Singapore's new (controversial) foreign interference law

Some critics are concerned that the new bill may represent a tool to suppress dissent. But what is the Foreign Interference Countermeasure Act really about?

On October 4, after nearly ten hours of debate, the Singaporean parliament passed a new law to limit foreign interference in domestic affairs, known as the Foreign Interference Countermeasure Act.  

This new law gives authorities the permission to intervene in cases of interference in the domestic politics by foreign entities. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, foreign interference poses a serious threat to Singapore's sovereignty and national security, and this law is an urgent necessity given the increase in cases of foreign interference, especially via the Internet, in local affairs. 

The law allows authorities, for example, to compel Internet service providers and social media platforms to provide information about users, block content, and remove applications used to disseminate content deemed hostile. The law also establishes requirements to identify individuals and entities defined as "politically significant persons," including political parties, political officeholders, parliamentarians, and candidates for election. Such individuals or entities will be required to report donations exceeding 10,000 Singaporean dollars (approximately 6,400 US dollars) and disclose their relationships with foreigners. Civilians may also be designated as politically significant if their activities are directed toward a political end and it is in the public interest to apply countermeasures. However, it is important to remember that this law does not include Singaporeans or other local organizations expressing their views, unless those views are used by foreign entities as agents of interference. 

The process will be as follows: first, authorities identify a suspected foreign-sourced information campaign that is deemed hostile. If they determine that the campaign is directed at a political purpose and it is in the public interest to take countermeasures, guidance is issued to limit the spread of disinformation. Third parties such as online platforms, Internet service providers and website operators may also be forced to block certain accounts or content in the country. Once identified, perpetrators can be arrested and possibly prosecuted, but they cannot be detained without trial. However, the penalties for violating the act are particularly severe and include up to 14 years in prison and 100,000 Singaporean dollars (about 64,000 U.S. dollars) in fines. Parties involved can appeal to the Minister of the Interior or an independent review tribunal led by a Supreme Court judge.

Despite the negative reaction expressed by foreign media and the criticism received by some NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders, passage of the bill was a mere formality given the decades-long legislative majority of the People's Action Party (PAP), which has been in government since 1959. 

Some critics have expressed concern that the bill could pose a threat to legitimate entities, including academics studying controversial issues or foreigners expressing opinions on Singaporean politics. Indeed, there are concerns that terms such as "foreign interference" are defined so broadly as to include "almost any form of expression and association relating to politics," as 11 human rights organizations stated in an open letter. However, the Minister of Internal Affairs reassured that the law will not be applied towards most academic activities, articles written for international journals and the receipt of international funding. The Minister added that the measure is not intended to target foreigners who comment on local issues in an open and transparent manner.

Another critic that has emerged is that this law was brought to Parliament without being subjected to public consultation or scrutiny by a select committee. However, even on this issue, the Government has responded that the issue of foreign interference has been widely discussed for more than three years in various fora. In any case, the government insists that most Singaporeans agree that the threat is serious and that something needs to be done. However, the concern persists among the many foreign companies in the territory about the future impact of such a potentially broad law.

Vaccini, Italia in aiuto dei Paesi ASEAN

Il sostegno sanitario al Sud-Est asiatico può aiutare anche una ripresa economica inclusiva e duratura in un’area di crescente interesse per il nostro Paese

Editoriale a cura dell’Amb. Giorgio Marrapodi, Direttore Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo

Da alcuni mesi il Sud-Est asiatico è interessato da una nuova ondata pandemica, caratterizzata da un incremento preoccupante dei contagi e dei decessi, specie tra le fasce più vulnerabili della popolazione. L’impegno delle Autorità locali nella lotta alla pandemia si scontra con la limitatezza dei mezzi a disposizione, specie in termini di dosi vaccinali disponibili. L’Italia, Partner di Sviluppo dell’ASEAN dal 2020, si è immediatamente attivata per l’inclusione del Sud-Est asiatico fra le aree beneficiarie in via prioritaria di donazioni di vaccini mediante la Covax Facility. Tale azione si è finora tradotta nella donazione da parte italiana di oltre 2,8 milioni di dosi al Vietnam e di quasi 800.000 dosi all’Indonesia, per un totale di oltre 3,5 milioni di dosi. Altre dosi saranno in arrivo nelle prossime settimane, sulla base delle più recenti allocazioni, e sulla base della segnalazione della regione del Sud-Est Asiatico come un’area prioritaria. Il nostro Paese sta lavorando alla donazione di dosi anche a favore di altri Paesi ASEAN. Le donazioni si inseriscono nel più ampio impegno dell’Italia a destinare entro la fine dell’anno 45 milioni di dosi ai Paesi a medio-basso reddito, annunciato dal Presidente del Consiglio, Mario Draghi, il 22 settembre scorso nel corso del “Global COVID-19 Summit”, a margine della 76esima Assemblea Generale dell’ONU. L’Italia “triplica” in questo modo l’impegno assunto lo scorso 21 maggio in occasione del Global Health Summit di Roma di donare 15 milioni di dosi entro il 2021 e conferma di essere in prima linea, anche in qualità di Presidente di turno del G20, nella lotta alla pandemia e nell’accelerazione della campagna vaccinale nelle aree più colpite, incluso il Sud-Est asiatico. Ciò nella piena consapevolezza che “no one is safe until everyone is safe” e che solamente attraverso una più equa ed ampia distribuzione dei vaccini sarà possibile creare le condizioni necessarie per un ritorno alla normalità e per una ripresa economica inclusiva e duratura, specie in un’area di crescente interesse per il nostro Paese e per le nostre aziende quale l’ASEAN.

Rocco Papapietro: “ASEAN markets, being there to grow”

ITALY-ASEAN / We begin a cycle of interviews and insights on Italian companies and realities present in Southeast Asia. This interview puts the spotlight on the CEO of Verdevita Sdn Bhd, a consulting company based in Kuala Lumpur, specializing in the design of strategies or companies that aim to penetrate and invest in Malaysia and in the ASEAN markets.

