months later, a military coup led to the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the party that won the elections, the declaration of a state of emergency, and the appointment of the Commander as President of the newly formed State Administration Council. Nevertheless, the 64-year-old general is not someone who changes his mind easily.
Min Aung Hlaing was born in 1956 in Tavoy, now Dawei, the capital of Tenasserim, a region in the far south of the country, bordering on Thailand, formerly disputed by the Burmese and Siamese regimes. As Le Monde writes, the general is not homme du sérail (a courtier) but a provincial man, who moved to Yangon to follow his father’s job and with the dream of pursuing a military career. Thus, Min Aung Hlaing enrolled in law school at the University of Rangoon (now Yangon) while preparing for the entrance exam to the prestigious Defense Services Academy, where he eventually entered in 1974, on his third attempt.
His former classmates remember the young cadet as a “man of few words” who would always prefer to keep a low profile. Gradually, the future general started climbing up the hierarchy of the Tatmadaw. The year 2002 marked a turning point when he was promoted to Commander of the Triangle Region Command in Eastern Shan State, where 82% of Burmese opium is produced. There Min Aung Hlaing learned how to negotiate with the local ethnic groups and guerrillas which have been fighting each other and the Burmese army for decades. A 2009 offensive against the Burmese-Chinese rebels in Kokang, a self-administered region on the border with the People's Republic, earned him the trust of Than Shwe, the strongman of Myanmar from 1992 to 2011.
In that same year, somewhat surprisingly, the ‘old’ leader left the command of the army to the ‘young’ Min Aung Hlaing – "battle-hardened warrior of brutal Burmese Army" as well as a "serious scholar and gentleman" – at a time when Myanmar was preparing for a democratic transition. With the 2008 constitution, the Tatmadaw had secured its role as the guardian of national unity and the Commander-in-Chief was quite possibly "the most powerful man in Myanmar". As a matter of fact, Min Aung Hlaing was able to select the ministers of defence, interior, and border affairs ministers, appoint a quarter of parliamentarians, and prevent any attempt to curb his power.
Unsurprisingly, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the 2015 elections – the first ‘free’ elections since 1990 – had to reach an agreement with the general. In the years following, Min Aung Hlaing participates in official events alongside Aung San Suu Kyi and established personal relationships with foreign dignitaries. The violent repression of the Muslim Rohingya minority in 2016-2017, which the UN Human Rights Council dubbed as ‘genocide’, only increased his popularity among the country’s Buddhist majority. Before being blocked by Facebook Inc., his profile was attracting hundreds of thousands of likes and by then the General was persuaded that “If the people get the right information about the army they will understand" that the army was in fact defending their interests.
When the general elections in November 2019 resulted in a landslide victory for the League, despite several allegations of fraud mainly coming from the army, there was some speculation of a possible agreement that would lead Min Aung Hlaing to the presidency. When this outcome did not materialize and the NLD decided to shun all compromises, the General, who strongly believed that "the history of the country cannot be separated from the history of the Tatmadaw," decided to use his “right to take over and exercise State sovereign power”. During an interview with a Hong Kong-based Chinese language broadcaster, the first one after the coup, Min Aung Hlaing admitted that he was a little surprised by the resistance of the people: "I didn't think it would be so much."
Terzo ciclo di sanzioni imposto dal Consiglio Europeo a 8 individui, 3 entità economiche e un’organizzazione per il golpe e la repressione delle proteste
Fonte: consilium.europa.eu
L’Unione Europea batte un nuovo colpo in risposta al golpe militare birmano e alla successiva repressione violenta delle proteste. Il Consiglio Europeo ha infatti imposto nuove sanzioni a 8 persone, 3 entità economiche e all’Organizzazione dei veterani di guerra. Tra gli 8 individui sono inclusi ministri, viceministri e la procuratrice generale, che l’Ue ritiene responsabili di aver “compromesso la democrazia e lo Stato di diritto e commesso gravi violazioni dei diritti umani nel Paese”. Le quattro entità colpite sono invece di proprietà dello Stato o sono comunque controllate dalle forze armate e contribuiscono in maniera più o meno diretta alle attività del Tatmadaw.
