Asean

Barbie & co.'s problems with maps in Vietnam

Depicting the South China Sea is a tricky thing, given the territorial disputes between some ASEAN countries and China. And it sometimes happens that movies or bands have problems 

It may be a "childish doodle," as Warner Bros. called it, but enough is enough. The map that appears behind Barbie's back in a scene in the trailer was enough to have the film removed from Vietnamese theaters. And it is not even nine features, but eight. Their location next to a parallelepiped sketched with the words "Asia" conveys an unmistakable image: that is the "nine-dash line," the demarcation line of those territories in the South China Sea that China claims as its own. 

First the posters disappeared from theaters, then on Monday, June 26, came the final news: Greta Gerwig's film will not be released "because of some scenes depicting the nine-dash line map, which is considered a violation of Vietnam's territorial sovereignty." Word from the National Council for the Evaluation and Classification of Films. Social media also favored the government perspective: regretful but infuriated with the producers, Vietnamese netizens were equally offended by the pro-China map.

Manila also considered the option of outright censorship. "The map legitimizes Chinese claims, which no government in the world supports" and is "offensive to all" countries in the region, argues military analyst Jose Antonio Custodio. These are smaller markets, but not so indifferent, explains Hollywood Reporter: a Hollywood cult in the Philippines and Vietnam can add between five and ten million dollars to Warner Bros. budget. Quite a risk if national pride starts infecting neighboring countries. The Asian archipelago, moreover, spearheaded the 2016 petition to the international tribunal in The Hague denouncing Chinese incursions and demanding compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Pop nationalism

The same "oversight" in 2019 cost Vietnamese film distributor CJ CGV as much as $170 in fines: it had marketed The Little Yeti, a DreamWorks-signed cartoon that ended up in the crosshairs of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia for the same reason. 2019, after all, has been one of the most tense years in the South China Sea, caused by the operations of the Chinese vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8 around the Spratly Islands.

La stessa “svista” nel 2019 è costata ben 170 dollari di multa al distributore di film vietnamita CJ CGV: aveva commercializzato Il piccolo Yeti, un cartone animato firmato DreamWorks finito nel mirino di Filippine, Vietnam e Malesia per la stessa ragione. Il 2019, d’altronde, è stato uno degli anni di maggiore tensione nel Mar cinese meridionale, causata dalle operazioni del vascello cinese Haiyang Dizhi 8 nei dintorni delle isole Spratly. 

The nine-dash line, which takes up about 90 percent of the three million square kilometers of water that bathes mainland Southeast Asia, has infuriated the Philippine government with Netflix over its appearance in some scenes of the Australian series Pine Gap. So much so that the streaming giant proceeded with their removal from the platform.

On the other hand, critics say, there would be an ongoing process of self-censorship and condescension toward China by the cultural industry giants. Between multimillion-dollar investments in U.S. production companies coming in from the PRC and the obvious preponderance of the Chinese market - the second largest in the world - here even Hollywood would be prone to the subtleties of Chinese soft power.

In 2016, a bipartisan group of sixteen members of Congress had taken it upon themselves to expose Chinese business around the U.S. entertainment industry, gaining the consensus of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). In ASEAN countries, at least those most aggressive against Chinese incursions into claimed areas, the process is less complicated: the government takes care of it directly.

Not just cinema

The rhetorical battle is not limited to the cinematic sphere. Initially denounced on social media, the controversial graphics on the website of the organizers of the Vietnamese leg of the k-pop group Blackpink generated the same boycott threats. The company, iMe Entertainment Group Asia, soon responded to the Culture Ministry's demands by promising to remove the tour map. It explained in a statement, "The map does not specifically represent the territory of any country, we are aware of and respect the sovereignty and culture of each country."

Hanoi also did not relent when it came to validating entry visas into the country on new Chinese passports. In 2012, these passports clearly showed the map that since 1949 would justify the historical belonging of the South China Sea territories to China. And Vietnam then asked to issue separate documents instead of stamping the dedicated pages.