With over twenty years of international experience in management positions, Eng. Rocco Papapietro, CEO and founder of Verdevita Sdn Bhd, is involved in commercial development of Italian and European companies in ASEAN countries.

How and when did your business in ASEAN start?

My first trips to Malaysia date back to 1999. At that time, I was working as Head of Development in Asia of the electronics/automotive sector for a well-known international company. I have held global roles where cross culture was essential, also collaborating with Toyota and Honda in Malaysia. I immediately appreciated the dynamism of Southeast Asia. Trip by trip, I noticed a continuous evolution, clearly visible from the endless construction of skyscrapers and buildings, which changed the skyline of the cities. Given such energy, I imagined the creation of a bridge of knowledge and business between Italy and Southeast Asia. Local companies were very curious and interested in learning Italian know-how. Being passionate about international development, in 2009 I started an exploratory phase and the following year I decided to move permanently to Malaysia, starting a consulting business. I understood that supporting companies directly from Malaysia would be the trump card. So, I founded Verdevita Sdn Bhd in collaboration with a local partner. I am the CEO of Verdevita. It is a company incorporated under Malaysian law, registered with the Ministry of Finance. This allows for easier access to government tenders and incentives. I have been living in Kuala Lumpur since 2010 and the same year I was appointed General Secretary of the Italy Malaysia Business Association – IMBA. Living in Malaysia allows me the direct management of projects and staff, training for partners, continuous updating on incentives, new laws and opportunities in the territories. I don't believe much in remote management, even if the pandemic has forced us to do it through new geometries and dynamics; difficulty overcome thanks also to our fantastic local staff, made up of highly trained collaborators, including Elena Konovalova, Kumaressan Suppiah, Kenneth Karnan, Emanuele Esposito.

Why did you decide to invest in Malaysia?

The initial push was the strong interest in going abroad and getting involved with curiosity and desire to do so. Italy and Made in Italy can count on a very positive image in Malaysia and Malaysia presents, in turn, all the essential elements for the development of a business abroad. It is the third largest market in the world and attracts 11% of global FDI. It comprises different cultures and makes it possible to expand not only in Southeast Asia, but also towards India and China. It is a well-connected country thanks to the presence of 39 airports (5 international airports), and 8 ports, and a key logistics hub for all of Southeast Asia. The favorable exchange rate and the low costs of incorporation for new companies were primary elements, especially compared to other ASEAN realities, such as Singapore, Hong Kong. As well as the low costs of energy, rents in city centers, the wide availability of skilled workers, incentives for digital start-ups and companies, and the possibility of opening regional offices, which is very useful in the exploration and study of the market and local laws. Malaysia enables investment sustainability. This is the concept that encompasses all the reasons for my choice. Furthermore, its role as a bridgehead for expanding into Southeast Asia is getting stronger thanks to a combination of the following factors: strategic geographical position, stable political system (as demonstrated by the last elections and the formation of the current executive), openness to international trade, good infrastructure system (fiber cabling is currently underway throughout the Mid Valley between Selangor and KL; Penang and Johor are landmarks for the electronics industry), excellent quality of life, spread of the English language, and tax incentives. The current government has adopted a strongly pro-business approach, with the aim of encouraging the development of local entrepreneurship. Among other things, with the entry into force of Act 2016 it is possible to establish Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE) without the presence of a Local Director. An equally important initiative is the launch of the Digital Free Trade Zone to prompt the digital export of local and foreign companies. Malaysia is not only an ideal setting for doing business, but it also has a naturalistic and cultural charm. "Malaysia Truly Asia'' is the motto that best captures and defines the uniqueness of this country, also the diversity of its landscapes, from Langkawi to Borneo with Sipadan. It is a true blessing country.

Has the Malaysian government taken business support measures to face the pandemic crisis?

Yes, Malaysia's Recovery Plan has approved a comprehensive package of measures to stimulate economic growth after the pandemic and business-friendly investment policies. It has also established a double taxation agreement with Italy and includes a hiring incentive program - Penjaya Kerjaya - which aims to reduce unemployment. Those eligible employers will be receiving up to 60% of the subsidy of the total salary.

What are the activities carried out by the Verdevita company?

Verdevita Sdn Bhd is a key part of the Malaysian economic ecosystem. It provides customized consulting services (commercial, administrative, and legal services) to support Italian and European companies that want to start winning projects in Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Australia. We employ local professionals, who are part of our network, and we also take care of finding financial resources for the implementation of our customers' export and internationalization projects. We create a specific market entry project, a business plan shared with the client company, in compliance with local laws, government and market directives. We analyse the needs of the company, evaluating the best integration solution: finding distributors, opening representative offices and/or branches, monitoring the progress of projects with both customers and local players. We also work to reduce internal conflicts, mistrust, and lack of team spirit; if this is missing, it becomes difficult to bring companies to the other side of the world.

 

We collaborate with important Malaysian government agencies: MIDA – Malaysian Investment Development Authority, in Malaysia and in Italy through the Director of MIDA Milan Mr. Awangku Fiarulnazri, and MARii – Malaysia Automotive, Robotics and IoT Institute, in which I hold the role of Technologies Advisor. In addition to the headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, we are also in China and Australia, with offices in Shanghai and Sydney.

What are the Verdevita company’s prospects?

The future is marked by continuous improvement. We have started a collaboration with the Ca 'Foscari University of Venice, through the internship agreement to be started in ASEAN, to make our contribution to strengthening the professional skills of young people and to train future managers. We will carry out a new project in the State of Sarawak for the integration of telecommunications and digital connectivity. We are setting up the UNITI Association with the aim of involving Italians living in Asia and Oceania to promote the culture and beauty of Made in Italy. Since the Malaysian government is encouraging the attraction of companies in the automotive sector, we are planning - together with MARii - the foundation of an Academy in collaboration with the Motor Valley of Emilia-Romagna. The opening of the Jakarta office is near. Finally, we are working on a Malaysian Ministry of Transport’s project for the improvement of road safety and the reduction of accidents through telematic tools, with the support of the Viasat Group, to introduce Italian technology into the Malaysian economic framework.