Lo scopo delle misure, che si concentrano sui settori delle pietre preziose e del legname, è quello di limitare la capacità della giunta militare di trarre profitto dalle risorse naturali birmane e sono concepite in modo da “evitare danni indebiti alla popolazione”. Si aggiungono alle precedenti misure restrittive imposte dall’UE, che includono un embargo sulle armi e sulle attrezzature che possono essere utilizzate per reprimere le proteste, un divieto di esportazione di beni a duplice uso destinati ai militari e alla polizia di frontiera, restrizioni all’esportazione di apparecchi per il monitoraggio delle comunicazioni e un divieto di addestramento e cooperazione militare col Tatmadaw.
Allo stesso tempo, l’UE continua a fornire assistenza umanitaria alla popolazione birmana, nel 2021 ha stanziato 20,5 milioni di euro in aiuti per far fronte alle necessità immediate delle comunità sfollate e colpite dal conflitto in corso. Bruxelles, che si dice pronta a cooperare con il centro di coordinamento ASEAN per l’assistenza umanitaria, si contraddistingue per le azioni messe in atto in riferimento al golpe. Mentre, nel frattempo, il Giappone continua a non applicare sanzioni e il generale Min Aung Hlaing viene ricevuto in Russia.
The death toll continues to rise and EU and US sanctions are not enough to stop the escalation of violence in Myanmar.
For the past two months Myanmar has been the scene of terrible violence. On February 1st, the armed forces carried out a coup, arresting de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi and some leaders of the National League for Democracy, the majority government and winner of the the last election in November 2020. Power is now in the hands of General Min Aung Hlaing, while Suu Kyi is accused of fraud and irregularities.
The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners said that since the start of the coup in Myanmar, at least 521 civilians have been killed during the protests, including 141 people only on Saturday 29 March, the most tragic day so far. The situation is getting worse and the use of lethal force against civilians by the army and security forces shows no sign of stopping.
The National Armed Forces Day became another bloodbath with over 100 deaths, including several children. The army continued to crack down on civilians with gunfire, while military parades were held in Naypyidaw to commemorate resistance against Japanese occupation during World War II. The unprecedented violence of the “day of shame” for the Myanmar rmy has in fact triggered various reactions from the international community. Tom Andrews, UN special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, called for the urgency of an international summit if the Security Council could not act. As member states, Russia and China could have the right of veto over any proposed intervention aimed at restoring democracy. Both nations featured in the military celebration, along with military representatives from Bangladesh, India, Laos, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam; Moscow was the only country which sent the Deputy Minister of Defense. The response of the Defence Chiefs from 12 countries, including Italy, was also timely. They signed a joint declaration condemning the use of lethal force by the Burmese army against unarmed people, urging an end to the attacks and the compliance with international standards of conduct.
In recent weeks heavy disapproval had already arrived from the Western front. On February 10, President Biden announced the imposition of sanctions to prevent Burmese generals from accessing the fund they hold in the United States, including freezing US assets that benefit the Burmese government, while maintaining support for health care and civil society groups. In coordination with the US, on March 22 the EU imposed sanctions on 11 people linked to the coup. The Council of Europe enacted a travel ban and an asset freeze, along with previous restrictions relating to the arms embargo and the export of communications monitoring equipment. EU sanctions hit Burmese junta chief Min Aung Hlain, nine other senior military officers and the head of the electoral commission. This was the most concrete and broadest act of Europe in underlining its unshakable support for the democratic transition in Myanmar.
After the horrific violence of the last weekend, the US considered additional measures and ordered the suspension of trade agreements with Myanmar, as well as the withdrawal of non-essential embassy staff. The new actions target the personal assets of Min Aung Hlaing's family, including state-owned enterprises or their subsidiaries, and military-related conglomerates.