In countries such as Vietnam, culture is one of the outlets granted by the Party. This was the case with the wave of demonstrations in 2011 and 2014 that brought masses of angry citizens to the streets of major Vietnamese cities, all in protest of Chinese manoeuvres in the claimed areas of Hoàng Sa (Paracelsus Islands) and Trường Sa (Spratly Islands). 

Bringing down the language of nationalism to the culture industry could allow this too. What better than a global cinematic success to ignite the flame of public participation where few-if any-are the venues for dissent? A process that occurs, by contrast, in China, where geographic definitions on a T-shirt can trigger a brand ban.

Philosopher Alfred Korzybski argued that "the map is not the territory," but an ideological construct. For Asian countries bordering the South China Sea, the map is something more: an always necessary history, and never a "doodle."

The depths of diplomacy

Among the most coveted projects is the Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 6, or SeaMeWe-6, which connects France to Singapore, touching a dozen other countries. A project at the center of competition between the United States and China, it will place Singapore even more at the heart of world diplomacy

By Chiara Suprani

Among the means that countries take to direct their "economic diplomacy," there is one less popular than semiconductors, but just as central: it lies underwater, connecting continents with "only" the power of a cable. These are undersea telecommunications cable networks, which have become critical infrastructure over the years for digital economy, international data traffic but also for logistics. Italy, too, is planning its own submarine cable: it is called Unitirreno, and it connects Genoa to Mazara Del Vallo, providing access to a "carrier-neutral" data center that does not belong to any telecommunications company. Submarine cables make connections faster, dilute data traffic, enable better telecommunications and digital phases of countless economic sectors. And a cable is as much a part of the network as it is a node.

Among those nodes is Singapore, which has 25 operational submarine cables under its belt, making it the largest underwater Ethernet hub in the region. And in addition to the already planned 14 future projects, the city-state will double the number of cable attachment points in the coming years through billions of dollars of investments.

Companies such as Meta, Google along with countries such as the Quads, which are Australia, Japan, India and the United States have set their eyes on Singapore. The companies are investing in projects called Echo and Bifrost, both of which will be finished next year and Echo will connect Singapore to the United States for the first time, directly; the Quads have signed a new agreement to increase undersea Ethernet cables in the Indo-Pacific.

And as critical infrastructure, their fragility has not gone unnoticed either. Submarine ethernet cables have often been the subjects and victims of diplomatic disputes between countries: for Wired, the global network of undersea cables makes up most of the skeleton of the internet nowadays, irreplaceable even by Elon Musk's famous Starlink project. As the number of undersea cables has increased, hubs became at the same time "choke points" or breaking points, as in the case of Egypt from which 17 percent of all the world's internet traffic passes. Similar could be the fate of Singapore, which will have to ensure uninterrupted data traffic and be a reliable resource. The city-state will have to develop a disaster mitigation response plan, disaster such as those that affected the Solomon Islands in 2018, the Federated States of Micronesia in 2021 and the Matsu Islands in February this year. Among the most coveted projects is the Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 6, or SeaMeWe-6, which connects France to Singapore, touching a dozen other countries. A project at the center of competition between the United States and China, it will place Singapore even more at the heart of world diplomacy.

ASEAN will lead the next decade of global trade

Southeast Asia is set to become a major growth center in the coming years. This is supported by a new report from Standard Chartered Bank