The best sectors to invest in Malaysia.

Technology represents Verdevita's core business, but other winning sectors are Oil & Gas, petrochemicals, telecommunications, digital, healthcare, automotive, engineering production, manufacturing sector. Malaysia also for the procurement of raw materials: palm oil, petroleum and derivatives, latex.

In conclusion, what do you recommend to Italian companies interested in internationalization?

Exports affect the performance of companies, which are more proactive and innovative, and increase their entrepreneurial skills. I believe it is necessary to understand and enhance the positive impacts of export projects on the innovation and growth capacities of companies and personnel, as these are the stimulus for the spread of a global culture and healthy competitiveness. Italian companies have a lot to give. We must leave behind distrust and increase curiosity because there are not only obstacles, but also opportunities. Export and internationalization also mean an exchange of cultures and business growth, not just sales abroad. These projects must start from the company leaders and drivers, so the involvement is felt by all the parts of the company. It is essential to be aware of your own entrepreneurial activity and use funding for internationalization, not always put the company in a wait-and-see attitude. In the coming years, also thanks to the funds that will come from Europe, it will be necessary to train companies to export. Let’s make Italian companies be citizens of the world.

The rights of the LGBT+ community in the ASEAN countries

LGBT+ Rights are a controversial topic in Southeast Asian countries. Although in some cases progress has been made, social stigma, homophobia and transphobia remain frequent.

Since the 1990s, ASEAN seems to have become increasingly interested in the issue of human rights. This is also demonstrated by the willingness of its Member States to establish the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. In addition, in December 2012, the Commission issued the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights (AHRD). However, this declaration is not binding for the Member States. In fact, the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights is a purely consultative body, devoid of any coercive capacity. Secondly, the right to sexuality is not in fact guaranteed in this declaration. ASEAN’s human rights declaration, for example, makes no mention of the term SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity). The representatives of Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore strongly opposed the mention of this term in the AHRD going against the opinion of the representatives of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, who were in favour of including this term in the declaration.

The rights of the LGBT+ community are a controversial issue in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; some ASEAN countries do not yet recognise the fundamental rights of the LGBT+ community, while others are making progress in this field. For example, Singapore has a highly organized LGBT+ community, but Article 337 is still present in its penal code condemning homosexual practices. Although in recent years this article has been applied less and less frequently, its presence in the code is used as a justification for not giving protection and for not eradicating prejudice towards the LGBT+ community. A statistical survey carried out in 2019 in Singapore shows that the majority of respondents, 61.6%, believe that a sexual relationship between two adults of the same sex is always wrong or inappropriate and only 5.6% believe that there is nothing wrong. This figure shows that unfortunately a change of pace on this issue is not close.

In contrast, 73% of Filipinos, according to a poll, are convinced that homosexuality must be accepted by society. According to a study by the Pew Research Centre in Washington, the Philippines in 2013 was already in the top 10 of the most gay-friendly countries in the world; in the country, in fact, there are several pride marches and gay societies continue to be established in universities. The Philippines, like other ASEAN members, does not have a national anti-discrimination law for the LGBT+ community. However, the Philippines and Thailand released in 2011 a joint statement to denounce acts of violence against human rights based on sexual orientation and are the only two ASEAN states where, at the local level, there are anti-discrimination ordinances in favour of LGBT+ community. In the Philippines there are approximately 25 local ordinances condemning acts of discrimination against this community. In any case, even if these ordinances are a big step forward, they do not have clear application mechanisms and therefore remain mostly symbolic.

Brunei also criminalizes homosexuality, having become in 2013 the first country in the area to apply Sharia at the national level. In this state, men who are homosexual can risk the death penalty. In addition, according to the Penal Code, any man who dresses and behaves like a woman and any woman who dresses and behaves like a man can face a penalty of $4,000 or a year of imprisonment. People of the LGBT+ community are also subject to severe penalties in Malaysia. In January last year, the ministers proposed to increase criminal sanctions against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, and moreover, only since June 2021, more than 1,700 Malaysians belonging to the LGBT+ community, have been sent to re-education camp. Also Aceh, an Indonesia’s autonomous region, inflicts severe punishments on members of the LGBT+ community. In this region, which has the permission to follow the laws of Sharia, only nine months ago people were publicly flogged as homosexuals. In the rest of Indonesia, however, there is no law that prevents homosexual relationships and transgender people are allowed to change gender legally, but only after the intervention of sex reassignment. In Myanmar, homosexual and transgender people have no rights and are legally persecuted under Article 377 of the Penal Code. In Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos, homosexuality is legal, but often there is no clear legislation in favour of the rights of the LGBT+ community. 

Southeast Asia: green economy for the relaunch

Green infrastructure development can drive the post-pandemic economic recovery. But huge funding is needed.

ASEAN needs new green infrastructures. Not only to improve the ecological approach of the region, but also to improve connectivity, reduce poverty and increase development. From this point of view, infrastructures are the backbone of the economic growth of each country, but the environmental costs are not low. That is the reason why the Asian Development Bank has estimated that Southeast Asia will need at least 210 billion dollars a year, for the period 2016-2030, to support the costs of green infrastructures.

If in the pre-Covid-19 era investments in that area were far below the necessary levels to get close to a significant ecological-environmental change, the global pandemic caused an economic contraction in the region of 4%, further reducing the infrastructure investments. In contrast, however, it has become even more urgent for ASEAN to engage in this direction, to build a more resilient economy in the medium and long term.

The Asian Development Bank has proposed itself as a platform for dialogue between the countries of Southeast Asia to understand how to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic, balancing economic growth with the protection of natural capital. How? Making the most of government funds, encouraging private financing and protecting natural resources. In order to do this, national governments can rely on various strategies: imposing a price on environmental externalities, subsidizing products and services with a low environmental impact, financing technological innovation and encouraging virtuous individual behavior.