In relation to the economic sphere, many analysts believe that Myanmar may be able to face Western economic sanctions, given that most of the investments come from Asia, with Singapore, China and Hong Kong in the lead. However, a significant decline in FDI is expected over the next two years due to social unrest and political uncertainty and the impact of sanctions, but for now the impact on trade and exports may remain modest given the likely amortization from other markets, especially Thailand and China.
In data 26 marzo 2021, il Vicepresidente esecutivo dell’Associazione Italia-ASEAN, Ambasciatore Michelangelo Pipan ha svolto una conversazione con l’Ambasciatrice Christine Schraner Burgener, Inviata speciale delle Nazioni Unite in Myanmar, sugli sviluppi del recente colpo di Stato birmano. Durante la discussione, sono stati toccati diversi temi quali l’impatto del golpe sulla società civile, la reazione della comunità internazionale, l’impatto sulla popolazione di eventuali sanzioni e il futuro degli investimenti esteri nel Paese.
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Richiamando gli spiacevoli accadimenti del 2018 con il genocidio dei Rohingya, il Vicepresidente Pipan ha posto l’accento su come il recente colpo di Stato rappresenti il culmine di una situazione di instabilità politica, notevolmente alimentata nel corso degli anni. I recenti sviluppi in Myanmar, infatti, riportano dati allarmanti ed è stato chiesto all’Ambasciatrice Schraner Burgener, Inviata speciale delle Nazioni Unite in Myanmar, un parere sull’impatto che l’attuale situazione politica avrà sulla popolazione. In tal senso, l’Ambasciatrice ha sottolineato come l’avvento al governo delle forze armate, i Tatmadaw, abbia rallentato drasticamente il processo di democratizzazione nel Paese e nonostante essi abbiano previsto la realizzazione di una roadmap istituzionale prima di svolgere nuove elezioni, il percorso non sarà affatto semplice. Le forze armate intendono, in primo luogo, procedere all’identificazione e all’arresto dei soggetti legati al governo democraticamente eletto lo scorso novembre e, in secondo luogo, dimostrarne l’illegittimità. In questo contesto, la popolazione è impossibilitata a lavorare e la chiusura delle banche ostacola i cittadini nel poter gestire i propri risparmi, incentivando spostamenti e migrazioni e mettendo a rischio la delicata situazione sanitaria nella regione.
In riferimento a quanto detto, il Vicepresidente Pipan ha rivolto una domanda sulla reazione da parte della comunità internazionale, interrogandosi, inoltre, sulla possibilità di un eventuale rallentamento delle proteste da parte della società civile, come nel caso della Thailandia, che ha assistito a diverse manifestazioni durante lo scorso anno, rallentate poi verso la fine del 2020. Per quanto concerne il primo quesito, l’Amb. Schraner Burgener ha analizzato la reazione delle grandi super potenze, Stati Uniti e Cina, che hanno condannato i recenti sviluppi, invitando tramite dichiarazioni ufficiali a un ritorno allo status quo. In relazione al secondo punto, l’Ambasciatrice ha espresso ottimismo e fiducia sul futuro delle relazioni tra la popolazione locale e le minoranze etniche. In seguito all’esperienza dei Rohingya, infatti, la popolazione birmana ha mostrato maggiore vicinanza e comprensione nei confronti del variegato tessuto etnico del Paese, creando relazioni più solide con altri gruppi armati etnici. Il contesto attuale ha, quindi, promosso un dialogo più aperto sull’adozione di una strategia comune.
Un ulteriore punto di discussione è stato fornito ponendo l’accento sul ruolo assunto dall’ASEAN durante l’attuale emergenza in Myanmar. In tal senso, l’Amb. Schraner Burgerner ha confermato come l’Association stia reagendo in modo inedito rispetto agli schemi del passato, maggiormente improntati invece sul principio di non-interferenza. È stato, infatti, menzionato l’appello fatto dal Presidente indonesiano Joko Widodo a svolgere un vertice dedicato alla risoluzione della crisi in Myanmar e parallelamente sono stati elogiati lo spirito d’iniziativa da parte dei Ministri degli Affari Esteri di alcuni Paesi Membri, quali Indonesia e Singapore. Nonostante, infatti, alcuni Paesi ASEAN siano ancora restii alla possibilità di interferire direttamente a livello istituzionale, come nel caso del Laos e della Thailandia, c’è un forte interesse a mantenere la stabilità socioeconomica, nonché politica, della regione e ad interessarsi direttamente alla grave fase storica vissuta dal Myanmar.