"Global trade is increasingly shifting toward Asia as high-growth corridors emerge within the region and to new markets in Africa and the Middle East. The bloc of Southeast Asian countries that are part of ASEAN is obviously at the top of the list, with trade among the bloc's member states set to accelerate to nearly 9 percent annually over the next decade." Michael Spiegel, global head of Transaction Banking at Standard Chartered Bank, strongly argues this in a commentary published in the Business Times. "While these trends signal great opportunities, businesses are also facing a polycrisis, or a set of interdependent challenges, from rising geopolitical tensions, inflation and energy prices to the increasingly urgent need to address climate risks," Spiegel writes. According to the Standard Chartered Bank expert, "to succeed, companies must act now, connecting to new markets to diversify both sourcing and production to achieve more resilient supply chains. Sustainability is increasingly an imperative for both investors and consumers, making environmental, social and governance (ESG) compliance more urgent than ever, not only for corporations but also for their suppliers." Spiegel argues that "companies must balance growth objectives with resilient and sustainable supply chains. They need to identify and connect to growth opportunities, then execute a sustainable and resilient growth plan." The Standard Chartered Bank expert concludes by asking a precise question to which he proposes an equally precise answer: "So where will the growth hubs of the future be? We believe they will be in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, which are set to propel global exports from $21 trillion to $32.6 trillion by 2030, according to our new Standard Chartered Bank Future of Trade report."

The water problem

The effects of rising temperatures on the Himalayas in a new report: the continent's main water supply risks running dry in 2100. With consequences for an area where the Yangtze and Yellow River, Indus, Ganges and Mekong are born

Asia will lose its main water reserve by 2100. This is the alarm raised by researchers at the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Kathmandu, who in their latest report predict a reduction in the Himalayan glaciers up to 80% of the current volume. The estimate is based on forecasts of a 4C rise in global temperatures, well beyond the limits promised by the Paris climate accord but close to actual projections unless significant action is taken.

The Hindu Kush area, object of the research, hosts what is today the largest ice reserve in the world after the two Poles. Here there are 15 thousand glaciers for a total of 100 thousand square kilometers of surface, from where the Yangtze and the Yellow River begin their journey, as well as the Indus, the Ganges and the Mekong. An area so vast as to directly affect the 240 million people who live on the plateau and another 1.65 billion along the river basins. 

According to ICIMOD forecasts, the melting of the glaciers will cause a peak in the water supply to the valley by the middle of the century, and then slowly begin to decline. From that moment on, the availability of water will begin to decrease and there will no longer be sufficient reserves upstream for the maintenance of local ecosystems.

From the dependence of energy systems on hydroelectricity to the instability of water resources for agriculture, the melting of glaciers will have and already has an epochal impact on the continent. This is in a region where 80% of rainfall is concentrated in the four months of the monsoon season, today increasingly intense, short and hot. In 2021, the president of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Mami Mizutori called drought "the next pandemic". Too bad, he added, that there is no vaccine for drought. 

Water scarcity comes into play in an area where investment in hydroelectricity has exploded over the past two decades. One hundred dams are now operational in the sixteen countries reached by the waters coming from the plateau, while another 650 dams are expected to be built in the next few years. Enthusiasm for the opportunities stemming from this seemingly sustainable source was soon dampened by record heat waves year after year. A prolonged peak in temperatures which, as has been happening in Vietnam for over five weeks, has led to the gradual closure of some of the country's main hydroelectric plants.

But the attractiveness of water resources to support the rampant energy demand of new industrial centers has generated very different narratives in the community of international investors. From the Irrawaddy for Myanmar to the Mekong for Laos, there are many companies and institutions that would like to take the opportunity to transform these countries into the "batteries of Asia". The water potential of Asia's major rivers is often referred to as a "missed opportunity" or "largely underexploited".

A gradual conversion of global supply chains in South Asia and Southeast Asia is contributing to this due to rising Chinese labor costs and international tensions. No less important are the tax breaks adopted by governments to attract foreign investors, as well as the numerous trade agreements. All measures that are expanding access to Asian markets and, by facilitating regional exchanges, make it possible to relocate an entire production chain on the basis of the fiscal or economic benefits of the various countries.

The contraction of the polar ice cap is to energy exploration in the northern seas what the melting of glaciers is to Beijing's infrastructure and mining ambitions. In fact, it is the People's Republic, in particular, that is betting on the growing accessibility of the Himalayan plateau. Recently some researchers have identified a vein of rare earths that could extend for a thousand kilometers along the southern border of Tibet, a factor that could both strengthen China's dominant position on one of the most strategic markets of our time, as well as re-emerge tensions with neighboring India.