However, all this is not enough. For an effective green recovery, the actions of governments of the ASEAN bloc must convey a structural change in ecological and energy policies, increasingly integrating green objectives into government policies. In the report prepared by Bain & Company, Microsoft and Temasek, “The Green Economy of Southeast Asia: Opportunities on the road to net zero”, it is highlighted that about 40% of infrastructure investments in Asia will have to come from the private sector. It is then necessary to continue with a series of targeted interventions concerning sustainable agriculture, green urban development and transport models, the transition to clean energy, the circular economy and the protection of the oceans and marine biodiversity. Finally, governments will have to rely on sustainable sources of finance, introducing green taxes such as the Carbon Tax and removing fossil fuel subsidies.

The will for a green recovery is also visible in the regional strategies. The ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework emphasizes environmental sustainability as a key component of the region's post-pandemic economic recovery process.

It will not be an immediate change, much less easy, also because it will require the allocation of huge amounts of resources. It is estimated, however, that in this way over 30 million new jobs will be created, stimulating a virtuous circle that could bring positive results in the long term.

Food e city diplomacy tra Italia e ASEAN

Prosegue la collaborazione tra Associazione Italia-ASEAN, Comune di Milano e Paesi ASEAN sul fronte della sostenibilità dei sistemi alimentari. Grazie alla sinergia con l’Ambasciata d’Italia in Thailandia, anche Bangkok ha aderito al Milan Urban Food Policy Pact

Editorial by Valerio Bordonaro, Director Associazione Italia-ASEAN

Il 19 ottobre si è aperto a Barcellona il settimo Global Forum del Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, un’iniziativa del Comune di Milano, nata come eredità dell’EXPO di Milano 2015. Fanno parte del network del MUFPP oltre 200 città da tutto il mondo e, per la prima volta, quest’anno prenderà parte anche una delle capitali dell’ASEAN, Bangkok. Dalla fine del 2019, l’Associazione Italia-ASEAN, condividendo l’importanza di lavorare al livello globale per la sostenibilità dei sistemi alimentari attraverso la City Diplomacy, ha avviato una collaborazione con il Comune di Milano per sensibilizzare i Paesi ASEAN nei confronti di questa sfida. 

Grazie ad un lavoro sinergico tra Comune, Associazione e Ambasciata d’Italia in Thailandia, si è arrivati quest’anno all’adesione al MUFPP da parte della municipalità di Bangkok, prima capitale di un paese ASEAN a entrare nel Patto. Il tema della sostenibilità dei sistemi alimentari urbani è considerato uno dei più importanti mezzi per la protezione dell’ambiente, come riconosciuto dal prestigioso premio internazionale Earthshot Prize assegnato a Milano per un progetto collaterale al MUFPP. Date le previsioni di crescita dell’area e le dimensioni di molte città del Sud-Est asiatico, l’Associazione continuerà a fare Sistema con Milano e il MAECI affinché nuove città dell’ASEAN sposino il patto e la sua filosofia.

Tensions in the South China Sea urge ASEAN countries to invest in air forces

Beijing's manoeuvres stretch across water and air. The air forces of ASEAN countries require huge investments to balance China's growing air power.

The South China Sea is one of the most concerning hotspots on the planet and tension does not seem to be scaling down soon. The disputes between some ASEAN countries and China over the control of the waters around the Spratly Islands, an archipelago of micro-islands of high strategic value, have pushed all the players to increase their military spending, especially on the navy. The more suitable pieces for this chessboard, we might think, are ships, submarines, or even artificial islands. In fact, what is at stake are access to seabed resources and control over the maritime trade routes. The most recent development from the Indo-Pacific region seems to confirm this idea: the much-debated AUKUS Agreement made to the headlines for a multi-billion dollar procurement contract for submarines. However, we cannot forget that influence over the South China Sea also means projecting power over its sky, not only its waters. A recent contact between Malaysian and Chinese aircraft was a wake-up call for the region, effectively putting the air arms race back at the centre of the ASEAN governments' agendas. 

The waters of the South China Sea are disputed between some ASEAN countries (Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines), China and Taiwan. More specifically, these states declare to varying degrees their sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, in order to extend the perimeter of their territorial waters into the open sea. The contested features are small reefs and cays, unsuitable for human settlement. Yet their strategic value is immense. In 2016, $3.37 trillion worth of trade and almost 40% of global liquefied natural gas transited through these waters. However, the importance of the South China Sea to the world's energy supply is not limited to its transit: at least 7 billion barrels of oil and approximately 25 trillion cubic metres of natural gas lie on its seabed. Fisheries represent another resource of the area.

The stakes are high. For several decades now, the states bordering the South China Sea have been challenging each other by building new outposts, claiming uninhabited atolls, or organising naval exercises in the waters under their control. Vietnam controls the most features (21), followed by the Philippines (9), China (7) and Malaysia (5), while Brunei and Taiwan occupy one island each. Some of these geographical features have been transformed into artificial islands to host military bases, in particular by China and Vietnam. The growing presence of military fleets in the area has also led to exchanges of gunfire between China and ASEAN countries’ boats in the past. The confrontation with Beijing over the Spratlys is an interesting case study in understanding the evolution of ASEAN. Taken individually, each state of South-East Asia would have little negotiating power with the much larger China - indeed, the Chinese have always tried to negotiate bilaterally, without success. The ASEAN countries have always opposed China's divide et impera strategy and agreed to negotiate with Beijing only multilaterally, as a bloc. These diplomatic exercises made possible in 2002 to define an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea

Chinese manoeuvres are closely followed by the US, which is determined to reinvigorate its presence in the region. Other actors are Japan, India, the EU (more recently) and Australia. The latest piece of news in the Indo-Pacific scenario comes precisely from Canberra – whose relationship with Beijing is currently strained, after a phase of convergence: the AUKUS strategic agreement with the US and the UK. The Agreement has caused concern among ASEAN governments, as it could push Beijing to increase its military presence in the South China Sea. The new Malaysian Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, has commented harshly on AUKUS, expressing the fear that it could ‘provoke other powers to act more aggressively, especially within the South China Sea region’ and pave the way ‘towards a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific region’. Kuala Lumpur's alarm can be explained in the light of some recent incidents with Beijing's vanguards. On 31 May, there was a contact between Malaysian jets and a squadron of Chinese aircraft, which was carrying on a training manoeuvre at the border of the Malaysian airspace. This incident reminded all ASEAN governments that the dispute over the South China Sea involves a strong air force, too - and that China holds a sizable lead.