L’ultima domanda del Vicepresidente Pipan, infine, ha evidenziato il ruolo delle sanzioni nella risoluzione delle crisi internazionali e come queste possano impattare l’afflusso di investimenti esteri nel Paese. In tal senso, l’Amb. Schraner Burgener ha osservato che il tipo di sanzioni da applicare dovranno essere mirate e volte ad intaccare i mezzi di sostentamento delle forze armate. La stessa popolazione locale, stando alle parole dell’Inviata speciale, fa appello alla comunità internazionale, richiedendo che i Tatmadaw vengano isolati e privati dei mezzi finanziari dei conglomerati dell’industria mineraria e del settore alberghiero (Myanma Economic Holdings Limited e Myanmar Economic Corporation). L’Amb. Schraner Burgener ha evidenziato, infatti, la necessità di imporre sanzioni che non abbiano ricadute gravi sulla società e che possano promuovere il ritorno in carica del precedente governo di Aung San Suu Kyi. Per quanto concerne, infine, il futuro del commercio, l’Inviata Speciale delle Nazioni Unite auspica un aumento degli investimenti nel Paese, soprattutto per progetti rivolti al potenziamento delle infrastrutture, che si pongano come obiettivo primario il netto miglioramento delle condizioni sociali dei cittadini birmani.
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Privacy Policy
Ultimo aggiornamento: aprile 2020
Informativa Privacy
Nella presente informativa sulla privacy (“Informativa”), resa ai sensi degli artt. 13 e 14 Regolamento (UE) 2016/679 Generale sulla Protezione dei Dati Personali (“Regolamento” o “GDPR”), sono descritti i trattamenti dei dati personali effettuati dall’Associazione Italia-Asean (la “Associazione”, “noi”, “nostro/a/i/e”) attraverso il sito https://www.itasean.org/ (il “Sito”).
Titolare del trattamento
Ai sensi della presente Informativa e dei trattamenti dalla stessa presi in considerazione, Titolare del Trattamento (ex art. 4, n° 7 del Regolamento) è l’Associazione Italia-Asean. La sede legale dell’associazione è in Piazza Sant’Andrea della Valle, 6 00186 Roma.
Che tipo di dati personali trattiamo, finalità e basi giuridiche del trattamento
Attraverso il Sito, l’Associazione potrà effettuare i trattamenti di Dati Personali descritti nella presente sezione.
Soggetti che si registrano sul Sito (“Utenti Registrati”)
Categorie di interessati e di dati personali trattati
L’Associazione potrà trattare i dati personali di Utenti Registrati, quali referenti e rappresentanti di aziende, professionisti, docenti, studenti, giornalisti e tutti gli altri soggetti che decidono di registrarsi sul Sito. Le categorie di dati personali trattati dall’Associazione e riferite agli Utenti Registrati sono le seguenti
Informazioni anagrafiche (nome e cognome)
Username scelto per la creazione di un account sul Sito
Indirizzo e-mail
Paese di provenienza (residenza)
Qualifica (rappresentante di azienda, professionista, giornalista, studente, docente, altro)
Nome dell’azienda rappresentata
Ateneo frequentato da uno studente o presso cui insegna un docente
Testata presso cui un giornalista lavora
Dati relativi a preferenze e interessi personali (paesi e settori di interesse)
Altre informazioni che potranno essere condivise da un Utente Registrato in sede di creazione di un account sul Sito
Informazioni relative alle interazioni tra un Utente Registrato e l’Associazione attraverso il Sito
Informazioni relative alle attività degli Utenti Registrati sul Sito (es. commenti pubblici)
Dati personali, immagini, foto e altre informazioni che gli Utenti Registrati decideranno di condividere pubblicamente interagendo con l’Associazione e con altri Utenti Registrati attraverso il Sito
Finalità e basi giuridiche del trattamento
Il trattamento dei dati personali di cui alla presente sezione 2.1 è funzionale a permettere agli Utenti Registrati di registrarsi al Sito e di compiere le attività proposte dal Sito, tra cui l’iscrizione a gruppi, l’interazione con altri Utenti Registrati e in generale la fruizione di tutti gli altri servizi offerti dall’Associazione attraverso il Sito.