In fact, a greater presence of human activities on the Himalayan plateau is already bringing to light the territorial claims of the various governments of the region. This is the case of the Tibetan county of Lhunze, one of the largest rare earth basins located in an area still contested by India and where infrastructure investments more than doubled between 2016 and 2019. The escalation of a conflict linked both to new mineral resources may soon be just the preview of a more bitter battle for water resources. Barring the Indus Waters Treaty signed by India and Pakistan, there is no regional mechanism dedicated to the redistribution and rights to use the waters of rivers flowing through multiple Asian states. 

The massive presence of Chinese dams upstream of the Mekong is just one example of how marginal the water emergency is still considered which, sooner or later, will no longer be just a problem for a few farmers. Its marginality, the report concludes, is also due to the lack of knowledge on ecosystems beyond data: the human dimension, underlines the document, is essential for understanding what consequences and what solutions are being put in place. Local populations are adapting, but they are doing so through autonomous and small-scale forms of support and redefinition. But the climate crisis is transboundary, and its effects on the already complex relationships between the actors of the region are - still - to be seen.

Southeast Asian textiles soar

Statistics from Trading Economics show that in 2021 Cambodia was ASEAN's second-largest exporter in the sector with $5.82 billion, behind only Vietnam's $1

By Tommaso Magrini

The ASEAN region is emerging as one of the world's major textile hubs, a sector traditionally dominated by mainland China and other players. According to ASEAN Federation of Textile Industries (AFTEX) president Albert Tan, who is also vice-president of the Cambodian member of the AFTEX Textile, Apparel, Footwear and Travel Goods Association in Cambodia (TAFTAC), he pointed out that over the past decade, the overall gap between production costs, which mainly include raw materials, labour, logistics and compliance, and FOB (free-on-board) and retail prices has narrowed. This trend is expected to continue over the next decade. Participants at a dedicated forum on the subject drew up a list of projects and work plans for the coming months under Cambodia's presidency, in an attempt to consolidate the role of AFTEX and stimulate the growth of the regional textile and garment industries. Cambodia earned $1.395 billion from the export of 'garment, knitted or crocheted articles' in the first four months of 2023, down 28.49 per cent year-on-year and 40.80 per cent on a six-month basis (compared to July-October 2022), according to provisional Customs data. This category of items accounted for 19.28% of the $7.234 billion value of the Kingdom's total merchandise exports in the four-month period, compared to 25.64% and $7.606 billion in the January-April 2022 period, as well as 31.97% and $7.368 billion in the July-October 2022 period. Statistics from Trading Economics show that Cambodia was ASEAN's second largest exporter in the sector in 2021 with US$5.82 billion, behind only Vietnam's US$15.73 billion and ahead of Indonesia's US$4.35 billion, which ranked third. Mainland China, on the other hand, exported $86.46 billion in the same year.

President Pipan attended 'No time left' conference

On Wednesday 21 June 2023, Ambassador Michelangelo Pipan, President of the Italy ASEAN Association, took part in the works of the conference "NO TIME LEFT. Against the consolidation of dictatorship in Burma/Myanmar" organised by the Association ITALIA BIRMANIA together with CeSPI and BASE Italia. Ambassador Pipan, speaking together with distinguished international guests, emphasised the importance of international cooperation in resolving the Burmese crisis and achieving peace.

"ASEAN in 2045”

What to expect from the future outlook of the organization of Southeast-Asian Nations

The future configuration of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was discussed during the group's last two summits, held in Belitung and Labuan Bajo. In fact, the community's vision for the coming years will not be limited to 2035, but will be extended by ten years, to 2045. But what exactly is this all about?