Efficient air defence requires the development of an integrated system of modern aircraft, detection networks, missile installations and trained personnel. And significant investments, too. According to analysts, Singapore and Vietnam are the only ASEAN countries with an adequate air force. Hanoi is also investing heavily in modernising its fleet. Malaysia, on the other hand, maintains a reduced air force, armed with obsolete aircraft - and in its budget, still struggling due to the Covid crisis, does not offer the needed resources to strengthen the sector. Even the Philippines seem unprepared. Indeed, Manila is putting its own military procurement rules in order to prepare for future investments. Indonesia seems better equipped, although investments are still insufficient and not much effective. The country has no demands over the Spratlys, but the nine-dash line that delimits Chinese claims passes close to Indonesian territory and is not looked upon favourably by Jakarta.

Considering these elements, it is possible to expect large investments in the air forces by ASEAN countries in the years to come. However, it is difficult to make predictions about the scale and effectiveness of this effort by each state. As we have seen, while some governments have managed to achieve good results in the past, others seem ill-prepared to allocate efficiently the huge resources needed and build up their military capacity alone. Other international actors interested in balancing Chinese influence - the United States, the EU, Japan - could support these governments in capacity building. The defence industry will also play an important role since ASEAN countries will necessarily need reliable partners in their arms race. Italian companies in the sector already collaborate with ASEAN governments. To give a few examples: Leonardo with Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand; Fincantieri with Indonesia.

Philippines presidential elections: here are the candidates

In Manila people wonder what the post-Rodrigo Duterte will be like. There are many candidates who have chosen to compete for the highest office of the State, the Presidency of the Republic.

Rodrigo Duterte cannot run for president again and has renounced to run for vice-presidency. The Philippine Constitution provides for a single six-year term for the President who is elected in a single turn, regardless of the difference in votes with rivals.

The top candidates for the 2022 Philippine presidential election are Panfilo Lacson, senator and former police chief, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, son of dictator Marcos, Manny Pacquiao, a senator and former boxer, Ronald dela Rosa, the former police chief who leads Duterte's war on drugs, and Leni Robredo, the current Vice President. For now, the candidates do not include Sara Duterte-Carpio, the president's daughter. However, as a candidate for a third term as mayor of Davao, where her father was, she has until November 15 to change her mind and run for president. This same escamotage was used by his father in 2016.

To date, no one seems sharply favored to become the future tenant of Malacañang Palace, the presidential domicile. The race is about to begin: the electoral campaign will officially begin on February 8th 2022 ending on May 7 and the polls will be open on May 9.

Regarding the various competitors, some have elements of continuity and others of discontinuity with the outgoing administration.

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr, 64, would like to lead the country out of the pandemic crisis by seeking the collaboration of other political groups. This intention seems difficult to accomplish as human rights activists, mindful of his father's past, hope he will not become president. Protests in the street demand that Marcos return the wealth accumulated during the dictatorship (estimated at more than 10 billion dollars) and that they pay a prison sentence. In addition to the funds, another important asset of Marcos Jr. is the link with Duterte: the electoral base of the President in the south together with that of the Marcos in the north has the potential to gather a large and widespread number of votes in the country. It competes under the Partido Federal Ng Pilipinas, founded in 2018 in support of Duterte.

Senator Ronald "Bato” dela Rosa, 59, is the closest to Duterte's policy, who put him at the head of the controversial war on drugs that since 2016 has resulted in more than 6100 casualties. His candidacy in extremis wanted by the PDP-Laban, the ruling party of which Duterte is also a member, has the declared purpose of keeping on with the legacy of the current administration.

Manny Pacquiao and Francisco "Isko Moreno" Domagoso follow a different line. Both share a past of extreme poverty and a present of economic redemption, as well as fame.

Pacquiao, 42 and proudly Christian, has been a senator since 2016 and his agenda includes helping the poor. He criticized the disparity with which Duterte distributed economic and health aid to cope with the pandemic. According to the journalist Maria Ressa, Pacquiao would be politically immature for lack of experience and for having been mostly absent and not very proactive in parliamentary sessions. He participates under the banner of PROMDI, based in Cebu, and not of the PDP-Laban of which he has been president since December 2020. According to Rappler, Pacquiao chose to run with this party after the clash with the Cusi faction of the PDP-Laban who contested the legitimacy of this change after the official candidacy. This has made the Electoral Commission investigate the illegitimacy of the candidacy and conflict of interest.

Domagoso, the on the rise forty-six-year-old mayor of Manila, is a well-known actor of the 90s who has been in politics since '98. He is considered a populist like Duterte but more moderate, he says he intends to be a “healing president” and wants to continue the fight against drugs but without allowing "legal murders". He competes with Aksyon Demokratiko, a party established in 1998.

Panfilo Lacson,74, a long-time senator and former police chief, also ran in 2004. Probably at the last stride of his political life, he declared the will to combat corruption, drug trafficking and crime by running with the Partido Reporma.

Finally, Leni Robredo,56, is the candidate most at odds with the current presidency. The Vice President is a human rights lawyer who has always been critical of Duterte's campaigns. In the Philippine system, the vice-presidency is voted separately and can be on the opposite side to that of the President. Robredo says she has applied to "ensure a future of equal opportunities" for Filipinos. His electoral base is very large thanks to the work during her mandate, and she is an independent candidate despite being leader of the Liberal Party.