La base giuridica su cui si fondano i trattamenti in questione è rappresentata dal consenso degli Utenti Registrati ai sensi dell’art. 6, par. 1, lett. a) GDPR.
Fonte dei dati
I dati personali di cui alla presente sezione vengono forniti all’Associazione direttamente dagli Utenti Registrati nel momento in cui gli stessi si registrano sul Sito. L’Associazione potrà, inoltre, raccogliere altri dati relati alle attività ed alle interazioni degli interessati attraverso il Sito, come meglio specificato alla successiva sezione 2.5.
Natura del conferimento dei dati
Il conferimento dei dati di cui alle precedenti lettere a), b), c), d) è necessario e, in mancanza, non sarà possibile creare un account sul Sito.
Il conferimento dei dati di cui alle lettere e), f), g), h), i), j), k), l) è facoltativo e la sua mancanza non inficerà la possibilità di creare un account sul Sito, anche se potrebbe limitare le esperienze di un Utente Registrato sul Sito.
Periodo di conservazione
I dati personali degli Utenti Registrati saranno conservati per il periodo strettamente necessario per il perseguimento delle finalità per cui sono raccolte. In particolare, nel momento in cui un Utente Registrato decida di cancellare il proprio account dal Sito, l’Associazione procederà alla cancellazione immediata degli stessi e provvederà comunque entro il termine di 1 anno
Il periodo di conservazione dei dati il cui trattamento è descritto nella presente sezione 2.1 potrebbe essere prolungato nel caso in cui ciò si rendesse necessario per adempiere ad un eventuale obbligo di legge o per difendere un diritto dell’Associazione dinnanzi ad un’autorità giurisdizionale, amministrativa o in altra sede.
Dati trattati per l’invio di newsletter e comunicazioni istituzionali
Con il consenso specifico degli Utenti Registrati e degli altri soggetti che visiteranno il Sito, l’Associazione potrà trattare i dati forniti dagli stessi per l’invio di una newsletter e di altre comunicazioni istituzionali relative alle attività dell’Associazione, dei propri soci e associati, dei membri del network dell’Associazione e di terzi.
Le comunicazioni in questione potranno, col consenso specifico degli interessati, essere personalizzate sulla base dei propri interessi e delle proprie preferenze.
Il consenso per questo genere di trattamenti è facoltativo e la sua mancanza non inficerà l’utilizzo e la fruizione del Sito da parte degli interessati.
I dati personali trattati per l’invio di newsletter e altre comunicazioni promozionali saranno conservati per un termine massimo di 24 (ventiquattro) mesi a partire dal momento in cui viene prestato il consenso da parte degli interessati per tale tipo di trattamento.
In caso di comunicazioni personalizzate, il trattamento proseguirà per un massimo di 12 (dodici) mesi dal momento della prestazione del consenso.
I periodi di conservazione potrebbero essere prolungati nel caso in cui ciò si rendesse necessario per adempiere ad un eventuale obbligo di legge o per difendere un diritto dell’Associazione dinnanzi ad un’autorità giurisdizionale, amministrativa o in altra sede.