A task force will work on developing and finalizing the details of this vision over the next three years, but what is certain, the leaders announced, is that the strategy will be composed of a balance of pragmatism and ambition. The primary goal is to achieve stability and progress for ASEAN while remaining true to its identity. In addition, both place greater emphasis on the welfare of the people of member countries, emphasizing the strengthening of ASEAN organs and the Jakarta-based secretariat, ensuring fundamental freedoms and human rights, and improving the lives of all ASEAN citizens. Efforts to improve capacity to address existing and emerging challenges while maintaining ASEAN's centrality, among other objectives, are also emphasized. This will also be achieved through active citizen participation, and "bottom-up" consultation processes will be encouraged (especially desired by Indonesia and the Philippines), involving civil society organizations in decision-making.

It was also planned to strengthen the Association's organs and secretariat based in Jakarta. In terms of member countries, on the other hand, enlargement is planned: by 2045, it is expected that ASEAN could potentially include East Timor and Papua New Guinea. The former, since becoming independent in 2002, despite being widely considered a Southeast Asian state and geographically being part of it when it was incorporated by Indonesia, is not yet a full member. Confirming this, the ASEAN states last November voted in favor of East Timor`s "in principle" membership in the Association. As for Papua New Guinea, the island has been an observer in the regional bloc since 1976, before any other non-originating ASEAN member. Its leaders have been pushing for full membership since at least the 1980s, and it is working hard to prepare for integration.

And, why not, if the broader political dynamics warranted it, members from the Indo-Pacific region could also join ASEAN. This, if it happened, would require a substantial increase in the budget. Currently each member contributes the same amount to the latter, unlike the EU model where each state contributes based on GDP. In fact, ASEAN members are determined to maintain the current system of equal contributions and equal voting rights.

The key organs and structures of ASEAN are expected to remain unchanged in the coming decades, preserving the time-honored principles enshrined in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. These principles include consensus-seeking, non-interference in internal affairs, and rejection of the use of force. 

It will be interesting to observe how the Association will manage the challenges and opportunities of the years to come. Certainly, demographic and geopolitical dynamics will change the landscape in which these countries fit, but the organization seems determined to maintain stability and regional centrality while engaging in dialogue and cooperation with major world powers.

ASEAN wants dialogue

We publish here an excerpt from a speech by Ng Eng Hen, Singapore's Minister of Defense, at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2023

Rising military spending, shifting military and trade alliances, and de facto nativist economic policies are strong winds of change. How do we weather the storms to come? For Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region, the US-China relationship is central to stability. That is the core, but the penumbra of relationships of other countries outside this core is also important for stability. No country, I think, wants war, but our working assumptions and scenarios must be that unplanned incidents can occur. Channels of communication, both formal and informal, must exist so that when these unplanned incidents occur, those channels can be used to deescalate and avoid conflict. Despite the Cold War, the strategic arms limitation and anti-ballistic missile treaties were signed between Brezhnev and Nixon in 1972. The salient point is that such channels of communications must be built over time. It will be too late to start or activate them only in moments of crisis. Seasoned diplomats compare unfavourably the lines of communication between the US and Soviet Union in the Cold War with what exists today between the US and China, now at its ebb. It is not our place and certainly not my intention to comment on the diplomatic efforts of other countries, but I state these observations on declining touch points between the American and Chinese military establishments knowing full well that Singapore and other ASEAN states are not disinterested bystanders. Both the US and China have said that they do not want ASEAN countries to take sides, but ASEAN member states, with a vivid recollection of great power rivalry in our past and the devastating consequences, are acutely concerned that worsening relationships between these two powers, US and China, will inevitably force difficult choices upon our individual states. For ASEAN, both through bilateral ties and individual member states, and collectively with the US and China through the ADMM-Plus, we have sought inclusivity and engagement as key platforms for pre-emption and confidence building. Within the ADMM framework, we continue to pursue multilateral exercises that involve all our eight-plus partners. These interactions strengthen practical cooperation like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) to reduce the risk of accidents and miscalculations. At the heart of our engagements, as fully exemplified in the Shangri-La Dialogue, is the desire to seek peace even as we security chiefs strengthen our militaries to protect our individual nations. At times, the progress seems painfully slow, but we owe it to our citizens and the next generation to persist and forge breakthroughs.