Last September, a study by Pulse Asia analyzed the chances of winning and the factors that determine the voting projections for each candidate. To have a good chance of winning is fundamental to possessing large funds and a widespread national organization that provides visibility. Marcos owns the family wealth but does not have an organization behind him; Lacson, Moreno and Robredo do not possess any of these requirements but rely mainly on their image and fame; dela Rosa is backed by the PDP-Laban but his sudden and last-minute candidacy can be a malus. Who could have great chances, if she were to apply, is Sara Duterte-Carpio. Her father's economic resources and alliances could give her an important advantage to obtain the necessary votes to take office in Malacañang Palace. But the game is still on.

Thailand, a land route over the Kra Isthmus

As the idea of constructing the canal is (for now) gradually discarded, new options arise. Here is why.

For centuries, Thailand has dreamed of a passage across the Kra Isthmus, which divides the Malay Peninsula in two, separating the Andaman Sea from the Gulf of Thailand.

The isthmus, in its narrowest part, is only 44 km long and building an east-west route across the isthmus would reduce by about 1,200 km the distance that merchant ships must travel in transporting goods from Asia to the Middle East and Europe. Currently, the only option is to sail south to the Strait of Malacca, the busiest strait in the world, extending the journey by two days. In fact, more than 94,000 ships cross this strait every year, and it is estimated that about a quarter of the goods exchanged worldwide pass through it, including 80% of oil and gas imports of China, Japan, and South Korea.

The idea of ​​digging a canal across the Malay Peninsula has been revived several times over the centuries. In 1677, Narai, the sovereign from the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, asked France to conduct a feasibility study for a canal and Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French diplomat involved in the construction of Suez Canal, personally visited the Kra Isthmus in 1882. More recently, the Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had taken over this project, but the idea vanished with the 2006 coup. There was also a mounting pressure from China to continue the project and incorporate it into the Belt and Road Initiative given Beijing’s interest in solving the so-called “Malacca Dilemma” and strengthening its political and economic position within the region. Consequently, although the Chinese government refrained from making official claims, China and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) canal project in Guangzhou in 2015.

However, despite several proposals and studies on the feasibility of the canal, the idea was gradually discarded given its prohibitive cost (estimated at about 30 billion dollars) and the technical difficulties in connecting the two seas, which differ by several meters in elevation. Moreover, concerns emerged on the possible environmental and political repercussions. More specifically, it should not be underestimated that an infrastructural project of this size involves serious disruptions to local ecosystems, and the consequences that the excavation of the isthmus would produce in the Indo-Pacific dynamics following the opening of a new connection are not yet certain. Finally, the southern part of the proposed country has seen the mounting tension between the Buddhists and Muslims ethnicities, and it is feared that the construction of the Kra Canal could endanger national cohesion, creating a further division, even physical, within the country.

Acknowledging these problems but not giving up the idea of ​​a passage between the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, the government has decided to change its strategy and what was once the dream of a canal is being transformed into the project of a land bridge. This new proposal, which appears technically and economically more feasible than the previous one, would include the construction of a deep-sea port in the province of Chumphon, on the Gulf of Thailand, and the expansion of the existing port of Ranong, on the Andaman Sea. The two ports would then be connected by a double-track railway and a motorway. According to a report published in January 2021 by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, the construction of the land bridge would cost 60 billion baht (1.85 billion dollars), or just 3% of what the canal would require.

Hence, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha and Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob seem increasingly leaning towards this option. Furthermore, at a time of economic uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government hopes to be able to use this infrastructure to revive the economy and attract private capitals. Moreover, the project would fit perfectly into the East Economic Corridor (EEC) strategy and studies have been commissioned to also evaluate the possible connection between the new route and the high-speed China-Laos-Thailand, the signature project made possible from the funds allocated in the country under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Therefore, it followed that already in September 2020 the executive ordered a feasibility study of the land bridge and the related complementary infrastructures, to be completed in 2023. The eyes of the whole region, and of China, are on this potential future megaproject, which has been long yearned for, yet remains very delicate given the fragile balance of the Indo-Pacific.

The 76th UNGA: ASEAN and the 2030 Agenda

By Clara Lomonaco

In recent weeks, the long-awaited annual appointment with the United Nations General Assembly took place. It was an opportunity to take stock of the climate change policies adopted by the ten countries of the Southeast Asian bloc. Here is an overview

In recent weeks, the Glass Palace has hosted the United Nations General Assembly: the highly anticipated annual meeting in which Member States strengthen the continued relevance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to build momentum ahead of major summits and intergovernmental meetings, such as COP26 on climate change, G20 and COP15 on biodiversity.

António Gyterres, the United Nations Secretary General, identified five areas where urgent action is needed to maintain the promise of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals): (1) the mobilization of comprehensive vaccination plans, (2) the implementation of sustainable and equitable recovery for all through courageous investments in human development, (3) equal rights for women and girls through investment and representation, (4) the end of the war to the planet and the affirmation of zero emissions by 2050, (5) and multilateral cooperation to put people first in the budgets and recovery plans.

Also this year, one of the hot topics of the international debate was the pandemic from Covid-19. Each State has expressed itself in its own internal situation promoting the concept of “Leaving No One Behind”: a phrase that has now become the motto of the entire international community, the meaning of which refers to the strong will to emerge from the crisis as a united and strong group. The heads of Governments and Ministers present have once again renewed their promise and their commitment in the battle against Covid-19 and in the promotion of vaccination campaigns.

Nevertheless, the virus was not the sole and only protagonist of the General Debate. Climate change is another forthcoming challenge that continues to catalyze global attention and requires urgent and concrete global actions at all levels. In this contest, ASEAN countries expressed their commitment to increase their involvement in the process of adaptation and mitigation of the Paris Agreement, in line with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”.

The world community looks to the United Nations General Assembly to respond to major global concerns. There were different ideas and opinions on the issue of environmental sustainability, but what proposals have been made by ASEAN countries in this regard, and what progress has been made in the implementation of Agenda 2030?