Dati relativi a candidati per posizioni lavorative all’interno dell’Associazione
Categorie di interessati e di dati personali trattati
Talvolta l’Associazione potrebbe pubblicare degli annunci relativi a posizioni lavorative all’interno del proprio organico. In tal caso, così come nel caso di candidature spontanee, l’Associazione potrebbe trattare le seguenti categorie di dati personali riferite ai candidati:
Dati anagrafici (es. nome, cognome, data di nascita e residenza)
Dati di contatto (es. recapiti telefonici, indirizzo e-mail)
Fotografia/ritratto personale (ove allegato al CV)
Dati relativi alle qualifiche, alla formazione e alla carriera professionale
Qualsiasi altra informazione che i candidati decideranno di fornirci in sede di candidatura
L’Associazione non tratterà categorie particolari di dati ex art. 9 GDPR allo scopo di compiere selezioni dei candidati per posizioni lavorative (es. dati sanitari, dati idonei a rivelare opinioni politiche, fede religiosa, appartenenza a sindacati, orientamento sessuale) a meno che, nel caso in cui le stesse fossero contenute nei CV ricevuti dall’Associazione i candidati abbiano esplicitamente autorizzato l’Associazione al loro trattamento.
Finalità e basi giuridiche del trattamento
Il trattamento dei dati personali poc’anzi elencati viene effettuato al fine di compiere le attività di ricerca e selezione del personale da parte dell’Associazione.
La base giuridica su cui si fonda tale trattamento è rappresentato dalla necessità di eseguire un contratto e correlati obblighi precontrattuali a richiesta dell’interessato ex art. 6, par. 1, lett. b) GDPR.
Fonte dei dati
I dati personali di cui alla presente sezione vengono forniti all’Associazione direttamente dai candidati nel momento in cui gli stessi presentano la propria candidatura per posizioni lavorative all’interno dell’Associazione.
Natura del conferimento dei dati
Il conferimento dei dati di cui alla presente sezione è necessario e, in mancanza, non sarà possibile per l’Associazione procedere alla valutazione delle candidature ricevute.
Periodo di conservazione
I dati personali dei candidati saranno conservati per il periodo necessario allo svolgimento delle attività di selezione per la specifica posizione lavorativa per cui un soggetto ha presentato la propria candidatura e, in ogni caso, per non più di due anni dal termine delle selezioni in questione.
In caso di candidatura spontanea, l’Associazione provvederà tempestivamente ad eliminare i dati dei candidati nel caso in cui non vi fossero posizioni lavorative aperte o i loro profili non venissero ritenuti in linea con le esigenze professionali dell’Associazione.
Con il consenso specifico dei candidati, l’Associazione potrà prolungare la conservazione dei loro dati in vista di future opportunità lavorative all’interno del proprio organico.
I periodi di conservazione potrebbero essere prolungati nel caso in cui ciò si rendesse necessario per adempiere ad un eventuale obbligo di legge o per difendere un diritto dell’Associazione dinnanzi ad un’autorità giurisdizionale, amministrativa o in altra sede.
Dati che gli utenti ci forniscono quando decidono di contattarci
Nel momento in cui un utente decide di contattarci secondo le modalità indicate nella sezione “Contatti” del Sito potremmo trattare dati personali allo stesso riferiti come dati anagrafici (es. nome e cognome), dati di contatto (numero di telefono, indirizzo e-mail, fax, recapito postale) o altri dati personali che lo stesso utente decide di fornirci nel momento in cui ci contatta.
I dati personali a noi forniti in tali circostanze verranno trattati, con il consenso degli utenti, per le finalità e per un periodo di tempo strettamente necessari a fornire un riscontro al soggetto che decide di contattarci, a meno che una conservazione più prolungata non sia necessaria per adempiere ad un obbligo di legge posto in capo all’Associazione o per l’esercizio di un diritto da parte della stessa Associazione innanzi ad un’autorità giudiziaria, amministrativa o in altra sede.
Dati raccolti durante l’utilizzo del Sito
Quando un soggetto effettua una navigazione sul nostro Sito, raccogliamo, tramite cookie che vengono installati sul dispositivo degli utenti, i seguenti dati di navigazione in forma aggregata:
Informazioni tecniche, tra cui indirizzo IP, informazioni sui dispositivi utilizzati dai visitatori del Sito, sul browser e sui sistemi operativi, etc.