Read the full speech here

Southest Asia's new "space race"

Tourism, communications and defense are the new frontiers of space technology

Article by Tommaso Magrini

Space tourism and satellite technology are the future of Southeast Asia. Indeed, Thailand and Vietnam have embarked on a new "space race" that will propel the region to the center of the industry's development dynamics. 

Thailand's Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency is preparing to put an industrial satellite, developed with support from the United Kingdom, into orbit in August. Within the next five years, moreover, the Southeast Asian country is intent on launching two or three more entirely home-made satellites.

These projects are as ambitious as they are important for Thailand's technological development, since the use of domestically developed satellites would give the country greater freedom in collecting and managing scientific data, which in Bangkok's case would be used to channel the agricultural sector toward a more technological and functional approach.

In addition, the country is considering building its own launch site. If budget and technological development allow, the facility could be built in less than a decade. Meanwhile, the government's prediction is that the space economy is set to grow by about $9 billion by 2030, becoming one of the country's top industries.

Thailand is also considering the use of space technology for defense purposes. It is also considering banning production sites for foreign military satellites and related equipment in the country.

But Thailand is not the only Southeast Asian nation with space ambitions. Hanoi is also moving in the same direction, having approved a plan to build a tourist spaceport by 2026. A 30 trillion dong project, according to local media, roughly $1.3 billion. The facility will be built on the island of Phu Quoc, already a popular tourist destination, and the first launch is scheduled for 2030.

Thailand and Vietnam are thus competing with the two space giants-China and the United States. But they are by no means starting at a disadvantage. In fact, the Southeast Asian countries have a not inconsiderable geographical advantage: their location near the equator allows them to use less energy for a single launch, consequently lowering costs.

The Philippines, too, did not miss the golden opportunity and signed an agreement with SpaceX, Elon Musk's company, to provide Starlink internet services. The company, in fact, hopes to improve communications and data transit in the mountainous and more remote areas of the archipelago, especially to facilitate rescue operations when needed. The increase in extreme weather conditions has indeed increased interest in the satellite business, Southeast Asia being one of the areas most affected by climate change, with floods and prolonged periods of drought occurring on a large scale. In this sense, satellite monitoring systems could help mitigate the consequences of such phenomena.

Shangri-La Dialogue, ASEAN calls for peace

During the Asia-Pacific Security Summit in Singapore, the centrality of ASEAN, whose countries are calling for more dialogue at the international level, was reaffirmed

Editorial by Lorenzo Lamperti

"South-East Asia has paid more than others for the devastating consequences of the clash between great powers. We do not want this to happen again'. Ng Eng Hen, Singapore's Minister of Defence, made this clear in his speech during the last plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific's top security summit held in the city-state from 2 to 4 June. Singapore and the ASEAN region in general once again confirmed itself as a crucial crossroads of global diplomacy. At a complicated time, to say the least, between the war in Ukraine and tensions between the US and China, the South-East is making its voice heard, asking world leaders for wisdom. "Military spending is also increasing exponentially in the Asia-Pacific," says the Singaporean minister. "It is not a source of instability per se, but in the absence of proper dialogue between the powers then it risks leading to a rearmament race that can destabilise the entire region." During the meetings, which were also attended by the US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, and the Chinese Defence Minister, Li Shangfu, the 'centrality of ASEAN' and the goodness of the ASEAN way was mentioned several times. And all the representatives of the South-East Asian countries emphasised their willingness to maintain relations with both Washington and Beijing, promoting multilateralism based on trade and international rules. But also and above all on dialogue. "Both Austin and Li assured that the US and China are not asking ASEAN countries to choose sides, but we also hope that these two countries can talk to each other again," said Ng Eng Hen. "Both have been in the Asia-Pacific for a long time and both will not leave. We have to find or rediscover a way to ensure stability and security for the region'. The same concept was also expressed by the IISS, the international institute that has been organising the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore for the past 20 years, where the intelligence chiefs of several countries, including the United States and China, also met behind closed doors. Proof, once again, of how Singapore and the South-East provide an exceptional platform for confrontation. If the future of the world will be written (also or especially) in this region, perhaps it would be worth listening to it.