From the outset, the path to achieving the UN Development Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development has not been easy. There has been steady progress over time, but Covid-19 has undone many hard-won victories. The pandemic amplified inequalities and pre-existing uncertainties; widened the gap between “who has and who has not”; and different degrees of deficiencies in governance and social security have pushed the most vulnerable populations back into poverty. 

We are far from reaching Agenda 2030 now than we were before.

Indonesia’s commitment to climate resilience, low-carbon emissions development and green technology is firm and clear. In 2020, Indonesia has reduced forest fires by 82% compared to the previous year and deforestation rates have decreased significantly, reaching the lowest percentage in the last 20 years. However, the process of energy and technology transformation must ensure the (previous mentioned) principle of “Leaving No One Behind”, facilitating the participation of developing countries in the growth of industries and technological production. In 2022, Indonesia will assume the presidency of G20, with the topic “Recover together, recover stronger”, committing itself to work for the benefit of all, from developed countries to developing ones, from the north to the south, from the archipelagos to the small island states of the Pacific.

The People’s Democratic Republic of Lao has highlighted the importance of tackling climate change by complementing the commitment of the Paris Agreement. From 2000 to 2020, Laos’ greenhouse gas emissions were reduced by 34%. By presenting the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) on Climate Change to the UN community on the same occasion, the Government of Laos has renewed its commitment to reduce 60% of greenhouse gas emission by 2030.

For Malaysia, the integration of sustainability is the key to ensuring a smooth transition to a greener socio-economic ecosystem. The Malaysian government has set ambitious plans to facilitate the transition to a more sustainable and low-carbon future. New policies focused on the circular economy have been introduced to deliver on the promise of making Malaysia a low-carbon nation by 2050.

The Philippines presented the first Nationally Determined Contribution, promising to achieve the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 75% by 2030. The Philippines government has called for urgent climate action, especially by those who can really tip the balance needle. Developed countries must meet their long-standing commitment to climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building investment in developing countries. This is a moral obligation that cannot be avoided. The transition of our world toward a green economy must not be at the expense of the economic viability of developing countries.

For small island nations such as Singapore, climate change remains a clear and present danger and recent extreme weather events remind us that we have no time to waste. Singapore has always been a strong supporter of the Paris Agreement and this year presented the “Singapore Green Plan 2030”: a well-structured action plan outlining a national approach to sustainable development, setting ambitious and concrete targets for the next 10 years in new areas such as green finance and clean energy.

Singapore also stressed the need for urgent multilateral action on the oceans. The oceans support our global ecosystem; they are a repository of biodiversity and a buffer for climate change. They are a critical artery for trade and a source of work and livelihood for billions of people. Singapore is a great supporter of the United Nations Convention on Law of the sea: UNCLOS, a document which forms the basis of ocean governance, establishes rules for maritime rights and provides the general framework for the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes. The 40th anniversary of the adoption of UNCLOS next year is an opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to this vital legal instrument for ocean governance, and to do more to ensure its effective implementation.

Thailand is preparing the National Energy Plan with the aim of achieving carbon neutrality by 2065-2070. At the same time, the government set the objective of increasing the proportion of renewable energy to at least 50% of the total amount of electricity generated. The speech of the Thai delegation urged the developed countries and invited the entire global community to take collective action and ensure constructive and concrete results for the next COP26.

Vietnam looks forward to COP-26, a time of international harvesting in which each Member State must renew its efforts and commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Vietnamese government has also stressed the need for increased funding in developing countries, which require more accurate assistance in technology transfer and capacity building to facilitate the transition to a green and circular economy. Only through collaboration and cooperation between the North and the South of the world, will it be possible to reach all 17 of the sustainable development objectives contained in the Agenda 2030.

Whether it is rising sea level or melting Himalayan glaciers, hurricanes, storms, floods or fires, climate change has become an existential threat to humanity. We need a globally supported and ambitious collective response to tackle climate change.

It is now clear to the entire international community that we need to focus world attention on achieving a lasting commitment to the Agenda 2030, that puts climate change at the heart of international efforts. The world cannot allow COP26 to be inconclusive. It is necessary to adapt the SDGs to the new reality of the post-pandemic world. To do this, we need greater and stronger solidarity and cooperation between all types of entities. Advancing the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in all areas is a key tool to respond to the challenges the world is facing, and to address the inequalities exacerbated by the COVID-10 pandemic. 

How Forrest Li (Sea) became the richest in Singapore

On August 31, 2021, Forrest Li, at the age of 43, became the wealthiest man in the city-state, with a fortune exceeding US$20 billion. His story confirms that the demand for digital services has skyrocketed during the pandemic.

Forrest Xiaodong Li, a native of the Chinese port city of Tianjin and later naturalized Singaporean, graduated in Engineering from Jiaotong University of Shanghai and worked in the same city in the HR division of Motorola and Corning city for four years, before deciding to radically change his life and career. With his MBA, "Singapore’s Steve Jobs" began to lay the foundations of his entrepreneurial success: he was among those present when the founder of Apple delivered the famous "Stay Hungry, Stay Foolish" speech to the new graduates at Stanford University in 2005. That became Forrest Li’s life motto, while Jobs’ call to "connect the dots" became the tagline of Sea Limited, the largest company in Southeast Asia by market capitalization (US$185 billion) of which he is President and CEO today.

At a time when so many people are forced to stay at home or to keep social distances, most interactions have inevitably moved online. Li himself, convinced that the pandemic has done nothing but accelerate a transformation already underway, has underlined that the "strong performance in terms of user growth and engagement shows that digital adoption is still rising healthily". Sea Limited, a holding company of which he is co-founder together with Gang Ye and David Chen, operates simultaneously in the flourishing sectors of e-commerce, online gaming and digital payments, which during the pandemic have been growing significantly.