Informazioni sulla navigazione sul Sito, tra cui URL delle pagine visitate e attività che vengono svolte sulla pagina, date e orari di navigazione, tempo di permanenza sul Sito, clickstream.
Queste informazioni vengono raccolte per il corretto funzionamento, la gestione, il mantenimento ed il miglioramento del Sito, nonché per garantire che la navigazione avvenga in sicurezza e per poter accertare la responsabilità in caso di violazioni cyber-security. Esse vengono anche utilizzate per consentirci di ottenere analisi statistiche sull’utilizzo del Sito con la possibilità di analizzare il dato anche in forma aggregata.
Per conoscere meglio il funzionamento dei cookie, il modo di attivarli e disattivarli, occorre consultare la nostra cookie policy.
Gli Interessati sono sempre liberi di decidere se fornirci i loro dati di navigazione, ad esempio scegliendo di disattivare i cookie tramite le impostazioni dei propri browser. Tuttavia, il rifiuto a fornire informazioni necessarie ai fini della navigazione potrebbe rendere impossibile lo svolgimento di attività strettamente connesse con la navigazione stessa e, dunque, anche la consultazione e interazione con il nostro Sito.
Conserviamo tali dati unicamente per il tempo strettamente necessario ai fini per cui sono raccolti.
Modalità del trattamento
Il trattamento dei dati personali avviene attraverso strumenti informatici, telematici e/o cartacei nel rispetto dei principi di correttezza, liceità, trasparenza, esattezza, integrità, minimizzazione dei dati e limitazione delle finalità e della conservazione, nonché in accordo con quanto previsto dal GDPR e dalla normativa vigente in materia di protezione dei dati personali, nonché con l’adozione di adeguate misure di sicurezza.
Come proteggiamo i dati
I dati personali di cui alla presente Informativa sono raccolti, trattati, trasmessi e conservati adottando adeguate misure di sicurezza (fisiche, logiche e organizzative) per proteggerli da eventuali violazioni (come distruzione, perdita, modifica, divulgazione non autorizzata o accesso, in modo accidentale o illegale, ai dati personali in questione) e per garantire che il trattamento sia effettuato unicamente per le finalità descritte in questa Informativa.
A chi comunichiamo i dati personali
Nell’ambito dei trattamenti descritti in questa Informativa, l’Associazione si avvale di soggetti terzi che forniscono dei servizi (es. back-up dei dati, gestori del servizio newsletter, gestori del sito), i quali potrebbero trattare i dati personali degli interessati per conto dell’Associazione e quindi agire in veste di responsabili del trattamento dell’Associazione. Tali soggetti sono stati selezionati tra professionisti che garantiscano l’implementazione di misure tecniche ed organizzative appropriate, di modo che i trattamenti siano sempre effettuati nel rispetto della normativa applicabile e garantendo la tutela dei diritti degli interessati.
Gli interessati potranno richiedere dettagli su tali soggetti contattandoci come indicato nel paragrafo “Come contattarci”.
L’Associazione potrebbe altresì dover comunicare i dati personali degli interessati a terzi (quali consulenti o autorità) qualora ciò sia necessario per la tutela dei propri diritti o per l’adempimento di obblighi di legge.
Inoltre, gli interessati ed in particolare gli Utenti Registrati potranno decidere volontariamente di pubblicare i propri dati sul Sito nel momento in cui interagiscono con lo stesso (es. tramite commenti su gruppi pubblici).
Trasferimenti dei dati al di fuori del SEE
Nel caso in cui i dati personali degli interessati dovessero essere trattati in un Paese al di fuori dallo Spazio Economico Europeo (SEE), l’Associazione assicura l’adozione di precauzioni appropriate per garantire che i dati personali degli interessati siano protetti adeguatamente e conformemente ai livelli di tutela garantiti dalla normativa UE, applicando una delle misure di salvaguardia previste dagli artt. 44-50 del GDPR.