Quem portum petat: geography and economics of ASEAN ports

The sea is the natural space for globalisation. The majority of goods moves by cargo ships. Efficiency in handling containers, combined with strategic location and economic-political relations, makes the ports of East Asia the busiest in the world. Among the 50 most active ports worldwide, nine are in ASEAN and 18 in China.

For those who do not know which port to steer into, no wind is good. Although this aphorism of Seneca comes from a ‘moral epistle’, we could return the metaphor to its original context – navigation – and draw a new lesson from it. Today, global maritime trade responds to partly different rationales than in the days of the Roman Mare Nostrum. While environmental conditions (wind, currents, distance of the sea voyage) affect colossal container ships less, the choice of ports remains essential for those who must design trade routes. And the sea is still the main trade route for goods: according to EU data, more than 50 percent of its external trade moved by ship in 2021. Another interesting fact is that, in the ranking of the world's top 50 ports, 18 are Chinese (the first is Shanghai and six other Chinese ports occupy the top ten), nine are in ASEAN countries (the second worldwide is Singapore) and seven are European.

It is no surprise that Asian ports are so numerous in the ranking. The title of 'factory of the world' can now be awarded not only to China, but to much of the continent as well. The dragon is joined by a growing group of tigers. According to the UNCTAD, in 2021 Asian ports discharged and loaded 64% and 42%, respectively, of all world goods per ton. It is interesting to note that in Asia, as well as in Europe (including Russia), more goods are discharged (thus imported) than loaded (exported). This figure should be accompanied by another recent trend in shipping. In 2015, developing countries in Asia were exporting more tons of goods than they were importing, while the opposite case was in developed countries. Data from 2021 show that this ratio has reversed. According to the UNCTAD again, this change can be explained in light of the fact that merchant ships are increasingly carrying dry cargo in containers instead of tanker cargo (goods 'in tanks', such as refined petroleum products, chemicals, and gas). Whereas, in the 1970s, more than half of sea trade was made of tanker cargo – thus, largely by raw materials and low-processing products –, today, three-quarters is made of dry cargo, a much broader category that includes, inter alia: minerals, components, advanced machinery, consumer products...

Asian and European economies, therefore, seem hungry for products for their own domestic consumption and, more importantly, to turn them into other, more advanced goods to export. In the ASEAN, Singapore stands out as a major world port, following a destiny already charted during the British colonial rule. In 1819, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles purchased the island from the Sultan of Johore to establish a settlement and compete, from a strategic position, with the nearby port of Malacca, under Dutch control, for the Straits trade. Shortly after the purchase, Raffles wrote: The Port of Singapore is a free port, and the trade thereof is open to ships and vessels of every nation, equally and alike to all. Raffles is remembered positively in the Lion City and is considered the founder of modern Singapore rather than an agent of colonial domination. In addition to determining the commercial vocation of the future city-state, he is credited with the first urban and infrastructure plan to open the island to international trade. The intuition of Raffles and the British, in whose wake Lee Kuan Yew, the first leader of independent Singapore, also moved, and the island's strategic location represent the roots of the port's success. However, it is more recent industrial policy choices that have consolidated its fortunes: the port infrastructure continues to be enlarged and modernised. Over the next two decades, work on the expansion of the Tuas 'mega port' will continue, following a four-phase project. The first phase alone, completed in 2021, cost $1.76 billion. The port can also rely on good governance, based on public-private partnerships, and Singapore's wide network of free trade agreements, including one with the EU.