After the debut in the world of videogame development and distribution with the foundation of Garena in 2009, the trio of entrepreneurs launched SeaMoney, provider of digital payments and financial services, and Shopee, an e-commerce site that adopts a mobile-first approach and carries out a policy of low commissions for retailers. The platform is designed to optimize the online shopping experience so as to make it more convenient and functional to navigation from smartphones.

Alongside the ambition to seize the opportunities of accelerated digitisation, Sea Limited also cultivates a sense of responsibility towards those who are less facilitated in accessing technology. Already in April 2020, Shopee announced the introduction of a support package worth 15 million Malaysian ringgit, to the benefit of about 70,000 local small and medium-sized enterprises. The programme includes a series of measures targeted to "help sellers digitalize, reduce expenses and grow sales": not only subsidies in the form of vouchers and significant operating cost cutting for vendors exposed to the challenges of the pandemic, but also a wide range of training courses aimed at providing a step-by-step guide for those who want to relaunch their businesses by starting from e-commerce. The company turns its gaze also outside the ASEAN area, in an effort to intercept the needs of an ever-growing pool of consumers who are focused on embracing the benefits of the new online lifestyle and Shopee is currently working to expand its operations in Latin America, India and Europe.

Li’s vision is in fact a long-term one, in which seizing the opportunities for growth and conquering new market shares is a priority compared to making profits quickly. During the ceremony of the thirty-fifth Singapore Business Awards in November last year, at which he was appointed "Businessman of the Year", the CEO reiterated his confidence in the potential of the conglomerate strategy, based on the synergy between the businesses that make it up. Actually, the same name of the group (Sea) is, at the same time, an acronym that recalls the Southeast Asian region, center of gravity of the activities of the company, and the image of the sea that, connecting between them the countries, makes it possible to keep faith with one of the core values of the tech company led by Forrest Li: "Make the world an even more connected community through innovative products and services."

Ho Chi Minh's Trail stretches: Vietnam's Diplomacy

Vietnam moves in the world between old allies and the General Assembly. At the heart of Hanoi's actions is the accumulation of vaccine stocks and the strengthening of old and new partnerships in terms of cooperation, health, security and economic growth.

Southeast Asia is experiencing a further wave of infections and a severe shortage of vaccine stocks, as well as being crossed by the general fibrillation triggered by the AUKUS storm. At the center is Vietnam which is proving to be among the most active in the search for serums, in the consolidation of old relationships on a regional and global scale as well as in the push towards economic recovery.

The last few weeks have been lived at a fast pace by the representatives of the Communist Party and the Vietnamese government, especially by the Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Bui Thanh Son, the President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and the Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh.

The Vietnamese leadership still takes into account the ideological assonance to guide the country's relations with the outside world. Trong had a long telephone conversation with Xi Jinping, in which he called for fairer trade relations, but also a rebalancing in other areas, especially in the management of border areas so as not to slow down the flow of people, as in the control of the pandemic to contain the increase in infections and in maritime cooperation. Trong also expressed his intention to maintain closer interministerial relations between the two countries in order to foster an environment increasingly capable of supporting synergistic economic development.

Still on the red path, President Phuc's expedition to Cuba and Foreign Minister Son's visit to Moscow gave a further demonstration of how the non-Western world is capable of moving autonomously in diplomatic and biotechnological terms. Ideological solidarity in the Cuban case and post-ideological in the Russian case, is the fil rouge that guides the Vietnamese external moves, which before relating to the rest of the international community continues to move in a well-kept socialist and post-socialist garden.

The vaccination diplomacy implemented by Russia has allowed Vabiotech laboratories to produce in Vietnam some doses of Sputnik V serum, which will then be evaluated by Russian research institutes. Relations between Vietnam and the Russian Federation currently pursue two objectives: to install vaccination production in the Vietnamese borders in order to have an extra asset in the fight against the pandemic and to grant an access into the Russian market to the Vietnamese agricultural products (bilateral trade increased by 12.5% in the first half of 2021). What Russia is asking for in return is cooperation and support in international forums, especially in ASEAN.

Immediately outside this close and vital diplomatic network, Vietnam finds itself more than ever in need to deal with powers of various kinds: Australia, which recently entered AUKUS, is one of these. Vietnam is on good terms with Canberra, with which it conducts annual maritime exercises within the Indo-Pacific Endeavours, begun in 2016 on the initiative of the Australian Ministry of Defence. The navies of the two countries have been exchanging practices and knowledge in many areas of intervention for five years. The strategic-military partnership between Vietnam and Australia is a solid pillar for Vietnamese political balancing.

Then, there is the European Union with its regional entities, especially the French-speaking Belgian one that is very deeply immersed in the Vietnamese context, in a win-win relationship based on cooperation and development. Very active for about fifty years, the French-speaking Belgian community has carried out a total of 783 projects in the biotechnological, medical, environmental, educational and cultural sectors. The mutual benefit lies in the enhancement of Vietnamese technological development and in the possibility for Belgians to invest directly in the country through the Walloon Export and Foreign Investment Agency, in agreement with the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment. Relations between the European bloc and Hanoi have flourished in recent times, as shown by the free trade agreement with the European Union of August 2020 that fits perfectly with the Vietnamese development and growth priorities of the 2021-2025 five-year plan. Vietnam's multilateralism is working: constant donations through Covax in several tranches have brought more than nine million doses from the EU, mainly from France and Italy, as well as medical equipment. To date, keeping on with the good old relations with the socialist and post-socialist field without cutting off from the rest of the world has allowed Vietnam to receive more than 54 million doses via Covax.

Following this renewed international momentum, the government delegates clearly show a new assertiveness and confidence even in the headquarters of the world forum: at the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, President Phuc spoke on behalf of that part of the world that hasn’t been reached sufficiently by the allocation of serums and that hasn’t been vaccinated enough.

Hanoi has definitively stretched the Ho Chi Minh Trail thanks to which Vietnam lends itself to being an increasingly important pivot at the regional level, especially after the outcomes of Doi Moi ("renewal", a process started in 1986 and similar to Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening program) and showing itself inclined to contribute to the balance of East Asia in times of great turmoil.

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