Diritti degli Interessati
In conformità con la normativa applicabile, ed in particolare con quanto stabilito dal Regolamento, gli interessati hanno i seguenti diritti:
Accesso: ottenere informazioni a proposito del trattamento dei dati personali da parte dell’Associazione ed una copia di tali dati personali;
Rettifica: laddove l’Interessato ritenga che i suoi dati personali siano inaccurati o incompleti, potrete chiedere che tali dati siano rettificati o modificati seguendo le istruzioni dell’Interessato;
Cancellazione: fatti salvi i casi previsti dalla normativa applicabile, l’Interessato ha il diritto di chiedere la cancellazione dei dati personali, quando: (i) i dati non siano più necessari per le finalità per cui sono stati raccolti e trattati; (ii) revoca il consenso al trattamento; (iii) si oppone al trattamento per finalità di marketing diretto o al trattamento effettuato per perseguire altre finalità e non sussistono motivi legittimi prevalenti per proseguire con il trattamento; (iv) i dati siano trattati illecitamente; (v) la cancellazione sia imposta dalla legge;
Limitazione: richiedere la limitazione del trattamento dei dati personali in conformità con quanto stabilito dall’art. 18 del Regolamento;
Opposizione: in conformità con quanto previsto dall’art. 21 del Regolamento, l’Interessato ha il diritto ad opporsi al trattamento dei Dati Personali in qualsiasi momento in relazione alla propria particolare situazione. Ricevuta l’opposizione, l’Associazione proseguirà con il trattamento solo se vi siano motivi legittimi e cogenti dimostrabili che prevalgano sui diritti, interessi e libertà dell’Interessato; Il diritto ad opporsi a trattamenti effettuati per finalità di marketing diretto è assoluto ed esercitabile in qualsiasi momento nelle modalità indicate nella sezione “Come contattarci”. L’opposizione a trattamenti effettuati attraverso strumenti automatizzati è valida altresì per i trattamenti posti in essere con strumenti tradizionali.
Revoca del consenso: nel caso in cui il trattamento dei dati personali si basi sul consenso, l’Interessato ha il diritto di revocare il proprio consenso in qualsiasi momento;
Portabilità dei dati: ove il trattamento sia basato sul consenso, l’Interessato ha il diritto di ricevere in un formato strutturato, di uso comune e leggibile da dispositivo automatico i dati personali che ci sono stati forniti fornito e, laddove ciò sia tecnicamente fattibile, alla trasmissione in sicurezza dei dati personali ad un altro titolare del trattamento.
Come contattarci
Per l’esercizio dei diritti dell’Interessato, e per qualsiasi domanda o chiarimento su come i dati personali sono trattati ed utilizzati ai sensi di questa Informativa, è possibile contattare l’Associazione a mezzo posta all’indirizzo Piazza Sant’Andrea della Valle, 6 (00186 Roma), tramite email all’indirizzo info@itasean.org o al numero dedicato +39.06.45491715.
Nel caso in cui un interessato decida di contattarci, tutti i dati che forniti in tale occasione saranno trattati esclusivamente al fine di fornire un pronto riscontro e per garantire la corretta gestione della richiesta avanzata.
Tutela dei diritti
A tutela dei diritti e dei dati personali di un interessato, è sua facoltà, in qualsiasi momento, proporre reclamo all’autorità di controllo competente, vale a dire il Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali (tel. +39 06.696771, indirizzo e-mail: garante@gpdp.it o urp@gpdp.it) o di esperire un’azione avanti ai competenti organi giurisdizionali nazionali.
Modifiche alla presente Informativa
Ci riserviamo il diritto di aggiornare in qualsiasi momento la presente Informativa. A tal fine, riportiamo l’ultima data di aggiornamento all’inizio dell’Informativa.
Qualora un Interessato ci abbia già inoltrato i suoi dati personali, qualunque modifica che incida sostanzialmente sul trattamento dei relativi dati personali gli verrà comunicata attraverso gli appositi canali, sempre in modo da garantire l’effettiva conoscenza delle modalità del trattamento, nell’ottica di una piena trasparenza del trattamento stesso e di una piena e adeguata tutela dei diritti.
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