Next on the list of the world's top 50 ports are Malaysia's Port Klang (12th place) and Tanjung Pelepas (19th), both on the Straits of Malacca. They are followed by the Thai port of Laem Chabang (20th) and Jakarta's Tanjung Priok (23rd). In Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh region is served by the city's port on the estuary of the Mekong (26th) and the port of Cai Mep (50th), while the industrial district of Hanoi relies on the port of Hai Phong (33rd). Finally, the Philippine capital Manila ranks 31st. The main reason for the success of ports in the ASEAN and the rest of East Asia lies in the efficiency with which port infrastructure is able to load and discharge containers from ships and transfer them to another vessel or mean of transport, as revealed by the Global Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) curated by the World Bank. Logistical efficiency can make a port a major hub of trade even if its 'inland' economy plays a relatively small role in the global economy or manufacture (as for Singapore). Moreover, companies might move their goods through another country's port, if its national ports, even when geographically close, are not as punctual and reliable time-wise. In conclusion, it almost seems that ‘knowing which port to steer to’ is more important than having ‘good wind in your sails’, that is, reaching the nearest port. In light of this consideration, we can also read the data on EU ports. In the world ranking, the three ports of Rotterdam (10th place), Antwerp (14th) and Hamburg (18th), all three on the North Sea and located on a river, stand out. These three cities represent the main trade route between the European ‘blue banana’ and the rest of the world. In addition to efficiency, a factor that increasingly influences companies' choice of ports is sustainability: reducing emissions from transportation is a necessary step in achieving the carbon neutrality of the supply chain. Antwerp, for example, is a ‘sustainable port’ recognised at the international level. And in the Mediterranean? Interesting cases appear in the ranking, e.g. Athens’ Piraeus (28th place) and the Spanish cities of Valencia (30th) and Algeciras (34th). Piraeus owes its importance to trade with Asia and is at the centre of a delicate political issue since, in China's plans, it should become the end point in Europe for its Belt and Road Initiative. Algeciras, on the other hand, in addition to its strategic location on the Strait of Gibraltar, can boast of being the top European port in terms of efficiency, according to the aforementioned World Bank CPPI ranking. Italy and France ports are absent from the top 50. Although the Mediterranean is still at the centre of global maritime traffic, Italian ports should modernise their infrastructure and strengthen their logistics in order to compete with other global ports.

Italy at the 2nd EU-Indo-Pacific Forum

By Maria Tripodi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

On 13 May, together with European Foreign Ministers and partners from Asia and the Pacific, I attended - by delegation of VP/Minister Tajani - the 2nd EU-Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum, organised in Stockholm by the Swedish EU Presidency and the EEAS. The initiative was initiated by the French EU Presidency, with the event on 22 February 2022, in Paris. In my speech, I emphasised Italy's concrete commitment to follow up on the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy. I highlighted our growing projection in the area, whose geopolitical, economic and demographic relevance places it at the centre of the complex global challenges underway, aggravated by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. These include threats to security and the rules-based international order, energy security, the food crisis, the (often devastating) consequences of climate change and sustainable development. It is precisely on climate that I wanted to focus, speaking at the panel discussion 'Pursuing green opportunities and overcoming global challenges'. The Indo-Pacific is home to some of the states most exposed to climate change and also most in need of energy, given their high economic and population growth rates. Italy, which is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 and to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, is supporting these countries with numerous initiatives, including the support to Vietnam and Indonesia in the framework of the G7 initiative 'Just Energy Transition Partnership'; the organisation of training courses on civil protection and sustainable development in favour of ASEAN countries and the 'Pacific Islands Forum' of which Italy is respectively Development and Dialogue Partner; the participation, through Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, in the 'ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility' and in the 'Team Europe' initiatives in favour of ASEAN. With these and other measures being devised, we intend to ensure that no country is left behind and that the area's emerging economies are equipped with the necessary tools to pursue inclusive and sustainable growth, an essential condition for the maintenance of peace and stability in a region that is increasingly crucial for world equilibrium.